


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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Political Affairs

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Armenia's Voskanyan on Changing Role of Republic Supreme Soviet, Local Soviets

90US0674A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
15 Feb 90 p 1-2

[Abridged speech by Chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet G.M. Voskanyan at a session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Respected comrade deputies! The April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee marked the beginning of a new period in the life of our entire nation with the Soviet people setting out on the path of revolutionary renewal. The basic provisions of perestroika, glasnost and new political thinking as proclaimed by the party have stimulated unprecedented processes. A start has been made to the universal politization of society and this inevitably should lead to a clash of different opinions and different approaches to the same problems.

These phenomena which are characteristic for virtually all the regions of the Union conform fully to the realities of our republic, where a starkly expressed national trend is added to them.

All of this further complicates the taking of political, state and economic decisions.

It is an imperative of the times that under the conditions of the revolutionary changes occurring in recent years in our nation, the democracy and national awakening, the public would show the closest attention to the activities of the Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet.

The activities of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet have been carried out in such a difficult and complicated situation, often under conditions of opposition and in the recent period also acute interethnic clashes.

The Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet over the report period has carried out its activities in accord with the Armenian Constitution. In consistently carrying out a course of restructuring its work, the Presidium has reviewed and resolved fundamental tasks in the republic's life. This has been reflected in the Armenian laws adopted at the sessions of the Supreme Soviet as well as in the decrees and ukases submitted at the 65 Presidium sessions.

At the center of attention of the republic Supreme Soviet and its Presidium have been the questions of an all-round improvement in the activities of the local soviets, an increased role for them in all areas of state, socioeconomic and cultural construction, the improving of management, the carrying out of a correct social policy and improving work quality. Particular attention is to be given to a practical solution of questions related to broadening the powers of the soviets and increasing their responsibility in all spheres of life on their territory.

Within the perusal of the Presidium have constantly been the questions of carrying out the planned quotas of the 12th Five-Year Plan. The attention of the Council of

Ministers has particularly been directed at increasing the coordinating role of the soviets on territories under the various departments by carrying out joint measures with the associations, enterprises and organizations in the process of solving economic and social problems; sharply improving the production of consumer goods and raising their quality; the greatest possible expansion of services provided to the public; carrying out the demands of the voters. Here in the preliminary discussion of the draft plan and budget, definite work has been done by the permanent budget planning commission of the Supreme Soviet.

Each year the Council of Ministers has also reported to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the fulfillment of the instructions given by the voters to the USSR people's deputies and to the Armenian deputies. Of the 718 instructions the local state bodies have carried out 300. Among these one should mention the construction, reconstruction and upgrading of roads in Talinskiy and Vardenisskiy Rayons, organizing industrial enterprise affiliates in the villages of Aygedzor in Shamshadinskiy Rayon, Dzhararat, Kamo and Akhurik in Akhuryanskiy Rayon, central gas supply for a number of regions, better water supply for the city of Abovyan and so forth.

In the aims of strengthening the improving the leadership of the soviets and providing them with practical aid, the Presidium has systematically heard reports from the executive committees of the rayon and city soviets on the various questions of their activities.

Due to the measures taken in recent years, there has been a noticeable rise in the activeness and initiative shown by the soviets and their bodies, the effectiveness of the local soviet sessions has increased and the public is more widely informed on the decisions being taken and the course of their execution.

Things have been aided greatly by control and verification of the fulfillment of the decisions taken as an important means for educating the cadres and for strengthening discipline and organization.

However, we should point out that the restructuring of organizational work by the local soviets in the republic is still going on slowly and does not meet modern demands. The sessions do not always create conditions for constructive analysis of the state of affairs or for an objective and principled assessment of the work done by subordinate bodies and officials.

Of particular importance is the work being done by the permanent deputy commissions of the Supreme Soviet the activities of which are coordinated by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The 18 permanent commissions which involve 85 percent of the total number of deputies, with the active aid of around 1,000 specialists and over 200 activists, during the report period examined 179 questions. The commissions brought up for review by the Presidium and Supreme Soviet sessions questions concerning the economy, ecology, the carrying out of legislative enactments and many others. Significant work

was done also by the recently created Supreme Soviet commissions for refugee affairs, and for coordinating and monitoring the work of the all-round development of economic, sociocultural and spiritual ties with the NKAO [Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast].

Unfortunately, certain of our commissions and their chairmen have not shown enough initiative and consistency in carrying out the adopted decisions. The attitude still prevails that "above" will order, decide and suggest. Life today poses different demands. A particular feature of the work done by the commissions is precisely that they themselves, proceeding from the interests of the matter, should show initiative, stipulate terms and organize.

Along with certain positive shifts in the activities of the republic soviets, it must be pointed out that perestroika in the state bodies still has not assumed proper scope as was stated at the September (1988) Plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee. The Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet has not yet been able to achieve fundamental changes in the work style and methods of all the republic soviets. The executive committees of many local soviets are not using the rights granted to them and there is not proper collaboration between the soviets and the enterprises and organizations located on their territory.

The organizational work of the soviets has not been aimed as it should at the consistent carrying out of tasks related to socioeconomic development. At the soviet sessions, these questions are at times discussed superficially and the elements of formalism have not been eliminated.

The Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet and the local soviets and their permanent commissions are still not yet completely exercising their functions of control over the observance of the legislation and are not involving the people's deputies and the social organizations in this as they should. As a result, individual articles of certain legislative enactments are often violated or are not carried out fully.

The Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet in the present stage of revolutionary changes in the nation and the establishing of a socialist state under the law considers as one of the primary areas of its activity the introduction of the principles of a state under the law into the practice of soviet construction, the strengthening of socialist legality, law and order, ensuring the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of the citizenry, social justice and law enactment.

The amendments and supplements incorporated in the current legislative enactments during the report period have been dictated by a spirit of the times and have been caused by changes in the life of our society, by the conditions of economic and social development and by the related necessity of choosing different approaches for the most effective regulation of social relations.

The Presidium has adopted 175 ukases of a normative and nonnormative nature as well as 76 decrees. The drafts of 315 enactments have been put up for review by the Armenian Supreme Soviet including an Armenian code on administrative violations, 29 laws and 34 decrees.

Draft legislative enactments have been worked out on the further development of socialist democracy, the socialist self-government of the people, the rights and freedoms of the citizens, improving the economic mechanism and national economic management, scientific-technical progress, transportation, environmental conservation, the rational utilization of natural resources, as well as on other questions.

During the report period, the Supreme Soviet Presidium incorporated numerous amendments and supplements in the current Armenian legislative enactments with 72 ukases being adopted on these.

In the aims of improving housing legislation, in a number of the enforceable enactments, new provisions were reinforced aimed at the legal settlement of questions related to the improving of housing conditions.

In solving the housing problem, great importance has been given to developing the institution of private property. The ukase of 4 March last year was aimed at this and according to this ukase the individual housing area will now include both residences which are the private property of citizens as well as apartments. In this context amendments have been incorporated in the appropriate enactments which also govern other sectors of legislation.

The Ukase of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet of 25 July 1988 proceeds from the principles of socialist democracy and the necessity of protecting the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of the Soviet citizens. This Ukase establishes a procedure for appealing to the court illegal actions by officials who infringe on the rights of the citizens.

The changes in the various areas of social and political life have also necessitated the incorporation of the appropriate amendments and supplements in the civil, criminal and other codes.

In the aims of regulating the situation, the Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a series of ukases of a normative nature and these have made it possible to establish new legal bases for strengthening the fight against crime in these areas.

These and other amendments and supplements in the current legislative enactments mark an important stage on the path of further development and improving the republic legislation. These will occur in parallel with the natural processes of transformations in the political, economic and sociocultural life of the republic.

During the report period, the Presidium has heard and discussed reports and briefs from the chairman of the

republic Supreme Court, the Armenian Procurator as well as the leaders of the justice and internal affairs bodies concerning a further strengthening of socialist legality, law and order, the reenforcing of the fight against crime and infractions of the law, as well as the defense of the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of the citizens. These bodies were given practical recommendations on improving the leadership of the subordinate bodies, increasing in every possible way the demands placed on the personnel, and the strict application of the legislative provisions on eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to the committing of crimes and infractions of the law.

As is known, recently upon a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the Union and republic levels, temporary commissions were organized to combat crime. Such a body has also been set up in our republic. In its sessions the committee has discussed the announcements of the minister of internal affairs and the leaders of other law enforcement bodies in the republic, as well as the measures worked out to prevent crime and to pool the efforts of the social organizations and the law enforcement bodies in the fight against crime.

The soviets should play an exceptionally important role in this matter.

The state of crime in the republic causes legitimate concern. Suffice it to say that last year the crime rate in the republic rose by 33 percent in comparison with the previous year. On matters of criminal search, the increase was 44.5 percent, including major crimes with 48.9 percent.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium over the report period considered as one of its main areas of activity the elaboration of the corresponding measures to emerge from the severe ecological state existing in the republic.

While in December 1985, the Presidium submitted for approval by the Supreme Soviet a new wording for the Law Governing the Conservation of Armenian Nature adopted in 1958. This was aimed at improving the protection of nature and strengthening legality in this area. The passage of the law has helped to improve conservation in the nation as well as activate work in the area of the rational utilization of natural resources.

The Presidium has reviewed the questions of further improving the protection of forests and rationally utilizing the forest resources in Idzhevskiy and Shamshadinskiy Rayons, ensuring supervision over the execution of the requirements of legislation on preventing the release of polluted effluents in cities and bodies of water, harmful atmospheric releases as well as the observance of labor and land legislation and other questions.

In noting the relatively active work being done to protect nature and the environment in recent years, the Presidium has recognized that the legislation in this area is

still not being satisfactorily applied. The questions concerning the placement and development of the productive forces in the cities of Yerevan, Kirovakan, Alaverdi, Abovyan and Razdan for years have been settled without considering the ecological consequences. Many republic enterprises do not properly observe production conditions and they are not expanding the introduction of waste-free and water-saving technologies.

In a corresponding decree, the Presidium instructed the Armenian State Committee for Environmental Conservation, the ministries of public health and internal affairs to steadily utilize the powers granted in strengthening the fight against violations of the requirements of conservation legislation while the republic People's Control Committee and the Procurator's Office are to strengthen supervision and control over the carrying out of the demands of legislation on protecting the environment and the rational utilization of natural resources.

As a result, the corresponding management bodies and enterprises have set aside money for introducing new production methods, for modernizing and putting the existing production capacity in order.

In the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the government and party decrees on a fundamental improvement in the ecological situation by a number of USSR ministries, the local soviets also have their share of blame as well as the bodies exercising state supervision over the conservation of the environment and the rational utilization of natural resources. These bodies have not shown proper exactness for the ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, organizations and citizens on the questions of their fulfillment of conservation legislation.

As is known, the 9th Session of the Supreme Soviet, having reviewed the question of the ecological situation in the republic, adopted an appropriate decree on the closing down and restructuring of several enterprises. Thus, the operation of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant was shut down, while the Razdan Mining-Chemical Combine and the Kanakarskiy Aluminum Plant were converted to new production. In the Nairit Scientific-Production Association, the Rubber-1 production line was shut down. Also closed were the Alaverdi Mining-Metallurgical Combine and a number of harmful production lines at the Kirovakan Chemical Plant. Construction was halted on an experimental-production plant at the Armbiotekhnologiya [Armenian Biotechnology] Scientific-Production Association. The question has been raised of restructuring the designated plants. A ring collector is being built around Lake Sevan with treatment plants and a water conduit. Construction has been completed for a road bypassing the city of Yerevan, and there has been an increase in the number of motor vehicles operating on liquified and concentrated natural gas. As of 31 December, the Nairit NPO was closed down by a decree of the Supreme Soviet adopted on 25 June of last year.

Comprehensive measures have been carried out to create new capacity for water treatment facilities, recycling water supply systems, for protecting and increasing the fertility of soils, for restoring forests and for ensuring supervision over the carrying out of the legislative demands to add to the wealth of the animal and plants worlds. The soviets, particularly now, should consider as one of the important and main areas of their activity the carrying out of ecological measures and the consistent application of conservation legislation.

The mail received by the Supreme Soviet Presidium reflects the sociopolitical, economic and moral-psychological situation in the republic. In their letters and statements the workers approve and support the processes of renewal and the restructuring of sociopolitical life, and demand an implacable struggle against social injustice and various other negative phenomena. The question has been sharply raised of the need to provide effective control over the carrying out of party and state decisions.

Suffice it to point out that over the report period some 27,367 statements were received, 17,940 citizens were given hearings, including 3,976 by the leadership.

The Presidium has periodically reviewed the question of the handling of complaints and statements from the citizens as well as the state and improvement of the work being done in this area. Also discussed were the questions of reviewing critical comments, proposals and letters as well as organizing the receiving of citizens in the labor collectives, individual departments and local soviets.

The Presidium, having discussed these questions, has instructed the soviets to improve the handling of the complaint requests. This is to be brought into accord with the demands of perestroika and democratization and these are to be used as an important source of effective activities by the soviets and a factor for ascertaining public opinion.

From February 1988, the republic and all the Armenian people have been living with the problem and concern of Karabakh. It can be said that the question of Nagorny Karabakh, in being engendered by perestroika, has simultaneously become the touchstone of perestroika in Armenia.

At present, the posing of the problem of Nagorny Karabakh and its political solution are natural and logical. This is directly linked to the policy of perestroika, democratization and glasnost and which has instilled in the people a belief in the triumph of justice and hope that along with the numerous problems confronting the nation, the many, many urgent problems of interethnic relations will also gain their resolution. Precisely this awakened belief has evoked a new unprecedented upsurge of the Artsakh Armenians in raising again the question of self-determination.

This was followed by the murders of Armenians in Sumgait and which were terrifying in their cruelty and vandalism. Actually, this became the grounds for the manifesting of antipathy and then hostility between the two peoples. Has it not been the absence of a political assessment or judgment of the Sumgait pogroms which led to the extreme exacerbation of interethnic relations and to shedding the blood of hundreds of innocent people in Novyy Uzen, Fergana, Abkhazia and, finally, in Baku, having caused a new wave of thousands of refugees who scarcely were able to save their lives?

In February 1988, when hundreds of thousands of people came out onto the streets and squares, the unpreparedness to answer the questions of the people and the inability to respond quickly to the stormy daily events deprived the party, soviet and state bodies in the republic of the opportunity to head the nationwide movement.

It was obvious that the Karabakh problem was a political task, it had been and still is, but at the same time it was clear that a solution to it was not a matter of 1 or 2 days but required, above all, a reasonable position and action, firmness and consistency.

On 15 June 1988, the republic Supreme Soviet, in being guided by Article 70 of the USSR Constitution and in expressing the will of the population of Armenia and the NKAO, approved the decree known to all of you on the agreement to incorporate the NKAO as part of Armenia. The question was shifted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 18 July 1988, for the first time in many decades and on a high level, without stimulations, the pain of the Armenian people was voiced at full strength and the demand was put forward of restoring justice. We feel that this was, nevertheless, a step forward along the path of solving the problem. At the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, representatives from the republic were able to convince the others that the Karabakh problem exists and were able to achieve the adoption of a decree which differed fundamentally from the previously proposed draft. While according to the initial draft the question of the NKAO was considered closed once and for all and the decree of the session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet was considered not conforming to the USSR Constitution, the decree adopted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet added two essential points which instilled hope that this question would not be closed subsequently.

At the November Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet the problem of the NKAO was raised again. And again this was done on the basis of constitutional principles.

The new outburst of the Karabakh problem, in contrast to previous times, from the very first days has been at the center of attention of the republic leadership and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Suffice it to say that over the last 20 months, the Presidium has returned

some two-score times to the NKAO problem, it has adopted decrees and has conducted active work to carry out the decision of the extraordinary session of the Nagornyy Karabakh Oblast Soviet both with the corresponding central bodies as well as those of the neighboring republic.

Over the past period, has it been possible to do everything within our power or have there been other, more effective ways? An analysis of the work done leads to the opinion that we have utilized virtually all opportunities. There have been numerous meetings with the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, personal and group conversations over the most diverse matters, the speeches and reports at conferences and scientific-practical meetings preceding the plenum on interethnic relations. Finally, there have been the important decrees adopted by the Armenian Supreme Soviet. The entire nation and the entire world know of our pain. And this is not our fault but rather the problem is that the solution to the question has been drawn out and as a consequence of this a difficult psychological situation has arisen in Nagornyy Karabakh and in our republic.

The discussion held on 28 January 1989 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was a new stage in the chronicle of the problem. Everyone knows the prehistory of this event as well as its result.

On 1 December of the same year, a joint session of the extraordinary 10th Session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and the National Council of Nagornyy Karabakh proclaimed the unity of Soviet Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh.

You also know of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 January 1990 which on the basis of Point 5 of Article 119 of the USSR Constitution proposes the adopting of measures to bring the republic's enforceable enactments which are a matter of discussion into accord with the USSR Constitution.

Unfortunately, at present the expression of the will of the Armenian population of the NKAO as brought to life by perestroika, that is, the right to self-determination, is viewed as a territorial claim and an encroachment on the territory of the neighboring republic. We have repeatedly repudiated this farfetched notion. The demand of the Armenian population of Nagornyy Karabakh is just and should be given a political solution.

It is also generally known what additional difficulties have been caused in the republic by the mass, violent deportation of our compatriots from Azerbaijan. The situation has been further exacerbated by the arrival in our republic of around 9,000 refugees as a consequence of the January crimes in Baku.

The presence of 235,000 refugees in the republic at present has a real and definite impact on the social and moral-psychological atmosphere.

A number of decrees adopted by the Armenian Supreme Soviet and its Presidium contain practical recommendations for strengthening socialist legality and public order, for safeguarding the legitimate interests of citizens of all nationalities and carrying out actions for the sake of friendship and collaboration. Having in mind the status of the Armenian population in Azerbaijan, the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet in the adopted decrees has repeatedly turned to the USSR government, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and to the Presidium of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet with a demand to take immediate and decisive measures to guarantee the security of the Armenian population and create normal conditions for their lives.

The Armenian Council of Ministers and the local soviets have carried out and are presently carrying out significant work in settling the urgent needs of the refugees such as residence permits, jobs, the exchanging of apartments, compensation for losses incurred, monetary aid and many other questions. The republic has formed and has at work an Armenian State Committee for the Receiving and Placement of Returning Armenians. Due to the measures undertaken some 109,000 refugees have already been housed. Of the 90,000 of working age, 45,000 have been hired. Aid totaling 60 million rubles has been provided to them. The payment under government authorization of a one-shot aid to the refugees in the republic is drawing to a close. More than 30,000 persons are already receiving pensions. The republic is searching for real ways out to solve the housing problem of the refugees. For individual housing construction 800 hectares of land have been set aside and an extraordinary long-term credit of 10 million rubles has been provided for these purposes. Some 8,000 families are now members of a system of cooperative housing construction and this is to get underway in the current year. Each of the new refugees has been provided with aid totaling 100 rubles and clothing valued at 200 rubles. The local soviets in a number of the republic rayons have provided housing with 23,000 places for them.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that a number of executive committees of the rayon and city soviets has shown an irresponsible and apathetic attitude toward their receiving, placement and the solving of social and domestic questions. The republic Gosplan, Gosstroy and Gosagroprom have not shown proper efficiency in selecting the sites, drawing up the plans and working out the design and estimate specifications for cooperative construction.

We would also like for the refugees, in turn, to fully realize in what a severe state the republic is and do everything so that we could overcome all the difficulties by joint efforts and raise our republic from the ruins.

On 7 December 1988, our republic suffered a very severe disaster, the earthquake carried off thousands of lives and Spitak, Leninakan, Kirovakan and scores of villages were destroyed.

All the fraternal Soviet peoples and all mankind stretched out a helping hand to us. There began a hitherto unprecedented unified movement of common human sympathy and charity and we felt that we were not alone in that fatal hour. Aircraft, trains and trucks with the freight of selfless aid arrived from all the republics of our nation and from various corners of the world.

During the report period, the Supreme Soviet Presidium received 50 state, parliamentary and overseas party delegations as well as political, social and religious leaders and their number increased significantly during the period after the earthquake of 7 December. Delegations and leaders of the Armenian diaspora arriving with the aim of providing help to the disaster zone were received by the Presidium leadership while the Presidium deputy chairman directed the receiving of specialists from foreign countries and the organizing of their aid.

The Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet prepared certificates of gratitude in Armenian, Russian and foreign languages as well as commemorative medal and these were presented to the Soviet and foreign organizations and persons who made a contribution to eliminating the consequences of the earthquake.

For courage shown and for unstinting actions, Union decorations were presented to 836 workers of organizations and enterprises of the Union-level ministries located on the republic territory, including 80 with the new order For Personal Courage. At present, we are all consumed with a single desire of setting to work with all the people, easing the cares of the people as quickly as possible and rebuilding our destroyed towns and villages.

The questions of reconstruction and construction work in the earthquake zone have been discussed at sessions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and a Supreme Soviet commission has been formed.

On the very first days after the earthquake, the leadership of the Supreme Soviet Presidium sent on official missions for varying times members of the Presidium and all responsible workers from its personnel into the disaster zone and they on the spot organized the necessary aid. At the Presidium sessions, preferential review was given to the questions of the disaster zone related to creating the necessary social, cultural and domestic conditions for the victims, as well as building housing, general education schools, preschool and medical institutions and other facilities. In the disaster zone such a complicated knot of unresolved questions arose that extraordinary difficulties were created for the local soviets. However, they at present more than ever before should fully utilize their mission of supervision and exclude any type of illegality or manifestation of social injustice.

We must honestly admit that for now we still have not been able to unite and set into operation all the forces

and levers available in the republic. We must also say that extraordinary difficulties on this question are being caused day after day by the strengthening blockade of Armenia and Nagornyy Karabakh by Azerbaijan which has created in our republic a crisis situation in the sphere of energy, raw materials and food. Without exaggeration it can be said that at present the vital activities in the republic are almost paralyzed. All of this continues to subject each of us to a severe moral testing.

Our creative people have preserved their way of life by labor, patience and wisdom. They have always been confident of tomorrow, they have resisted, fought and vanquished. And we will be loyal to the legacy of our ancestors.

One other question related to the earthquake zone. You recall that certain deputies raised the question of amnestying all convicts in the disaster zone without exception. First of all, I would like to point out that the Presidium made an amnesty initiative immediately after the earthquake, even in December.

And here in reviewing the questions of amnestying citizens condemned by the republic courts, the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet has been guided by humane considerations that they, returning home in the shortest possible time, will set to work raising their children, be concerned for parents, become involved in socially useful labor and the rebuilding of their homes, home towns and villages which suffered in the earthquake. Proceeding from this, amnesty petitions received from convicts from the disaster zone have been reviewed first.

The Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet has reviewed 680 amnesty petitions. Some 431 of these are from the disaster zone and 411 have already been reviewed. Some 258 petitions were granted, including 203 from the disaster zone. We are continuing to review petitions on the amnestying of convicts who were victims in the earthquake.

However, no self-respecting state structure can allow the prison doors to open freely for persons condemned for murder, robbery, banditry, rape and other major crimes. This would mean anarchy and be an inhumane act.

The Supreme Soviet and its Presidium in the aim of developing and deepening democratic principles in the activities of all levels of soviets, have improved the forms and methods of their work and primarily the organization of the sessions. The sessions of the Supreme Soviet have truly become an epicenter for the expression of the sociopolitical, socioeconomic and moral-psychological spheres, attitudes, demands and desires of the people as these currently exist in the republic. The professionalism of the sessions has risen, the discussion has become more profound and critical, the activeness of the deputies is rising and the work of the sessions is becoming more democratic in content. Such a constructive form of supervision over the activities of the state bodies and officials as deputy interrogation has become

widely established. The range of questions discussed at the sessions is becoming more diverse.

At present, there is no doubt that the democratization of parliamentary life itself has posed problems the solution to which is still difficult. On a self-critical basis it must be admitted that we have not been ready for such a turn of events. At present, great importance is being assumed by the professional preparedness of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, his deputies and each deputy as well as their competence in the new parliamentary style of work. In order not to sin against the truth, we should point out that a significant portion of the members of the deputy corps is carrying out its high mission as the elect of the people in a worthy manner and with a feeling of duty and responsibility; they are showing principledness and consistency in carrying out complex and very difficult tasks posed for our republic by the people. At the same time, individual deputies have appeared who are pursuing narrow personal interests. A portion of the comrades invited to a session, without having any right to do so, has presented an ultimatum to the Presidium and deputies from the rostrum, it has made threats, participating actively in the "television competition." You will agree that all of this leads one to lamentable reflections and arrives at similar results.

In feeling profound concern and undertaking all possible measures to carry out the very complicated tasks related to eliminating the consequences of the earthquake, Nagornyy Karabakh and the refugees, we cannot help but be concerned by other aspects in the sociopolitical and moral-psychological situation in the republic. This is a matter of the activities, in particular, of certain social and informal organizations.

All of you know that the state authorities and the party bodies with difficulty and, possibly, with some delay, but ultimately, in expressing the will of our people, initiated by constitutional means definite steps to realize the just demands of the people. However, instead of honestly setting to the strengthening and development of what had been achieved, eliminating the very severe consequences of the earthquake, providing a just resolution to the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, settling in hundreds of thousands of refugees, working for all-round democratization of the republic, collaboration and fighting on a single front, certain informal organizations have continued their attempts to provoke confrontation.

From this rostrum there have been repeated appeals for unity, solidarity, mutual understanding, an alternative and dialogue, but what question can there be of this is those who support a different opinion not only do not want to listen but also are ready to paste various labels on it? We still do not realize that instead of putting one another between the hammer and the anvil, we must strike the anvil together and act in concert. Our actions at present urgently demand this, particularly when the situation in the region has gone beyond the danger limit as was mentioned with concern and alarm at the recent Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

It is essential to channel the spiritual and physical forces of the people into creative labor. We have lived enough by our emotions and grief. Work and a cause are the best cure and balanced, reasonable steps are the key to all success.

Under the conditions of perestroika in all spheres of our life and the deepening of democracy, there is a prime need to improve the work of the Supreme Soviet and its Plenum, to concentrate the efforts of the authorities on the crucial areas of economic and social development for the nation and the republic. The Supreme Soviet and its Presidium should further strengthen and improve control over the implementing of such major programs as energy and food, the production of consumer goods, the service sphere, the protection of nature and the environment and the task of fully satisfying the needs of the workers. It is essential to carry out consistent work to improve and develop the republic legislative enactments relating to the various areas of state, economic and sociocultural construction. On this level democratization is already underway in working out the draft legislative enactments with the broad involvement in this matter of the workers and representatives of the various strata of the public as well as the use of effective forms of democratic discussion.

Self-critically we should point out that the Supreme Soviet Presidium has not initiated consistent activities to strengthen the fight against phenomena which prevent a complete freeing of the real opportunities of the soviets as one of the crucial elements of perestroika and democratization in all aspects of social development. As a consequence of this, a situation has arisen where the local authorities often do not investigate the questions of satisfying the urgent needs and requests of the workers. The Presidium has not undertaken the necessary measures to study and generalize the work experience of the local soviets or to disseminate and introduce positive experience. There have been oversights also in organizing real control over the exercising of their powers by the deputies of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the carrying out of voter demands or the review and implementation of the proposals and comments by the deputies.

Let us also point out that the deputies have not shown proper activeness in taking part in preparing questions under review in the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium and, in particular, the organization and supervision of the execution of adopted decrees. There are numerous shortcomings in leadership of the work being done by the deputy groups, and proper attention is not being paid to strengthening the ties of the deputies with the voters and labor collectives.

A professional and concerned discussion of the report of the Presidium at the session of the Supreme Soviet as well as the proposals and comments aimed at a complete improvement in its work will contribute to a bettering of its activities, to the socioeconomic development of the republic and to implementing the party's course of the further democratization of all aspects of our life.

Azeri Official on Party Budget, Apparatus Salaries

90US0800A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian
30 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Oktay Shakhbazov, business manager of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, by E. Gadirov (KOMMUNIST, 29 March 1990): "The Party Budget: How Is It Formed and What Is It Expended For?"]

[Text] Until recently, the party budget and how it is expended was considered to be an internal matter for the party apparatus. The lack of glasnost in this sphere gave rise to various interpretations and conjectures, at times evoking negative emotions. There were stubborn rumors to the effect that the party budget was unlimited and that the party is living not only at the expense of its own funds.

What reason would there be to keep secret from Communists how and for what purposes the budget is being used—a budget that is formed basically from party membership dues? On the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress there has been a considerable increase in the interest toward the party's economic and financial activities. The authors of letters arriving at the editorial office want to obtain information on many questions—from the salaries paid to party apparatus workers to the organizing of their recreation and medical treatment.

Our conversation deals with all of this.

[E. Gadirov] Let's begin our conversation with the simplest question: where do the funds deposited to the party budget come from?

[O. Shakhbazov] I would like to say first of all: the remarks to the effect that the party is living at the expense of others are unfounded. The party does not receive any subsidies from the state and it pays for all of its expenses from its own funds.

The chief source of proceeds paid into the party budget is membership dues. According to the Rules, a definite part of the income derived from party publications is also paid into the budget.

[E. Gadirov] For the sake of complete clarity, could you possibly give some specific examples relative to the Azerbaijan party organization's budget?

[O. Shakhbazov] In 1989 the income of the Azerbaijan party organization's budget was equal to 25.2 million rubles, 75.7 percent of which was made up of party membership dues and 22.5 percent of which was profit from party publications. For informational purposes, I might say that the income of the Azerbaijan party organization's budget is equal to approximately one percent of the CPSU budget.

[E. Gadirov] And, basically, what are the budgetary funds expended for?

[O. Shakhbazov] The republic's party organization unites within its ranks 386,550 Communists. Last year

the expenditures from our party budget came to 22.2 million rubles. Most of the funds were expended to maintain the workers—of whom there are 1280—in the apparatuses of the Central Committee, the city and rayon committees, and the primary party organizations. The political enlightenment houses, Marxism-Leninism universities, the political enlightenment departments of the party committees and primary organizations, the Baku Higher Party School, the Institute of Party History, and the Baku Branch of the Central Lenin Museum are also maintained at the expense of the party budget.

Here are a few specific examples. The 1990 budgetary expenditures has been planned in the following areas: maintenance of party apparatus, 18.1 million rubles; expenditures for construction and repairs, 2.4 million rubles; party propaganda, 0.9 million rubles; etc.

I repeat that absolutely no funds from the local budget or the profits derived by institutions and enterprises are allocated to party agencies. If there is a budgetary insufficiency, this is adjusted in a centralized procedure by the CPSU Central Committee. I will say, incidentally, that 4.7 million rubles of the budgetary expenditures by the republic's party organization in 1990 will be financed by CPSU Central Committee.

[E. Gadirov] Judging by the letters to the editor, people are very interested in knowing the number of workers in the republic's party apparatus.

[O. Shakhbazov] At the present time there are 5066 persons in party agencies at all levels. Of them, 3052 are responsible workers; 1637 persons work in the technical services sphere, and 377 work in party institutions. At first glance these figures might seem to be high. But the share of every city and rayon committee, on average, is 18 responsible workers and 10 technical workers.

[E. Gadirov] It might be appropriate to give some information about the monthly salaries paid to the party apparatus workers. The raise in their salary rates caused various remarks.

[O. Shakhbazov] Prior to the raise, instructors at city and party committees had a monthly salary of 190-200 rubles and department heads, 230 rubles. The cadres to fill these positions are selected basically from specialists with higher education. A rather large number of them are scientists. Just think about this yourself: who would refuse a high salary and take a low-paying job? It is not a random situation that recently serious difficulties with the cadre question have arisen. For ten years the salary rates of the party workers have remained unchanged. During that time, however, the wages have been raised frequently in other spheres. As a result there arose a sharp differentiation—in 1988 the party agencies, with regard to the wage level, occupied the 45th place as compared with various branches of the national economy.

At the present time the monthly salary paid to instructors at city and rayon committees is, on average, 305

rubles. For purposes of comparison we might say that this is approximately the volume of wages paid in 1988 to medium-level cadres working on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Department heads receive 380 rubles, or the level of chief specialists. The salaries paid to the first secretaries of the rayon and city party committees are comparable to the wages paid to managers of profitable farms, and the salaries paid to first secretaries of oblast party committees are comparable to the wages paid to managers of large-scale industrial enterprises.

The released (paid) secretaries of primary party organizations (of railroad junctions, higher educational institutions, scientific-research institutions, with the exception of secretaries of party organizations of soviet and economic agencies) without any limitations receive wages in a volume of 85 percent of the salary rates of managers of institutions and enterprises.

[E. Gadirov] Where do the funds for these raises come from?

[O. Shakhbazov] Basically they come from the saving derived by reduction of forces. In 1989 alone, in the apparatuses of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee and the oblast and city party organizations, more than 70 responsible positions were reduced. As a result of structural changes, the number of technical personnel and official cars was reduced. At the present time there is a total of 335 vehicles of various makes at the disposal of all the republic's party agencies and party institutions. Other than a few special-purpose vehicles, all the cars are assigned on a duty basis.

[E. Gadirov] The intensification of independence, including financial, of the primary party organizations is one of the vitally important problems. Many Communists suggest leaving a definite part of the membership dues at the primary organization. What is your attitude to this?

[O. Shakhbazov] Actually it is important for party organizations to have funds at their disposal, and this, first of all, makes them independent. I feel that neither the present unlimited centralization of the party budget nor its excessive dissipation will benefit the situation.

There is good grounds for concern. In certain instances the allocated funds are not being used completely. For example, in accordance with decisions of the 19th party conference, at the present time 3 percent of the collected party dues, and in nonproduction areas (schools, public-health institutions, housing operation offices, etc.) even as much as 30 percent, is left at the primary organization. Provision has been made for the use of these funds to render material assistance to needy Communists and their families, to pay incentive awards to shop organization secretaries who have distinguished themselves in the organizing of party work, to purchase office supplies and equipment, to carry out various measures, etc. For this purpose, last year 553,000 rubles were allocated to

the republic's primary party organizations. Unfortunately, only 173,000 rubles of that amount were expended.

[E. Gadirov] How are the recreation and medical treatment of the workers in the republic's party apparatus organized? What privileges do they have?

[O. Shakhbazov] There is not a single party sanatorium, rest home, or hospital situated on the territory of Azerbaijan. The medical treatment and recreation of party workers are organized in CPSU Central Committee sanatoriums and rest homes that are situated in other cities. For this purpose, trip tickets with a total value of 200,000 rubles are purchased every year. These trip tickets are sold with a 70 to 80 percent discount. In certain instances the trip tickets intended for party agencies are also sent to trade unions, institutions, and enterprises. For example, in 1989 as many as 150 trip tickets were sold to them.

[E. Gadirov] How is the financing of the party agencies in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast organized? This is another question that our readers are interested in.

[O. Shakhbazov] As a result of the application of a special form of administration, last year the oblast party agencies were financed directly by the CPSU Central Committee. Starting in 1990, this work will be carried out by the republic itself. The budget of the oblast party organizations is again included in the republic's party budget.

[E. Gadirov] Finally, one more question that evolves from the nature of the period that we are undergoing. To what extent is it desirable to have budget centralization at a time when there is an assertion of the need to expand the republic's sovereignty, and the need for the independence of the republic-level party organizations? Will the republic's party organization be able to live at the expense of its own budget?

[O. Shakhbazov] That question is of interest to everyone, not just the Communists. If we are talking about the republic's complete sovereignty and the principles of cost accountability, then we must also eliminate the party organization's material dependence upon the center.

Now, as for the second part of the question: if the membership dues are deposited correctly and promptly, and the budget is expended efficiently and economically, the Azerbaijan party organization's own funds will be completely sufficient for its functioning.

Belorussian CP Views Party Polarization

90UN1651A Minsk SOVETSKAYA
BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro and commentary by the Party Organization and Personnel Work Department of the Belorussian CP

Central Committee: "In the Buro of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party"]

[Text] The Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro examined the question "Concerning the Activity of Supporters of the Belorussian Communist Party 'Democratic Platform' in the CPSU". The resolution notes that separatism has begun to surface recently in the work of individual political clubs that were created for the purpose of democratizing party life and interpreting the place and role of the party under current conditions, and that attempts are being made to influence primary party organizations directly and to remove them from under the control of party committees. This is especially clearly observable in the Minsk club "Communists for Perestroyka." Here its own statute is in effect, a procedure for accepting members has been worked out, and an organizational committee has been established to conduct a republic conference of supporters of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." The club has embarked on a path of open oppositional political struggle, which objectively leads to the creation of a new political structure.

In this connection, the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro has obliged the obkoms [oblast party committee], gorkoms [city party committee], and raykoms [rayon party committee] immediately to look into the developing situations in all primary party organizations and to hold talks with every communist who has deviated or is deviating from the ideological positions of the CPSU on the basis of decisions of the February and March (1990) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee to clear up the incorrectness of their views and actions. In necessary cases, when persuasion and explanations do not give the desired results, they are to examine such communists at meetings in the primary party organizations and sessions of the buros of gorkoms, raykoms, and obkoms, and take measures to draw the line with them, all the way to exclusion from the party.

A group of members of the Belorussian CP Central Committee has been instructed to analyze the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" and to formulate clearly the propositions that diverge from the fundamental Marxist-Leninist ideas of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress.

The Party Organization and Personnel Work Department of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party Comments on the Resolution

In recent months, a rapid increase has occurred in the political activity of communists of the republic. One of the manifestations of this process, in particular, was the organization of political clubs and discussion centers in a number of cities. As a rule, they unite members of the party on the basis of a search for ways and forms of renewing the CPSU and interpreting its place and role under current conditions. The participation of communists in the work of such associations by and large is dictated by a sincere anxiety over the development of many negative phenomena in the life of the country,

dissatisfaction with the degree of resolution of existing problems, and a need also to make their own contribution to a speedy restructuring of the party on a genuinely democratic basis.

However, along with this, separatism has begun to appear in the activity of a number of individual clubs, and processes are underway in a number party organizations that lead objectively to their ideological and organizational decay, and, in the final analysis, to the possibility of a split in the Belorussian Communist Party. A polarization is occurring not only in opinions, but also in actions. Some communists have actually taken antiparty positions, they openly run down the party and its entire historical path, and they reject the socialist prospect for the development of Soviet society and the future of the CPSU as an influential political force. These views and attitudes are expressed openly at meetings with party workers, on the pages of publications, and on radio and television. They appeared to a considerable extent during the preparation for and conduct of elections to the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and to local soviets of people's deputies.

In some party organizations, especially in the city of Minsk, there are cases of nonfulfillment of the requirements of the CPSU Statute, the established procedure for payment of membership dues, and other normative party documents.

The political club "Communists for Perestroyka" began to function in the city of Minsk starting in October 1989. In contrast to other party associations and formations of a similar type, the club has its own statute, and it has worked out a procedure for enrolling members.

At the beginning of March, activists of the club took steps aimed at convening a Belorussian republic conference of supporters of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." An organizational committee was established which distributed to party organizations an "Information Report" on the conference, at which the order of election of delegates was determined. All March meetings of the club were conducted under the guise of preparation for the congress and the resolution of organizational, financial, and other questions. The conference was held on 24-25 March in the city of Minsk, and material about it was published in the newspapers ZVYAZDA and SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA.

Analysis of the progress of the conference, the speeches of delegates, and documents adopted makes it possible to come to the conclusion that members of the club actually took the path of open oppositional political struggle, and that they operate with methods far from the principles of democracy and internal party relations. This is indicated by the establishment of a coordination council, the definition of authorized areas for communications with it, efforts undertaken to organize the primary structure of the "Democratic Platform" in some labor collectives, the elaboration of questions of tactics for the short term, aggressive actions for the coordination of activity with

like-thinking persons in other cities of the country, and the direct statements of the leaders of this movement themselves.

Objectively, the matter is heading toward the creation of a new political structure and a split of the Belorussian Communist Party by "boring" from within. It is not without reason that it was said categorically at the conference: Do not leave the party. The leaders of the Belorussian "Democratic Platform" movement are pretending that they are trying to give perestroika a more radical character. But this is only a screen behind which they are hiding their ambitious plans, a kind of proclamation with a demand to transform our party into a formless association with the full freedom of factions; that is, for all practical purposes, to wreck it.

In this connection, the continuing wait-and-see attitude toward such separatism, the indecision and lack of principles in evaluations, and the position of noninterference of the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the KP Belorussian and the primary party organizations are becoming absolutely intolerable. It has become obvious that the conduct of an open debate with them, the ideological debunking of original aspirations and goals, and a display of the true political and moral face of their leaders are now no longer enough, although such work, unquestionably, is necessary. The logic of events itself has led us to conclude that to preserve the party and its development, it has become vitally necessary to sever relations with those who have assumed a policy of undermining the unity of the Belorussian Communist Party. An ideological and organizational break with extreme trends and extremist groups is a painful process, but it is inevitable, up to and including the dissolution of individual primary party organizations.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee is for the consolidation of party ranks on the basis of the principles of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and for the firm unity of all those to whom the goals of perestroika and the ideals of a humane and democratic socialism are dear. But one must not allow oneself to be distracted by loud phrases and superficial promises behind which there is nothing other than political ambition.

Estonians Polled on Independence Issues

90UN1462A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Maandi, under the rubric "In the Language of Statistics": "What Is Your Opinion, Subscriber?"]

[Text] On the eve of the elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet, employees at the Estonian SSR Journalistic Information Center conducted a number of sociological polls, the latest of these was a telephone poll conducted on 14 March. Telephone numbers were chosen according to two principles: random selection (here a computer was used to choose residential numbers from all residences having

telephones) and a quota system, whose goal was to maintain the socio-demographic structure of the population during the poll, plainly speaking, to obtain a certain number of responses from people of various ages and educational backgrounds. 1018 people were polled. The results of the analysis speak for themselves. A word to Andrus Saar, the director of the information center:

—On the morning of 16 March, I opened the newspaper PAEVALEHT and I could not believe my eyes. On the fourth page under the headline "What Do They Think in Estonia?", part of the results of our latest analysis was reprinted. Merely reprinted—without commentary, without a description of the conditions and the course of the poll and, more importantly, without the concurrence of the center's director. How did these statistics fall into the hands of the journalists?

There also was a similar situation last year. A journalist from the NOORTE HAAL of that time called me and stated that he had access to data from one of our investigations. During the phone call, he refused to reveal the source of the information, but demanded consent to publish it. This sounded like an ultimatum. At that time, I could do little except release the documents since they were already in the journalist's hands and would appear in the press anyway, but with a report that we were concealing the data from the public. For once, the author of the publication did not even get around to doing this.

I do not want to be misunderstood. We are not concealing the results of our polls. Furthermore, we are working so that people are aware of what opinions and ideas are circulating around and what the present situation in the republic is. We also do not deny journalists the right to "unearth" information, interesting, and even scandalous information, nor to gather "dossiers"—that is their job. This is the order of things abroad, but, in our blind aspiration to imitate the West, we frequently forget that one cannot thoughtlessly adopt their experience and methods.

As a matter of fact, this thought applies not only, and not even that much to the incident involving PAEVALEHT—it is merely the most recent example of that which should not be done. Not having had long-standing democratic traditions, we should act proceeding from our specific circumstances. The simplest example is a clarification, what preperestroika social and political activities of candidates should have been forbidden methods in our country—one must remember the hopeless historical context.

And the very same thing can be said regarding the election campaign. While fastening their eyes upon the West, the leaders of our now numerous political movements are trying to convince the voters that the election campaign is a struggle among the movements, whereas the election is the election of the leading, most popular movement. Our research shows that the voters assess the situation very sensibly and rationally, in spite of the

attendant confusion and bustle. In the classical sense we currently have only two political parties—the CPSU and PNNE (Estonian National People's Party). All the others—the NFE (Estonian National Front), the "greens", and the democrats—are in a stage of formation. One does not have a clear-cut membership, another has no clear and distinct program, or they change their program frequently according to the political situation and state of affairs.

At present, support of a candidate by one or another movement has not substantially influenced the voters' selection. According to the data from our polls, they are most of all interested in, firstly, the candidate's moral qualities, secondly, his competence in political issues, and thirdly, his ability to cooperate with various political groups. As to future activities of a candidate, who has been elected as a deputy, he should, first and foremost, proceed from the interests of the voters, secondly, adhere to his own personal views, and thirdly, submit to the line of the party or movement, which supported him and of which he is a member, only in the most general issues. Thus, elections under our conditions are not the election of a movement, but the election of a person (however, with a small adjustment for the political group).

It is important to understand this, because unfortunate as it is; after the elections, if one may put it this way, the bragging by those movements, whose candidates will go to parliament, will certainly begin. Political movements, be it the National Front or Communist Party, democrats or liberals, after calculating that the number of parliament members supported by them, exceeds by a certain amount the number of representatives from other political groups, declare, if not a monopoly, then their advantage, supremacy, and leadership in society. It is easy to imagine what this might lead to. This type of political game would be dishonest—I repeat, at present, the people elect a person, not a party.

And now some results from the latest telephone poll. For the sake of clarity, we have made a table below where the wording of the questions and the variations of the possible responses are given, and to the right of them—the number of respondents (expressed as a percentage of the total number), who selected exactly this variation. The first column represents Estonian-speaking respondents, the second represents Russian-speaking respondents, and the third represents the average.

1. How do you evaluate the results of the work of the Estonian Citizens' Congress?

Very good	26	3	18
More good than bad	59	20	46
More bad than good	4	16	8
Very bad	0.4	12	4
Not enough information, don't know	4	30	13

2. As you know, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has proclaimed a Lithuanian Republic. Should our republic's supreme organ make the same decision as the Lithuanians did?

Definitely	36	12	28
Definitely not	11	36	20
Another path must be chosen	44	40	42

3. In your opinion, upon what political forces in Estonia does the attainment of Estonian independence primarily depend?

Upon the Estonian Citizens' Congress	12	8	11
Upon the Estonian Supreme Soviet	13	26	17
Equally upon both	68	28	54
Upon some other forces in Estonia	0.5	8	3
It depends entirely upon external forces	4	6	6

4. Upon what external forces does the attainment of Estonian independence primarily depend?

Upon the central organs of the USSR	35	35	35
Upon foreign nations	7	5	7
Equally upon both the USSR and foreign nations	35	17	29
It depends, first and foremost, entirely upon Estonia itself	19	27	21

5. In your opinion, how long will it take for Estonia to attain full state sovereignty?

It is unattainable	1	6	3
Several months	6	6	5
Before this year is over	39	13	30
One-two years	26	20	24
Three-four years	10	17	10
More than four years	7	17	10

7. If Estonia becomes independent, will your feeling of confidence (the opportunity to obtain work, legal defense, etc.), in comparison with the present, increase or decrease?

Increase significantly	54	8	38
Increase somewhat	31	14	25
Nothing will change	7	16	10
Decrease somewhat	2	18	8
Decrease significantly	—	27	9

7. How do you evaluate the Estonian Supreme Soviet's work during the last six months?

Very good	14	3	10
More good than bad	74	37	61
More bad than good	7	29	15
Very bad	1	9	4
Unfamiliar with its work due to a lack of information	1	6	3

8. The Council of Ministers is concluding its work in view of the elections. Please evaluate also its activities during the last six months.

Very good	8	1	6
More good than bad	60	25	48
More bad than good	20	32	24
Very bad	2	9	4
Unfamiliar with its work due to a lack of information	5	11	7

Sillari Views Party on Eve of Congress

90UN14424 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with E.-A. Sillari, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, by unidentified SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent; date and place not specified: "What Is the Essence of the Renewal?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The revocation of Article 6 of the Constitution with all the consequences ensuing from it puts the Estonian Communist Party in fundamentally new conditions. Particularly in-depth contemplation and collective counsel is required in this connection in searching for an answer to the questions: What should we be restructuring in the party and how? What should we be renouncing, what acquiring? What do the lessons of the past teach? In a word, what kind of party should we have under these new conditions? What should be its goals and tasks, its strategy and tactics, its ideology?

[Sillari] This will be discussed at the congress. There is much that we need to reinterpret in the party's activity and its initial propositions and principles. It is for this reason that we are submitting for discussion by the congress delegates a draft program of the Estonian Communist Party's reorganization. It has had a difficult birth, in clashes of opinions, positions and different viewpoints. But this is, I believe, an honest and candid document. We are essentially offering our "model" of the party's restructuring. This is not, incidentally, the sole "model" of its kind, not something extraordinary. In elaboration of the draft we took as the basis the program documents examined at a conference of the Estonian Communist Party, with regard for the observations expressed by the communists in the course of the pre-congress discussion, and material published for the 28th CPSU Congress—the "CPSU Platform" and the "Democratic Platform Within the CPSU."

It is no longer only or so much a question today, in my opinion, of the repentance of former sins and mistakes of a party that held monopoly power or of making promises to govern better, but rather of being capable in practice of becoming an independent party, a party that defends its own program and its own values within the framework of a democratic process. Not decreeing the leading role but laying claim to it and proving by deeds the justification of its claims—such is now our point of departure. Whether we are in office or not and whether

we govern or not now no longer depends on the desire of the party members themselves and the dispositions of the center but on the will of the people and on whether we, the party, are capable of winning the votes of the electorate to obtain the people's mandate for the formation of the executive authorities.

Such a change in the party's position and its departure from the spot it occupied could prove for many people a calamity. After all, the stereotype of government and "leading role" is literally in our blood. We were raised on this. Incidentally, the program documents that were discussed at our party conference this February and the drafts are really dissimilar among themselves yet they essentially agree on what is most important—these were draft programs of the sole governing party, a party in office, as before.

People are having difficulty abandoning this approach. This is in fact a very painful ideological change and for some people an abrupt shattering of the consciousness, perhaps.

[Correspondent] Nihilistic sentiments and proposals for the abandonment of the party altogether, the termination of its activity, dissolution of the party organizations, in a word, for dispersal, have appeared recently....

[Sillari] I believe that this is a reaction to the party's new, unfamiliar status and a manifestation of subconscious logic: If there is to be a party, it should be the governing party, and none other. Consciously or unconsciously, the idea of the Estonian Communist Party as a part of the apparatus of compulsion which has merged with the state and party machinery is still reflected here.

[Correspondent] We know of other proposals also—the creation of another party in place of the Estonian Communist Party They have been heard quite loudly and persistently. How, in your view, should we treat these?

[Sillari] This also is a reaction, I believe, the other side, so to speak, to the change in the position of the Estonian Communist Party. It is also expressed in the attempts to convert a party of the left into a party of the right, to declare free enterprise and the liberalization of the economy the main slogan and to promise the working people a difficult and colorless future. Are the interests of the working people upheld?

[Correspondent] But the draft program of the reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party also provides for a set of the most radical economic measures, which include a reduction in the proportion of state ownership, the free development of enterprise, privatization of production....

[Sillari] Yes. In addition, we see and caution that transition to a market economy in the next few years will lead to a certain growth of property inequality. But such an economic policy is inevitable if we wish to emerge from the crisis. This is essentially the NEP. But what is of most importance here? While supporting radical economic

reforms, we at the same time believe that the Estonian Communist Party must struggle actively for the rights of the working people.

I am convinced that under the present most complex conditions, particularly under such conditions, I would say even, there should in society be well organized forces of the left which by their assertive activity in defense of the working people's interests balance the forces of the right and relax the tension that is inevitably accompanying and will continue to accompany the changes in the structure of the economy.

Figuratively speaking, under the new conditions our world will increasingly be divided into those who obtain a wage and those who pay it. And their interests are, after all, frequently different. I would put it thus: The Estonian Communist Party sees itself not as a party of employers but of employees. It is this, incidentally, which distinguishes it from other political formations. If the "Vaaba Eesti" association, for example, which was initially formed as an election alliance, continues its existence in the role of a political party, its function will obviously be defense of the interests of the professional executive personnel. As far as the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] and STKE [Estonian Union of Labor Cooperatives] are concerned, when the working people, that is the recipients of wages, realize that the association of employers is defending precisely the interests of the employers they will occupy the true, real place in society that essentially belongs to them.

It is this, incidentally, that determines the Estonian Communist Party's relations with such associations. Cooperation on issues of common interest, and disagreements where the views and interests of the top echelon of society and the ordinary people part company.

[Correspondent] That is, the concept of an "opposition" is emerging? For us this word has to a large extent been compromised and drags behind it a train of things that are harmful, unnecessary, politically dangerous even....

[Sillari] And wrongfully. There is behind it much that is healthy and useful also. If we consider ourselves real politicians, we must under the new conditions learn to act and if the situation so demands be in constructive opposition or in a coalition with other parties, unless of course this entails revisions of fundamental positions of the Estonian Communist Party.

I would say that the essence of the renewal of the Estonian Communist Party should be not simply a "turning left" (there are increasingly more of the right from day to day) but its formation as the political force of the left in society. With the corresponding focus of activity in parliament, with leftwing political slogans....

Determination of the differences and, conversely, a search for common features and points of contact with other forces in political life—all this is extremely important today.

It is, after all, a question of possible allies or adversaries, coalition or opposition. It has to be said that in modern civilized countries there is broad political consensus between different political parties, those in confrontation included, and between the government and the opposition, as a rule, on two main, determining issues. These are state independence first and the stability of society second.

[Correspondent] As far as ensuring stability and civil peace is concerned, everything is clear here. People are tired of confrontation and will evaluate the efforts of this party or the other precisely to the extent that they are able to defuse tension. The more so in that there can hardly remain anywhere else in the world such a serious situation as in our country. The general trend is a move everywhere away from extremes toward moderation.

[Sillari] The Estonian Communist Party sees as its most important task in this plane the regulation of interethnic relations in Estonia, the defusing of the seriousness of the situation and the provision of clear legal safeguards for the free development of all national groups. This is emphasized particularly in the draft program of a reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party....

[Correspondent] As far as the problem of state independence is concerned, it is being accepted with difficulty and mistrust by many Russian-speaking communists and part of the Russian-speaking population generally.

Along with other members of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau you recently met with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. As the press has reported, this issue was raised there. What are your impressions of this discussion?

[Sillari] The discussion with M.S. Gorbachev and other secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee lasted approximately four hours. And it has to be said that this was a composed, thoughtful discussion. As we understood it, the leaders of the party and government were well informed about our affairs and intentions. They wanted to hear us one more time and understand our position. I, for example, said that the question of the elaboration of a Union treaty had been broached by the republic in 1988. But people did not wish to listen to us at that time. And that speaking of a future renewed federation now was too late. People do not believe in it and cannot see what the fabric of this renewed federation would be. The discussion ended with an understanding concerning dialogue—between the republic and the Union.

Mikhail Sergeyevich was of the opinion that Estonia's secession from the USSR would not afford it an opportunity to progress. And asked whether we had given careful thought to everything.

This question is indeed very complex and requires serious study. But it must be resolved. We would note that in this plane the Estonian Communist Party is not counterposing itself to other political forces acting for

the good of Estonia. However, the draft program emphasizes particularly that the achievement of state independence is a difficult and contradictory process in which together with the legal foundations the creation of a solid economic and social base is essential. And this means a great deal of work.

[Correspondent] Another sore point, as we all understand, is the status of the Estonian Communist Party.... How is it proposed to examine this issue at the congress?

[Sillari] At the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev we said that we would go to the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress with our own program. However, we said that we would not sever ties to the CPSU and wished to participate in the democratic transformation of the CPSU, and that our delegates would participate in the 28th Congress. This is, after all, very important—what the 28th Congress comes up with....

There is much talk and argument with us currently as to what kind the Estonian Communist Party should be— independent or on the CPSU Platform. But look what complex, contradictory processes are occurring within the party. Various positions and views are being manifested. Specialists from Moscow's Higher Party School already count eight currents within the CPSU. But at least three can be traced very clearly: radical, aspiring to the party's transformation into a social democratic party, centrist, and conservative. Certain party officials of Moscow and other cities of the country, scholars, and sociologists believe that there will be a delineation at the 28th Congress even. The radical part could break away. The situation is further complicated by the possible formation of a Russian Communist Party, a conference of which is currently in preparation. And a congress, possibly, is being prepared also....

In a word, big changes, which would influence the fate of the party as a whole, could occur within the CPSU in the very near future. And thought has to be given to this....

This is why we will propose at the 20th Congress the adoption of our own program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party. In the transitional period up to the 28th CPSU Congress, however, the communists will have to determine their place at the personal level, so to speak, but after the 28th Congress, organizationally also.

Girenko Address to Estonian Party Congress

90UN1443A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Speech by A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at Estonian Communist Party Congress on 24 March]

[Text] Dear Comrade Delegates and Guests of the Congress!

Permit me first of all to express gratitude for the opportunity to participate in the general debate at the congress, and on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo to convey to you comradely greetings and wishes for constructive and amicable work. After all, it is this work of the communists that is the main guarantor of a solution of all the complex problems that confront us and a guarantor of the assured surmounting of the difficult period upon which our party has embarked.

The present situation in which the country and the party now find themselves may be described as complex and contradictory, and in some respects critical even. The main thing, however, is that our society is unswervingly progressing along the path of perestroika and that processes are unfolding which will determine our fate today for many years to come. New social and political structures and mechanisms of control are taking shape, and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet are operating and have already done much for the creation of a state based on the rule of law. The creation of the system of new organs of state power is culminating in elections to the republic and local soviets. The transition to a law-based, democratically renewed socialist state logically led to the need for the introduction in the country of the institution of a presidency. The president of the country, which M.S. Gorbachev has been elected, is today the guarantor of the stability of the state, the further democratization of all spheres of our society, and the transformation of the Soviet federation.

The spread of opinions in the evaluation of the nature, difficulties, and contradictions being experienced by our party is extraordinarily wide. And we can see this for ourselves in the example of the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress. The processes of cleansing and renewal in Estonian society and the republic Communist Party began earlier than in other republics and for this reason, perhaps, although not only for this reason, they have been more dynamic and at times dramatic.

Not without reason, the present situation in the republic Communist Party is often spoken of as a crisis situation, and this has been manifested at the congress also. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee leadership managed to a certain extent to avert the organizational split in the party which had shown through earlier and bring the party to its 20th Congress united, but the heart of the debate which has unfolded here—the question of preservation of the unity of the Estonian Communist Party—remains open, as before. As we understand it, it revolves primarily around the status of the republic Communist Party and the nature of its ties to the CPSU, and also the republic's relations with the Union.

Whatever the attitude toward these questions one thing is clear, they are not contrived. They really are troubling the whole population of Estonia, both communists and nonparty people. It has to be said that the CPSU Central

Committee, the party as a whole, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the USSR Supreme Soviet are seeking the optimum solution to questions of nationality policy under the current conditions. Consequently, both the problems and the logic of the development of processes in Estonia emphasize the interconnection of your Congress and the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress and the processes occurring in the country as a whole.

Proceeding from this objective interconnection, the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress and the new party rules were elaborated to a large extent. I believe that these documents lay down new, far-reaching prerequisites for a radical renewal of the CPSU.

The appeals to the press and the party Central Committee submit proposals concerning an enhancement of the role and independence of the Union republic communist parties. These proposals are part of the mainstream of the party's democratization and are embedded in the draft new party rules. An extract from the draft rules concerning the position of the Union republic communist parties was quoted yesterday. Truly, the draft envisages the broadest rights and practically unlimited independence of the Union republic communist parties, but within the framework of the basic principles and ideas determined by the program and rules of the CPSU. I would like to add to this that the draft rules envision fundamental decisions of the Presidium, commissions of the CPSU Central Committee, and all executive bodies of the CPSU concerning the Union republic communist parties being examined with the participation of competent representatives of the republics' communist parties and, in the event of disagreement with the adopted decisions, the Union republic communist party central committees having the right to demand the convening of a CPSU Central Committee plenum to discuss the contentious issues. It seems to me that mechanisms with which many of the knots of intraparty contradictions, which were tightened for a period of decades, may be untied have been outlined here.

As far as the question of the nature of the new relations of the communist parties, which is being debated extensively both with us and in other republics, is concerned, it is no secret that the following proposition is being advanced from time to time: Only by having detached itself from the CPSU may a communist party assume responsibility in the republic for the economy and policy, change tactics flexibly, create coalitions, and compete with other parties and movements. Some comrades are linking the independent path of the development of the Communist Party and its withdrawal from the CPSU with Estonia's independence. To what such an approach can lead if thought is not given to all the consequences is graphically attested by the situation in today's Lithuania and its Communist Party.

You know that the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has been unequivocally propounding a policy of the withdrawal of the republic's

Communist Party from the CPSU and of the Lithuanian SSR from the Soviet Union, counting on both Lithuania and the party itself coming out the winners here. What, however, are we seeing today, a short space of time after the adoption of the pertinent decisions?

The split that has occurred and the process of formation of two Lithuanian communist parties shows that the hopes of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee leadership for the support of the vast majority of communists for the policy of detachment from the CPSU were unwarranted. Up to the start of March less than 90,000 of the party's 200,000 members had switched to the platform of the reorganized independent Lithuanian Communist Party. At the same time, however, approximately 40,000 communists have expressed support for the Provisional Lithuanian Central Committee on the CPSU Platform. The remainder—of the order of 70,000—are evidently following the example of the more than 10,000 communists who have left the party altogether. Thus approximately one-third of the republic party organization has already been lost. A further drift away from the republic Communist Party cannot be ruled out. And as a result of the split the Lithuanian Communist Party sustained a cruel defeat at the elections, and the leader of the party and head of the republic, Brazauskas, a very strong and insistent personality, it should be said, has been demoted to secondary positions. The independent Communist Party has found itself politically isolated and is essentially departing the arena of political struggle.

In the light of what has been said it would seem to me that it is necessary to closely analyze the results of the 18 March elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet. Of course, analyzing them will take time, but I would like to express one thought even today. The party committees were unable, unfortunately, to appreciably influence this most important political campaign which, evidently, will be reflected in the influence of its representatives in the republic's new parliament. Not least, in my view, because the communists' unity of action was not secured.

The question of unity is today fundamental. The documents that have been prepared for the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress may be interpreted variously by the delegates and, naturally, the communists of Estonia. Some will accept them right away, others will not be able to do so. But I would like to remind you that we are today at the stage of direct preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and that only three months until its opening remain.

The proposed draft congress documents (the draft rules will be published shortly) are the basis for the discussion of urgent problems in the party by the people also. The CPSU says: Here are our ideas, here are our aims, this is our critical view of work in the past, this is our vision of the paths of the party's development and its influence on political life in society. Tell us what needs to be added or altered.

I would ask the delegates to the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress to consider very seriously when adopting decisions the extent to which they could have far-reaching consequences for the Communist Party and people of Estonia. It is essential to cool emotions and submit these decisions as proposals to the 28th CPSU Congress, and to begin their realization after the Congress with regard for its results.

I would like to say with all certainty that the CPSU Central Committee is opposed to all attempts to tear apart the CPSU into national apartments. The Central Committee September Plenum adopted a platform on the nationality issue and firmly advocated the unity of the CPSU. Under the conditions of the expansion of the republic's independence the party is called upon to perform a consolidating role to an even greater extent, uniting all peoples around the goals of perestroika. It is the impending move into the arena of political struggle of new parties and other public organizations that is a very serious argument in support of the preservation of an ideologically and organizationally united party built on the principles of the equal rights of the citizens of all nationalities.

The internationalist principle in the party by no means signifies, of course, some underestimation of the interests and particular features of this national detachment or the other. Incidentally our opponents, while serving up the idea of disconnection as the highest manifestation of democracy, have begun to actively consolidate. They are even creating interrepublic associations pursuing a common policy and coordinating their actions. The representatives of various movements and organizations are constantly performing propaganda and organizing work in all parts of the country.

A characteristic feature of the communist movement has always and everywhere been struggle against the manifestation of nationalism and chauvinism. The existence of a communist party on a national basis is altogether an unnatural phenomenon. Therefore none of us can fail to be disturbed by the demarcation that has emerged within the Estonian Communist Party not only for ideological and political reasons but also on a nationality basis. The party's split on this basis would objectively lead to its self-liquidation.

I believe that the concern and misgivings I have expressed will be perceived with due attention by the Congress delegates, they being dictated by genuine concern for the fate of both the Estonian Communist Party and the CPSU as a whole.

While upholding the principle of a united party, the CPSU at the same time confirms its devotion to the right of nations to self-determination up to and including the right to secession. However, we are opposed to abuses in relations with the Union, opposed to ultimatums accompanied by references to the will of the people, whose opinion, as a rule, is not sought, and opposed to legal games, which turn into a game involving people's

fate. Only in a state of high temper not befitting serious politics can the political, socioeconomic, territorial, legal, humanitarian, and other problems arising in these instances be ignored.

The position of all the Union republics in the Soviet socialist state is based on a constitutional foundation and also reciprocal allied commitments ensuing from the Union treaty. For this reason the solution of the fate of any republic is possible only within the framework of the constitution. A matter for the immediate future is the renewal of the entire system of treaty relations in the USSR. But this business can only be impeded by unilateral enactments, whatever the circumstances that dictate them. It is not possible to act proceeding from one's own interests at the expense of other peoples here.

I believe it would be appropriate also to mention the position that was manifested at the Special Third Congress of People's Deputies on matters of interethnic relations. The essence is as follows: While strengthening their sovereignty and acquiring broad independence the Union republics should also assume full responsibility for ensuring the civil rights of people of all nationalities on their territory. I refer to political, legal, and material responsibility in accordance with our Soviet and international law.

In the process of the development of democracy, improvement of the political system, and the broadening of the rights and independence of the republics, federal relations themselves will be extended and enriched, avoiding every standard and stereotype. Speaking of the need for the further development of the Soviet federation, Comrade Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the treaty principle in state building and the creation of legal conditions which afford an opportunity for the existence of various forms of federal connection. "We," he said at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, "support the diversity and polychromatic nature of the structures of national life given observance of the wholeness and unity of the Soviet state."

Comrades, the idea that the question of a Union treaty is a question of the past and that the Union is too late in settling the issue of a Union treaty was heard both today and yesterday. This is an erroneous idea. A Union treaty could not have been drawn up last year because there were no underlying laws determining the economic independence of the republic. I refer to the laws on property, land, leasing, and others. Today these laws exist and they make it possible to realize the independence of the republics and draw up a new law on a Union treaty.

The fact that Estonia is today known in the country and throughout the world as a republic with a high level of development of the economy, culture, and science is indisputable. And the credit here goes primarily to the people of Estonia and their wealth of talent.

And concluding my speech, I would like to emphasize that in adopting a decision today at the Congress and all other party decisions we will proceed from the fact that

the peoples of our country are bound by a common history, common present and, I am sure, common better future.

I wish you success. Thank you for your attention.

Estonian Party Congress Speeches

90UN1446A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 27 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[20th Estonian CP Congress: From the Delegates' Speeches"]

[Text] Ya. Soobik

In the beginning of his speech, the first secretary of the Tallinn Party Gorkom said that at rayon conferences held before the congress, the city's communists presented a broad range of opinions on the status of the Estonian Communist Party and that there are a considerable number of people who are interested in real cooperation and realize that a split in the party will have serious consequences.

As is well known, the Estonian Communist Party conference decided to set up a working group to bring together various viewpoints and work out compromise documents. During the joint work the group came to the conclusion that there are no fundamental questions upon which we cannot come to a mutually agreeable solution if we want to. The program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party, which provides a contemporary view of the party's independence and its tactics and strategy, economic policy, and other things, was the working group's summary document.

Estonian society which is being renewed needs a party which is being renewed and is based on the human values of Marxism, new political thinking, and the real experience of mankind. How its relations with other parties take shape will depend on those program documents which the 28th Congress adopts. We must also do what we can in developing these documents.

In the supplement to the Estonian Communist Party program there must be in internal policy a guide to action in three different situations: when the Estonian Communist Party is in a coalition, in opposition, or is the ruling party, which we should all strive for. It is simplest of all to blame some particular person for the situation which has taken shape. This is not the time to settle accounts within the party, when we have more than enough critics outside it. The complex challenges we face demand the unity of progressive forces and harmonious joint work.

V. Chetvergov

Never before have I participated in the work of party forums with such emotion and such a heavy burden of responsibility. Never before in appearing on the rostrum have I had to choose words capable of persuading those

who came to the congress certain, though for contradictory reasons, of the inevitability of a split in the party. That is how the general director of the Narva Baltiyets Plant began his speech.

Most of the people living in this land who combine concern and responsibility for the present and future of Estonia must remain in the party, whose strategic goal is to create a society comparable in living standard to the developed countries of Europe.

The speaker expressed his disagreement with focusing on the national idea and with the proposed methods of achieving the independence of Estonia. There are only two ways to resolve the issue: either further development on the basis of the Union Contract providing the maximally necessary degree of freedom for the republic, or a separate state rupturing all ties with the USSR. A third way is not possible. Unfortunately, in the time between the conference and the congress we did not receive a concrete analysis of either way. The voices of realistically thinking economists and politicians drown in the stream of brilliant statements of the idea of independence, in which most of the new parties and movements compete.

The republic's unprepared transition to the principles of a market economy is fraught with an amplitude of negative phenomena: a reduction in production facilities and their respecialization, higher prices, unemployment, and a lower standard of living. Breaking ties with the USSR will make this amplitude destructive, since there will then be no talk of any social guarantees. The republic has neither the means nor the potential to do that.

V. Vasekha

The main thing, what we now lack, is clarity, declared the teacher from Tallinn High School No 15. The fault of the Estonian CP Central Committee is that it was not always energetic in defining its position, and as a result the initiative was taken over by other movements. We often followed events; we did not anticipate them or predict them.

Now we have, on the one hand, a powerful national idea and, on the other, a no less powerful Union idea. Despite all the extremes, a large part of the representatives of both the national and the Union ideas support the unity of the Estonian Communist Party. We must find the truly progressive meaning of the concept "sovereignty." Everything progressive must certainly include the best of that which preceded it. But for us what preceded is the existence of our federation.

The speaker acquainted the delegates with the content of proposals which the Kalinin Rayon Party Organization is presenting to the 20th Congress. They start from the idea that Estonia is a sovereign socialist state which independently determines its own policies and the development of the economy and culture and is building its relations with the Union on the basis of a new contract. But the Estonian Communist Party is a party of the

socialist choice which independently decides organizational, cadre, and financial questions. Its unity with the CPSU is implemented on the basis of the new CPSU Charter within the framework of the party under renewal.

Ya. Napa

The dean of the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute appealed to people to get rid of the syndrome of the enemy and the desire to attribute all our difficulties to the intrigues of extremists, generated by totalitarian thinking. Have not too many enemies suddenly been discovered not only in Estonia but in Latvia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, and throughout the Soviet Union?

Glasnost has revealed all the depth of the crisis in which the country finds itself. And a share of the responsibility for the black shadow lies on all of us members of the party. There is not one of us who can avoid internal "inventory," because we can move ahead only with a clear conscience. We must above all be self-critical today.

If the Estonian Communist Party does not want to be forced out of the political arena, it must deal with the interests of the majority of people of Estonia and with their desire for sovereignty and, accordingly, seek independence. The important thing for us is to insure the joint actions of all progressive forces of Estonia interested in building a democratic and economically powerful state. We need cooperation in order to dismantle barracks socialism. But it is difficult for appeals for cooperation to reach those involved in finding the internal enemy; they have other goals and a different idea of the future, and, hence, need a different kind of party.

A. Zybin

The deputy secretary of the party committee of the PET Production Association began his speech by evaluating the activities of the Estonian Communist Party and disagreed with those who asked people not to try to find others to blame. The speaker immediately names "our first secretary" as the main one to blame for all the troubles.

"Not because he did anything, but because he didn't do anything on that plane to explain to people: the creation of a mononational state is a fixed idea and people should be able to live with equal rights on the territory in which they live. When V. Vyalyas became secretary, with the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee plenum, he gave very good speeches, taking advantage of his experience as a diplomat, and convinced everyone that all would have equal rights. So it was in words, but not in fact."

S. Smolyakov

The start of the work of the 20th Congress reminded the secretary of the party committee of the Baltic Ship Repair Plant of the work of the Congress of People's

Deputies, where there were also many skirmishes and discussions on issues which were not the most pressing ones, the use of domestic semifinished articles and the like. But it is not only communists who are watching the delegates.

"I will state my view on certain crucial problems. Sovereignty for me means the opportunity for the republic and its people and higher organs to themselves determine by what laws they should live and how to build their own interrelationships in the federation and with other states."

The Estonian Communist Party used to be in general a regional organization of the CPSU. Now it should become a republic party. In the ideological sense the Estonian Communist Party should be close to the CPSU, but in the organizational sense it is obviously hardly possible to fix it firmly beforehand. But it is a fact that they will retain an organizational link.

Slogans will not make the matter right now. The best aid to the CPSU is for us to be a capable Estonian Communist Party enjoying the support of the people and having a precise program, again supported by the people, to stabilize the situation in the republic and bring the economy out of crisis.

A unified Estonian Communist Party is a real political force able today to prevent a confrontation, while the extremes come together and aggravate the situation and aggravate this standoff.

L. Pasternak

The deputy chief engineer of the Tallinn Grain Products Combine expressed his opinion on the organizational construction of the party.

"Undoubtedly, the 'primaries' [primary party organizations] should be the basis of the party. But, I think, the time has already arrived to switch to territorial organizations by retaining only party groups in production. This transition should be combined with the possibility of free withdrawal from the party, and that will ultimately lead to the departure of people who are indifferent to party affairs. The republic party organization seems to me to be an independent Estonian Communist Party which is part of the united CPSU."

I want to say something in particular about interethnic relations. Denying the existence of serious tension recently is at the very least short-sighted. Can someone from the parties springing up like mushrooms resolve them, clearly and definitively, without depriving a single person or family. I think that neither today nor in the foreseeable future does the Communist Party have any rivals in that regard, in my opinion. And God forbid that we allow the virus of interethnic confrontation to multiply and turn into a cancerous tumor in the organism of our party! The essential thing is that we ourselves and,

most importantly, those people in whose name we so often act, more than 70 years now, believe in the party's ability to cure this disease.

Kh. Kaur

The communists of Estonia today face a serious choice, said the first secretary of the Raplaskiy Party Raykom. We have been waiting for this congress for a half a year and the question of the place and role of the Estonian Communist Party in the life of contemporary society has been on the plenums of the party raykom more than once and hot debates have gone on in primary organizations as well. We have had enough time to discover what the people want and what the will of the communists is. We have come to the congress ready to express this will. It is that the Estonian Communist Party should change from a territorial organization of the CPSU to an independent political party with its own program and charter.

The independence of the Estonian Communist Party is not an end in itself, and we are not pitting ourselves against the CPSU and its progressive part. We must ourselves be responsible for getting out of the crisis and building a democratic society which people will value and where the main asset is man.

We have lost a great deal of time creating an independent party and we have lost the trust of the people and a considerable number of members. And the elections to the Supreme Soviet demonstrated that. We will recover trust when we cease to be part of the mechanism of unlimited power.

S. Sovetnikov

The director of the Narva Polytekhnikum believes that discussions about the fact that the need has now arisen to create a new Estonian Communist Party are groundless and naive, for such a party already exists and has existed for seven decades.

"The main task of our congress is to preserve the unity of the Estonian Communist Party and not split it and not divide it on nationality lines. The party is a union of like-minded people and ideologically confirmed fighters, and the party is made strong by the unity of its ranks. However, in present conditions when the situation in the Estonian Communist Party has become extremely aggravated and when the party members have taken up various ideological platforms on fundamental issues of the state order of the USSR, the economic and political independence of Estonia, as well as the organizational structure of the Estonian Communist Party, the withdrawal from its ranks of certain communists who undermine the party from within is a natural phenomenon, and that fact should not disturb us particularly. For the party is strong not in the number of its members but in their ideological conviction, unity, and political activism."

A. Mamayev

Serviceman A. Mamayev believes that the desire to restore historical truth has resulted not only in condemnation of the Stalinist phenomenon but also its monstrous offspring, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. But in fact, under the same banner the graves of Soviet soldiers are being defiled, battle relics are being taken down from pedestals, antimilitary hysteria is being fanned, the dignity of people in military uniform is being demeaned, and the rights of the Russian-speaking population are being encroached upon.

"Home-grown political experts skillfully and purposefully fan the fire of interethnic relations. The leaders of citizens committees and the Congress of Estonia declare existing forms of state power to be occupying powers and thereby try to destroy civic peace in the republic and urge the society toward chaos. It would be unfair and wrong to accuse the Estonian Communist Party of cultivating anti-Russian sentiments; on the contrary, the draft of the resolution on the historical-political evaluation of its activities incriminates conduct of the policy of Russification. But what we are seeing now is the other extreme."

Today it disturbs us military people when the very cheap word "occupier" is addressed to us. I am certain that most of our people associate this concept with the atrocities of the fascist invaders, who in the literal sense created a new order and their own prosperity on the bones of millions of murdered and tortured people.

Today military men oppose the flagrant trampling of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and oppose legislative acts which demean them; they are not only against poor living conditions, as the local mass information media sometimes presents it.

A. Sammalpyarg

The first cause of the fear and agitation of Estonians and non-Estonians alike, assumes the instructor of the Khyumaaskiy Raykom of the Estonian Communist Party, is the breakdown and destruction of the Soviet unitary state created on the model and orders of the "great leader of all peoples." That is essentially the breakdown of the empire.

"The prospect of forming a genuine union of sovereign states in place of the present imperial power should be our overall goal. The creation of an independent Estonian Communist Party on those principles of which a great deal has been spoken today is our local action in this direction."

The transformation of the Estonian Territorial Organization of the CPSU into the Estonian Communist Party is not only justified but also necessary. The program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party is fully applicable for this purpose. I am hopefully watching the formation of an independent Estonian Communist Party. First, this party, unlike other parties which exist

and are emerging, will have a broad, strong social base. The trade unions can and must be our closest allies in the struggle for its interests and rights. Secondly, this party will have a great life-giving impulse and genuine interethnicism where for the first time the basic principle of interethnicism, the voluntary unity of people, will be observed in reality. Finally, this party will and should have its own, to put it simply, Russian policy, which other parties and movements do not have. Who, comrades, is not familiar with the words on the vanguard role of communists? Being in the vanguard means, in my opinion, to see the turning points of history in time and control those turns. But peoples rather than parties make history. So our choice today is how to join the next turn which Soviet society as a whole and Estonian society in particular is now making. But has it not already happened that some leaders from the vanguard have practically gone off the road, without noticing it themselves? We must figure it out now, fast, for tomorrow our train of history leaves.

G. Israelyan

In the opinion of the department head of the Tallinn Party Gorkom, the Estonian CP Central Committee has done less than it could to stabilize the situation.

"What do I see as the problems in the work of the Central Committee? The erosion of criteria and vague reaction to sociopolitical events. Principled evaluations have not been given on virtually any vitally important issue of the activities of social movements and formations or newborn parties, even though the primary organizations and even plenums of party raykoms demanded that insistently. Many communists have gradually gotten the impression that the Central Committee is accountable not to party organizations but to the Popular Front, which has slid faster and faster toward the right."

The proposed draft of the status of the transitional period of the Estonian Communist Party is nothing less than, on the one hand, instructions on the formation of a new party and, on the other, an ultimatum to communists to leave the CPSU altogether or join the new party. In other words, it is an order to annul the organization of the Communist Party locally. Are we not in a hurry, comrades, to bury it? For we have the documents of the renewed CPSU supported by many communists in the republic. The proposal by Ya. Allik and the working group of the Estonian Communist Party to reform it contains quite a few interesting points. There are very democratic ideas on the charter of the working group of the Tallinn Party Gorkom.

I appeal to all delegates with an earnest entreaty not to make hasty decisions without seriously weighing all the consequences of this step and without interpreting the lessons of Lithuania. Putting the proposed Central Committee documents to a vote means creating a new party, by no means a communist one. Do we understand that?

And the last thing. On behalf of the communists who sent me to the congress, I propose that we declare the

work of the Estonian CP Central Committee and its Buro for the report period as unsatisfactory.

More Estonian Party Congress Speeches

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[Text] V. Palm

We must clearly acknowledge, said the academic, that the organization to which we belong and the ideology which was the basis of this organization and the policy which was followed over the decades has finally come to an impasse and there is nowhere else to go along this path. No cosmetics will help here and a sharp turn in ideology and policy is needed to remain an active force in the life of society.

I understand that it is not simple to make such a turn, inasmuch as irreconcilable propaganda from two sides is constantly being fanned, and that is being done not out of lofty motives but from elementary ambitions.

What is the solution? It is stated in the program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party, which gives communists the opportunity to really participate in party policy. Up till now the apparat did this, and it was the apparat that embodied the party and decided everything for it and not the 20 million members who were a silent mass. Only an independent party can restructure itself. And I have the feeling that after the 28th Congress the CPSU will split into several parties; the completely incompetent policy of its Central Committee led to this, and we have been convinced of that more than once and felt it in our skin. This policy worked toward confrontation and toward fanning emotions and escalating tension, and the rightist forces skillfully used it by appealing to ethical values which communists do not take into account. In many respects whether we will be able to subdue this propaganda of irreconcilability depends on the decision of our congress.

M. Bronshteyn

The well-known economist and Estonian Academy of Sciences academician began his speech with the thought that two invincible trends are now operating in the world. The first is peoples' desire for freedom and the desire to be the master of their own fates and the second is the trend toward greater interdependence and economic integration, because only that is the way to economic prosperity in conditions of a market economy. These trends are interwoven. Namibia, which people were reminded of here, received its freedom and immediately began to set up treaty relations with the Republic of South Africa, joining its and the world economic structures. That is the extremely complex dialectics and, by the way, peace and conditions of development arise only when a country and its people become the master of their own fate. Here are the keys of the approach both to events in Estonia and to the Estonian Communist Party's place in Estonia's future. A party can no longer

exist in Estonia if it does not support the clearly expressed desire of the Estonian people to revive the forcibly interrupted state system and to revive the Estonian Republic as a subject of international law. If certain members of the party among us do not understand that, then it means that they have very little understanding of what is going on in Estonia. If people in Moscow do not understand that, then it closes the way to finding the right decisions in the interests of the Union and in the interests of Estonia. If we want to preserve ourselves as a party, we must support freedom, but in doing so immediately define what tomorrow will be like, the day after we have acquired freedom. What is our strategy? A politician and all the more so a party which cannot foresee two or three steps ahead of not only its own course but the answering course of its possible partners or possible opponents is not worth anything. The misfortune in the Transcaucasus was that politicians there proved unable to foresee even the responses to their actions.

As it was not possible to build socialism in one separate country, so it is impossible to build freedom in one separate Estonia if next to it there is no free Union and if other countries are not free. Freedom is above all freedom of choice and responsibility for choice before one's own people and the world. Unfortunately, I do not see a strategy of development of independent Estonia which has been worked out. Tactical maneuvers for the purpose of winning more votes predominate in numerous Estonian parties and movements. There is populism, there is a struggle of leaders, but most often strategy and responsibility are lacking. And a precise strategy is impossible without a precise analysis of the situations not only in Estonia but in the Union and in the world. Can we fully break away from the Union and fully join the Western economic and political structure?

The Union is changing and certainly will continue to change. An altogether new system of economic coordinates of the Union market on the example of the EEC [European Economic Community] will be set up. Whoever becomes part of the structure of the Union market will have the advantages in prices and tariffs. Whoever is outside this market will immediately know it, because it will immediately be compelled to change to world prices. For Estonia that is a loss of approximately a billion rubles every year.

The strategy of laying bridges is a strategy where Estonia and the Baltic Region will no longer be the spoils of the wolfish appetites of the West and the East, but will acquire international prestige by helping to build a renewed Europe in a renewed world and by finding the source of prosperity in it. If the Estonian Communist Party adopts this and if it says, we want the prosperity of a free Estonia, defense of the interests of Estonia, and the equal rights of all its residents, then the party will have its own place and future too.

T. Pupkevich

The brigade foreman of the Estonslanets Association began his speech with the idea that the party which used to be the party of the working class has over time become a party which no longer represents that class. It has become a party of apparatchiks and administrators. The tragedy of the party, in the speaker's opinion, is that it did not define its positions clearly.

A struggle is going on here with the Moscow bureaucracy. But as a worker and brigade foreman who back 15 years ago posed questions of cost-accounting independence, I now see that the authority of the central Moscow bureaucracy is changing into more of a secondary authority but a more rigid one. Labor collectives have not in fact received freedom of actions. Neither the emancipation of enterprises nor the convergence of the worker with the results of his labor is felt.

In the speaker's opinion, there is nowhere from which to expect improvement for the labor collective or the entire society. It has not gotten any better either for Yukhan who took a farmstead or livestock unit or for Ivan who works on a machine tool. Pressure on the laborer will grow while the apparat consolidates itself. While we have been fighting against the administrative command system, it has become more powerful, stronger, and richer.

The speaker noted that even the IME [Self Managing Estonia], upon which so many hopes were laid, is not an economic policy but that same administrative command system, only more refined.

The republic is losing prestige. Our internal situation causes distrust of us. The change in positions by many of our deputies and the abrupt switches make our policy unconvincing.

Our mistake is that the Russian-speaking population is not included in resolving issues of migration and other issues. One part of the population tries to decide everything itself without taking into account the opinion of the other. But all the issues cannot be resolved independently, the speaker stressed. We are now like spiders in a jar. When the economy has to be strengthened and we should be working on ecology, we are clarifying relations. Only unity on the basis of reason and labor will bring us to the goal which we have set for ourselves.

R. Otsason

The president of the Estonian Bank appealed to the delegates not to forget that ultimately the economy determines everything, and it also stands behind political passions. The country is now undergoing a total economic, financial, national, and ecological crisis. But who can be called responsible for the country's condition? There is no answer. And in this hall there are many management comrades. But they are also not responsible for what is going on in the republic. Is that not the cause

of the crisis? Universal lack of responsibility was generated from above by a centralized system of management which was created by Stalin, but up to now has been jealously supported by many central departments and their local representatives who under cover of fine slogans do everything to maintain old customs.

We persistently sought a solution to the situation which had been created. That is how the idea of republic cost-accounting arose, the idea which the Union departments immediately rose up against. But when the program was carried through the USSR Supreme Soviet, an open boycott of it began. All this led to the fact that today the question is already being posed of the republic's independence and its right to independently resolve all issues. Now they are trying to convince us that this step is groundless and that economic ties must not be severed. But can ties really be severed if economic interest exists? And is this really in our interests?

The speaker also noted that it is senseless to clarify who owes whom and how much—the republic to the Union or vice-versa. Everything that has been built as capital construction in different regions of the country was built on capital allocated from the Union budget. But all republics, Estonia among them, made their contribution to the budget. Therefore, clarifying what belongs to the Union in the republic can only lead to the absurd. And understanding that, we do not pose the question that way, since just as much in the Union belongs to the republic.

A. Gusev

The first secretary of the Morskoy Party Raykom noted that the importance of today's congress is difficult to exaggerate. In many respects it is determining the future of the party and the future of the Estonian State.

Recently the Estimpeks Foreign Trade Firm marked its third anniversary. What is its existence based on? Export of petroleum products—62.2 percent, timber—6.4 percent, and knitwear—6.1 percent. What does that say? It may be compared with a cow which has its head in the Soviet Union while the part that gives milk is in our republic. Today we have fallen out with virtually everyone. And now we will most likely come into conflict not only with the economic structures of the Union, but also with the political ones. For separating Estonia from the Soviet Union and separating the Estonian Communist Party from the CPSU does not bode well for us. The Estonian CP Central Committee bears substantial blame here. It made many attempts to stabilize the situation in the republic. But nonetheless it did not manage to do it.

The term "Russian policy" has appeared among us. But can there be a "Russian policy" in the republic if we declare equality of rights? Can there be special nationalities policies in republics if we are building a democratic state?

What kind of a party will we have—an independent one or one that is part of the CPSU? I asked about this at the

plenum but I was told that time would tell. But yesterday this line had already changed.

My rural colleagues speak correctly when they say that if a decision on the independence of the Estonian Communist Party is not made today, then the rural rayons will lose Estonian communists. But the same situation exists in the city as well. If the independence of the Estonian Communist Party is unambiguously declared today, but not on the CPSU platform, the same fate awaits our primary party organizations.

Each communist must himself think and decide how he should act. There is nothing terrible in that after the 28th Congress other parties, among them communist parties, will appear here. For healthy competition moves society ahead.

The speaker requested that those present fight together for the sovereignty of Estonia and for the greater sovereignty of the Estonian Communist Party on the CPSU platform.

T. Tamm

The secretary of the Vilyandiskiy Party Raykom proposed that it be recorded in the Estonian CP program that the party's activities are being shaped on the basis of human values. He also suggested many other corrections.

The Estonian Communist Party stands at the crossroads now. And we must make a choice. A difficult past and the party's participation in collectivization and mass repressions, which cannot be erased from the people's memory, looms over this choice. The struggle against what comes from this past is still ahead in many respects. But it should not be a struggle against former party leaders, for the guilty party is the system, Stalinism. And I am making a proposal to recognize Stalinism as a crime against humanity by decision of our congress.

The congress should also provide guidelines for the future. We need a 6-month transitional period to form an independent Estonian Communist Party. That is the key issue of the congress.

V. Kovtun

The secretary of the party committee of the Estonian Maritime Steamship Line proposed that the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress be approved. In it the USSR is represented as a renewed federation of Union republics. The positions of the CPSU Central Committee on the issues of nationalities relations are directed against the pretentious pose of those who support an openly imperial position and defend the unitary form of the state order, as well as against their diametrical opposites, among whom are separatists and all kinds of groups and movements.

Today when the country is in a difficult position the main thing is consolidating all the restructuring forces. The realization of perestroika, it seems to me, is possible

only on the basis of the published draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform.

Two main directions can now be identified in the party: the reformist, which is steadily gaining strength, and the conservative, which is waging a persistent struggle for influence and losing its positions. But there is one more direction which we make no mention of. It may be called the liquidating direction. Those who although members of the CPSU believe that it has exhausted the possibility of progressive impact on society and should leave the historical arena can be counted among them. Liquidators are those who decisively and completely reject Marxism and declare it responsible for the establishment of Stalinist barracks communism in the country. However, while openly declaring their political opposition to the CPSU, the liquidators nonetheless are not leaving its ranks; they prefer the tactics of "gnawing" at it from the inside. They clearly intend to incline as many communists as possible to their side, to enlist their broad support both at the 20th Estonian CP Congress and at the 28th Party Congress, and cause its split by forming a new party which shares the liquidators' platform.

The Estonian Communist Party has lost the initiative and lost prestige. The Estonian Communist Party was the only political organization which did not propose its own platform for elections. What kind of a Central Committee is it which is so ashamed of its name "communist" and does not propose its own platform? It is correct as they say that communists voted against communists.

The speaker noted that the program documents of an independent Communist Party are perhaps good documents, but that, in his opinion, this is a program of voluntary disarmament of the Communist Party which has brought the republic's social and political life to an impasse.

M. Luukas

The radical reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party should have begun at least a year ago, the first secretary of the Paydeskiy Party Raykom expressed the opinion of the communists of Yarovamaa. The draft of the reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party proposed to the congress and the establishment of a transitional period are the first constructive steps toward independence.

The political situation in society is changing very rapidly. After the elections and the formation of new organs of local self-management, real potential appeared for fundamental changes in the economic and social life of regions. We now depend less on the center. But in order to feel more confident, I would like to receive from the political experts and those elected to the new Supreme Soviet an indepth analysis of the present condition of Estonia, and I hope they will be ready for useful compromises.

In rejecting the accusation that the republics of the Baltic Region want to destroy the Union, the speaker noted that the desire for independence is in fact an affirmation of its new quality. Society is capable of developing only by creating new forms, rather than maintaining old schemes.

A. Sinyavskiy

The serviceman from Tartu expressed his concern that the party Central Committee did not really prepare for the congress and find a compromise between the delegations of various gorkoms, raykoms, and party organizations in advance so that the congress could engage in serious work, not become a political meeting. At such a meeting no one ever listens to anyone else.

I think that the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee who spoke here should have acknowledged the mistakes of the CPSU Central Committee. The fifth year of perestroyka is ending, but the draft of the new CPSU Charter just appeared. We should have had it 3 years ago. I understand that the party organization of the Union republic cannot be on the same level as the party organization of Tambov Oblast. That should have been changed.

In Tartu the situation before the party conference was approximately the same as it is here now. There were irreconcilable positions. But even before the party conference we managed to get together and find a compromise, and our conference went on peaceably and we found a sensible compromise.

In Tartu I became familiar with the work of the social democrats of Estonia. And now, after carefully reading the program proposed to us and the program of the future social democratic party of Estonia, I see that a great deal is being repeated. That is, there is already such a party. I met with Laborites of Great Britain and Swedish Social Democrats and listened to them. They said, if you stab Gorbachev in the back, we will not support you. I think that we do not need for Gorbachev to be stabbed in the back. I would hope that we do not repeat the mistakes of the Lithuanian Communist Party here. After the Lithuanian Communist Party declared its independence there were rallies. Brazauskas is a leader! But Brazauskas is no longer the leader of the republic. And the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is already declining. But the Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU does not decline. The same thing must not happen to the Estonian Communist Party. I would like to ensure that after the congress we do not embitter friend against friend and we are able to understand both. But we do not want to understand now. I would hope that after this congress we remain friends and try to normalize the situation in the republic. I would hope that we come to a compromise. For a split is of no help to anyone.

Yu. Tamme

In the opinion of the first secretary of the Tartu Party Gorkom, the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress as a political document is a big step ahead. But for us it is too late. It also has a great deal that is contradictory and superficial and the part about the Party's future and its renewal looks very weak. In the sixth year of perestroika talk about the new meaning of the Soviet federation still go on, but on the party level the pyramid-like building of the mechanism of power is not even questioned. It seems that the CPSU as a whole is not yet ready for strictly revolutionary renewal and does not keep pace with the changes occurring in society. When in the summer of 1988 Estonia came out with the idea of a Union Contract, the center opposed it adamantly. But now, when the idea has begun to be accepted even in the center, most of the people of Estonia by now demand independence. And the idea of federalism in the party, which was rejected from the outset, is even less acceptable today; the Estonian Communist Party has ripened into independence.

We understand achieving independence as a process whose meaning, rate, and scale in Estonia may not coincide with similar processes in the Union and the CPSU. Strict adherence to it takes away from us the right to ourselves decide our own fate; all our past experience attests to that.

We must go to the 28th Congress with a platform which expresses our aspirations for democratization of the party. We must look not for enemies but for allies of whom, I am certain, there are a considerable number in the CPSU.

V. Yermolayev

In the opinion of the secretary of the party committee of the Estrybprom Association, before we make any decision we must define the concepts of what are we dealing with—the ends or the means? Then it is simpler by calling things by their names to take the right course. Let us say openly today: the party has always been a means, an instrument of the end. And the end and task of the party is to take and keep power. I am profoundly certain that the point is not aggravating interethnic relations. Permission was asked of neither the indigenous nor the nonindigenous population to raise prices. Obstacles were put up on the hauling of agricultural products across the republic's border, thereby striking the villagers above all. Both the indigenous and the nonindigenous suffer from the curtailment of housing construction in Tallinn.

The program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party is in principle not a program of our party. It is a well-done homework assignment to refine the experience of our southern neighbors.

Two issues remain fundamental ones: an independent republic within the CPSU or outside it. In speaking today of the unity of the party, we understand that the Estonian Communist Party leaving the CPSU is not an

end in itself but a means to achieve the final goal—the republic leaving the Union. Having cut the umbilical cord which links us to the Union, we increase the temptation to take the next step—leave the USSR. The consequences may be difficult to predict. I appeal to all of you to use reason and consideration when making decisions.

The games played by the apparat in 1988 in elections of delegates from Estonia to the all-Union party conference were one of the reasons which led to the crisis of the Estonian Communist Party and the change in leadership. But now we are again inclined toward apparat games by proposing to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress at our congress. I am certain that communists both in the cities and in rural rayons should elect them.

N. Mikhayeva

The Estonian Communist Party, as a territorial organization of the CPSU, is not capable of expressing the interests of the people and does not meet the aspirations of most communists. That thought was heard among us at the rayon party conference which supported the program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party, said the first secretary of the Kokhtla-Yarveskiy Party Raykom. We must acknowledge the failure of dogmatic Marxism and give a historical evaluation to the activities of the Estonian Communist Party and recognize the inevitability of the process of self-determination of the Estonian people.

We need our own economic policy constructed not on utopian ideas of the future but on objective laws of development. We also need our own nationalities policy which guarantees the safety of all residents of Estonia and upholds civil peace.

The following question arises among many communists and the CPSU leadership, as it seems to me: in setting up an independent party, why do we want to break off ties with the CPSU? For we really do not want that! Over the decades of ties we have experienced the primitive subordination of the lower-ranking organization to the higher-ranking and more powerful authority. But why can't our ties be equal and voluntary? For such a union of equals, a union of like-minded people, will be fixed more strongly and firmly.

M. Amelin

The war veteran emphasized in his speech the idea that the friendship of peoples, Estonians and Russians or Eesti and Russ, was born in ancient times, with Oleg and Vladimir. The Estonian and Russian peoples fought together and in 1936 took part together in strikes and together fought in destroyer battalions.

The speaker asked that people honor the memory of the communists who gave their lives in the struggle.

Why do communists open up a memorial to the SS troops, when we know that the SS as an organization was

condemned by the international tribunal in Nuremberg? For this is being done on behalf of the Estonian people. Both the Estonian CP Central Committee and the party raykoms close their eyes to that. How can the activity of the Estonian CP Central Committee be evaluated after that?

I am proud of the fact that I fought and that I have four wounds, fragments in my head, fragments in my arm, and two bayonet wounds in my chest. But people say to me now: traitor to the Estonian people. That is what the last 2 years have led to. I just returned from Lake Chudskoye. On 26 February of this year citizens' committees collected signatures and forced children and school students to sign. In our village 3 or 4 people from a total of 101-103 homes were found, plus illiterate old women signed. But when they approached the store, the line, people there refused to sign. They said, we don't want to wear primitive shoes and eat your skim milk which the peasants used to feed their hired shepherds.

V. Levitin

After the 15th plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee, noted the department head of the Estonian Association, most communists hoped that then, finally, our party would really begin to work on developing its own program document and materials for the 28th Congress which would define, as we the republic's communists see it, the development of the communist movement in Estonia and the development of the CPSU as a whole. But, unfortunately, the 16th plenum and the party conference showed that not everyone wants to follow that path. The documents which we have received here, among them the draft of the program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party, contain a number of progressive ideas. But again an attempt is made to create a certain "party of the whole people." It is declared that the strategic goal is to realize the independence of the Estonian State. But as for the immediate tactical task, bringing Estonian society out of crisis, that is also linked to withdrawing from the Soviet Union and breaking with the CPSU. Moving along this path will eliminate from Estonia's political arena Marxist ideology and the party which in general is the only one in the world which stands for the positions of the working class.

I completely agree with the idea from Comrade Vyalyas's report that the Estonian Communist Party must purify itself rather than create a new party. But the draft of the program of reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party proposed to us in combination with other documents clearly shows that our Central Committee wants to set up a different party. Because it is precisely the program and charter which are signs to identify the party. If these documents were presented for our discussion as proposals for the 28th Congress as our platform or an addendum to that platform which the CPSU Central Committee presented for discussion, that

would be logical and understandable. But what is being done now is an attempt to pull down the party from above.

I propose the following: for the actual breakdown of the Estonian Communist Party manifested in the lack of leadership by the republic's party organizations, especially in the last 6 months, which led to the mass exodus of communists from the party, flagrant violations of the CPSU Charter (payment of dues and the like), and violations in the use of party capital as well as in the Estonian CP Central Committee's attempt to set up a different party made up of the republic's communists, to acknowledge the work of the Central Committee as unsatisfactory. The speaker also proposed that the program draft and the statute not be presented for a vote.

I. Shepelevich

The director of the Plant imeni Pegelman announced that a telegram had been sent to Moscow and to Lithuania in support of the Lithuanian Communist Party which stands on the CPSU platform by many party organizations, the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives], and the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power.

Yesterday's morning "limbering-up exercises," when there was a series of votes even on a number of insignificant issues, defined the distribution of forces at the congress and identified the advocates of two ideologies of the construction of the party and the state: the advocates of a federated unified state and the Estonian Communist Party as part of the CPSU (approximately 270 people), and slightly more than 400 who are people who are advocates of an independent republic and, naturally, an independent Estonian Communist Party.

Today's speeches have not brought us closer together and have not persuaded anyone of anything. Estonia is starting its next historical experiment, and it is sad that living people are the guinea pigs of this experiment. When strike processes began here, I understood the wisdom of the policies of the Estonian CP Central Committee. For the Estonian CP Central Committee did not go against its own people and stood firmly for its positions. We also did not go against our own collectives and against our own people in the strike processes. But it was a vicious circle. Where are those leaders who are able to lead a multiethnic republic? Most likely, today we face the need for coalition leadership in the republic in the good sense of that word.

The proposed situation with a transitional period is already consideration of Lithuania's experience. The so-called transitional period is nothing more than an attempt to demonstrate to public opinion a democratic process of withdrawing and setting up new parties, rejecting accusations of a split "from above," and an attempt to bring public opinion to the idea that everything that is happening is being done by the people.

Under the banner of the 20th Congress the appropriate documents will be adopted. But they are the documents of a new party. After those kinds of documents are adopted, our congress acquires an altogether different sense and becomes a kind of constituent congress of the transitional period which commands party organizations to begin forming a party.

Kh. Barabaner

"Our common enemy today," the chief scientific associate of the Institute of Thermophysics and Electrophysics is certain, "is street politics. Yes, in counterbalance to serious politics, the politics of indepth analyses, serious reckoning, and long-term forecasts; street politics is acquiring more and more influence, a politics of flashy slogans and easy solutions, a politics oriented to fashion in which the pain and concerns of peoples become not the incentive for dominant action but a means of achieving by no means unselfish goals. But everyone knows that a mob does not result in a democracy but leads to ochlocracy—mob rule. A mob does not give birth to leaders, it creates fuehrers, and it is not important what nationality these fuehrers are, German, Russian, or Estonian. The basic generic sign of street politics is the lack of a systematic approach to socioeconomic phenomena and the lack of a concept of the phenomena, and here I unfortunately must say that very serious manifestations of the street politics phenomenon were noted at the start of perestroika. It was started without serious formulation of the concept and the relations between phenomena were interpreted along the way."

I would like to propose to mention in the decision of our congress that we must act as initiators of a social forum of the republic's democratic forces. And at this forum each social movement which considers itself responsible for the republic's fate and for the fate of the peoples of Estonia should express its vision of Estonia and only after that make the final decisions.

We must certainly participate in the work of the 28th CPSU Congress. I think that serious change in the entire policy and structure of the party will come about at this most important congress.

I. Kalmykov

The secretary of the primary party organization of the plant administration of the Kekhra Production Association is convinced that the basis of the difference of opinions is the difference in the political views of the Estonian CP members on the social processes going on at the present time, similar to the difference in the political views of the entire population of Estonia, by the way. This difference was built into the initial readiness of the republic's two population groups for perestroika to begin.

"While the overwhelming majority of the Estonian population simply did not acknowledge 'barracks socialism' but has accepted perestroika as the long-awaited time for realizing an undying dream, the revival of their own

state order, for most of the Russian-speaking population the arrival of the age of glasnost meant the overthrow of the 'ideals of socialism' which seemed invincible. That is the reason for the suspicion and even hostility toward all ideas and initiatives which come from Estonian social movements, parties, and state organs. Even after Moscow acknowledged them (let us recall the evaluation of events in 1939-1940, regional cost-accounting, defense of language, nationality symbolism), a certain alienation between the two language communities remained. Unfortunately, the Estonian CP members were not up to the mark on this delicate issue. Comrade Vyalyas's appeal to communists to carry out purposeful explanatory work first of all among their own fellows was, alas, not heard. Moreover, the actions of many communists, especially managers of various ranks, promoted and at times simply provoked the condition of lack of trust and suspicion among the Russian-speaking inhabitants toward the processes underway in the republic. The apotheosis of these actions concealed by the interethnic phrase but in fact directed against the national-democratic movement of the Estonian people was the formation of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia. I would like to ask the leaders of this committee: what power are they planning to protect? How can they combine actions to defend this power with the appeal to boycott the first free elections to the soviets?"

Numerous facts show that the stratification in the party is the result not only and not so much of the 'nationalities question.' The stratification follows political views.

V. Gaylit

The first secretary of the Pyarnuskiy Party Raykom made critical comments regarding the start of the congress which most likely made a depressing impression on many of those who were following what is happening in the hall by radio and television. We gathered here, he said, to make sure that the talk begun at the Estonian Communist Party conference on the new make-up of the party and the republic continues rather than to squabble and settle personal accounts.

In Pyarnumaa we had hot debates in the period between the conference and the congress. Three-quarters of our communists are seriously concerned about what will happen to the party now. They, and certainly many others, are by no means indifferent to what is happening at this congress. They want to see the Estonian Communist Party an independent party such as the mandate we have received dictates.

The speaker directed attention to the fact that the high average age of the delegates attests to the age of the party. The party, if it does not get young reinforcements, does not have a future. And to insure that these reinforcements come, we must follow an attractive, flexible policy which takes into account the fundamental interests of young people.

Estonian CPSU Loyalist Decries Party Split

90UN1600B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 6 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by G. Israelyan, delegate to the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress and deputy of the Estonian Supreme Soviet: "What Next?"]

[Text] A fair amount of time has elapsed since the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress. Passions have subsided, and, casting emotions aside, we may draw conclusions and introduce a certain clarity simultaneously for communists and all for whom the fate of the party is not a matter of indifference. It is further necessary to do this because hot on the heels of the congress representatives of the press, television, and radio, particularly its versions in Russian, aptly nicknamed in Tallinn's work force "nightingales of perestroika," created a commotion in connection with it. Everything was put to service—both name-calling ("splittists," "conservatives," "factionalists") and one-sided evaluations. Flashes of rich imagination of the journalists and those whom they considered it necessary to interview substituted for the absence of reliable information.

Not only this forced me to take up my pen. Immediately after the congress I met with communists of many outfits and realized that people are having difficult getting their bearings in the current critical situation. I would therefore like to briefly describe what I, as a delegate to the congress, encountered there. What, then, happened at the congress?

In the process of preparation for it the former Estonian CP Central Committee Buro (it has now relinquished its authority) deliberately moved to create an independent party outside of the CPSU. Proof? In defiance of the resolution of the Estonian Communist Party conference, the congress agenda did not include an item concerning the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. The Estonian Communist Party Program prepared by the Central Committee working group contains the precise postulates: Estonia is not a part of the renewed federation of the USSR and an independent party outside of the CPSU. In addition, a statute of this party for the **transitional period** was prepared (I would ask that you remember the last words, we will return to them).

No one from the working group of the Tallinn Gorkom [City Party Committee] was enlisted in the preparation of the congress material by the former Central Committee, despite promises to work hand in hand. And this was logical since it was not seen as being of like mind. And at the congress our attempts to incorporate in the working bodies supporters of a different viewpoint were rejected by the built-in majority.

In the course of the debate not one speaker from the "minority" called for a party split. On the contrary, all maintained that division was dangerous and would lead to impasse and that it was necessary to go to the 28th

CPSU Congress together. But, alas.... We were not heard. It is now being said that the "majority" moved toward compromise constantly. Excuse me, I missed this. Of course, some details in the program of the new (or independent) party may be changed, but the document has not on account of editorial cosmetics shed its basic essence which caused the dispute. We proposed that it be seen as the platform for the 28th Congress. By secret ballot the majority rejected this also. True, it should be noted for fairness' sake that the congress presidium dropped from discussion the draft statute and that it was not handed out to the delegates.

In my view, the pivotal stage in the work of the congress was the vote on the new party program. We could not participate in this. I am prepared to repeat once more what I said at the congress: The communists who delegated us did not give us the authority to create a new party.

Was there a possibility of compromise? Yes. More, it was very close. Both sides were ready to form a coalition Central Committee. We proposed that it be elected by "faction." This was the essence of the compromise. Unfortunately, the congress presidium did not keep its promise and did not agree to separate, according to factional list, elections. The reason given for this was that such a procedure was not provided for by the CPSU Rules. Yet the congress had several minutes earlier made up its mind to break the rules and elect delegates to the 28th Congress by precisely this method.

Thus the last attempt at reaching a compromise was canceled out. The ratio of representatives of the two sides also was altered in the course of discussion of the future Central Committee. So it was by no means a question of some people being elected but of some people being "steamrollered." It had become clear even prior to the elections that there would be no coalition Central Committee. Nor did there remain any hope of the crisis being overcome following a proposal concerning the co-option of four new members of the Central Committee. The elected committee could by absolute majority turn down any proposal of the minority. We are seeing constantly how this is being done. Fuel was poured on the fire also by the adoption of the declaration of the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress concerning the creation of an independent party in Estonia and also the communication concerning the adoption in 10 days of a party statute for the transitional period. So who "split" the Estonian Communist Party?

I believe that, like myself, many communists have no need of a **transitional period**. We joined the CPSU and will remain in it. We consider unacceptable the creation of a new party on the basis of the existing structures of the CPSU and the structuring of membership of a new party within the heart of the CPSU.

Why such haste for the 20th Congress? The answer is simple: in order not to leave Lithuania in solitude and "help" it a little more quickly.

Having weighed all these circumstances, the group of delegates to the 20th Congress continued it late into the evening and elected a new Central Committee and two secretaries, and adopted a resolution and an appeal to the CPSU Central Committee.

What had we achieved? We now have two parties—an independent Estonian Communist Party (SKPE) and the Estonian Communist Party, two central committees and... a single membership. We see as the Estonian Communist Party's main task preventing the independent party from causing the disintegration of the CPSU organization. Of course we do not rule out cooperation and joint actions with the SKPE Central Committee. It would be highly logical to discuss the current situation jointly.

I hold to my opinion that only a united Estonian Communist Party may be a mechanism stabilizing society. But, alas.... The Estonian Communist Party has been dealt a telling blow. Yet it was the last barrier in the way of a sharp exacerbation of interethnic relations in the republic. There is nothing surprising in the fact that since the congress events have unfolded at the pace of a frenzied leap forward. Five days later the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet elected on 18 March hastily, without broad discussion and by automatic majority, adopted the declaration on the cooperation of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia and the decree "Official Status of Estonia." In spite of the protests and appeals of the "For Equal Rights" group of deputies that they not be in haste and that they carefully consider and discuss with the people this step, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies adopted these documents by that same majority. A **transitional period**, which will culminate in the formation of constitutional state authorities of the Republic of Estonia, has been proclaimed in Estonia.

The adoption of these documents without regard for the opinion of all inhabitants of the republic means in practice the start of a political coup effected peacefully and the transfer of state power to the restorers of the Republic of Estonia.

I foresee a clamorous chorus of incensed democrats: Stalinist, conservative, interist! He is against independence, to which the Estonian people have every right. Esteemed opponents, it is not national statehood that I oppose. I oppose the restoration of the practices of 1939 and the constitution and collection of rights and liberties which personify the past. Let us recall history. Any restoration is accompanied by reaction: the return of the Bourbons in France, the defeat of the Paris Commune and the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia.... Of course, direct parallels are impossible. But there is, you will agree, certain cause for concern. Look who is standing in line at the employment offices in the GDR.

Activists and members of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany. It is not from lack of competence that they are not being hired but on account of their past. Many of Landsbergis' edicts are eloquent. They are already pointing the vector of the changes. And in our own republic notes making it possible to catch the bravura marches of the future "democracy" creep in from time to time. I hope that not everyone has yet forgotten the response of the Estonian SSR Government to the strikes last summer.

Just think into what temptation we are leading our future rulers in dissolving a party of the left, reforming the unions, banning the activity of party organizations at the place of work and thus disconnecting the working people. I spoke about this at the 20th congress, incidentally, but for some reason or other it was this section of my speech that failed to attract the attention of the press. I would not wish to be a Cassandra but consider myself simply duty bound to point out what I foresee. Some 110,000 social odd-men- out in one small republic—is this not rather many? Perhaps it would be better to move toward an independent Estonia, but by a path which is not as swift but less dangerous for all its inhabitants? With regard for today and tomorrow.

Of course, the People's Front wants to help Lithuania. Although it has not asked the opinion of the inhabitants not only of our republic but of the republic itself in choosing its path....

But let us return to the 20th Party Congress, which adopted a decision on a **transitional period**. I ask myself: Are not the scripts of the congress and the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet First Session the fruit of the endeavors of one group of authors? What goals are being pursued? Or is there a goal? The answer suggests itself: A transitional period is necessary for the formation of a new (highly undemocratic) state power in which there is no room for the Communist Party.... This is the whole distinction between "our Estonian" version and the "Lithuanian" version. What next?

End of Political Strike Declared in Estonia

90UN1947A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 25 May 90 p 1

[Article by S. Tarakanov: "It Was Decided To End the Strike"]

[Text] Tallinn—It seems that just two days ago the political strike in Estonia reached its climax. Railwaymen of the Narva-Tovarnaya station and workers of the Baltic ship repair factory had taken part in the protest action. In all, 30 of the republic's enterprises quit working completely or in part.

At a press conference conducted by the republic's strike committee it was reported that deliveries of food to the factory dining rooms at the striking enterprises were partially halted, which gave rise to a response from Narva's power engineering specialists. At a session of the

Supreme Soviet, republic deputy S. Sovetnikov announced a resolution of the conference of the Estonian GRES [state regional electric power plant] labor collective. It expresses support for the USSR president's Edict on Estonia and a readiness to begin a strike and cut off the supply of electric energy.

"Pressure on the strikers only aggravates the situation," said A. Kutenev, an electric welder at the Tallinn ship repair factory. "Now there is a very real threat that the bank will not distribute money to the enterprises participating in the political action for payment on account."

Incidentally, the strikers of the enterprise intended to make up the work that had been missed inasmuch as the goal of the strike was political and not economic. Losses from the strike are expected to be great, although several newspapers and radio and television broadcasts have tried to convince us that the republic did not suffer any damage because the products at the halted enterprises are shipped out beyond its borders. That is far from the truth. A major portion remains in Estonia. In addition, about 70 percent of the republic's budget is formed from money deducted from enterprises subordinate to the Union.

And now the representatives of the strikers have assembled in the "Mayak" Palace of Culture to coordinate their further steps. Because the goal of the strike—to attract the attention of the country and of the republic's leadership to the problems of the non-Estonian population—has been achieved, they decided to end the strike on the morning of 24 May.

Georgian CP Winds Up Pre-Congress Campaign

90US0922A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
27 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Report of the Commission on Preparation of the 28th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party: "To Ensure the Consolidation of Party Ranks"]

[Text] A significant stage has been concluded in the pre-congress campaign of the republic Communist Party—meetings have been held in the primary party organizations. City and rayon party conferences at which delegates of the 28th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party will be elected have begun work, the first results of discussions held at party conferences have been summarized, and a position has been expressed on specific problems raised by Communists, and on those questions on which there will be discussions at the upcoming congress. Party meetings were held in an atmosphere of unparalleled frankness and critical and sharp discussions and debates. They displayed the strong and growing intellectual potential of the party.

Most of all, the sovereignty of Georgia and the status of its Communist Party disturb Communists. They believe that these questions are vitally connected to each other. Discussions about the future of the party and its role in

a radically renewed social life revealed a broad spectrum of positions and opinions, clear signs, and the maturity of political perestroika.

The diversity of views is the result of the socio-political and socio-economic processes that are occurring in the country. The intensification of crisis phenomena and the difficulties that arise in interethnic relations and party life trouble Communists. Party members express dissatisfaction with their inadequate information about the activity of the party authorities. Support of party committees was also shown. At the same time, they were sharply criticized for an insufficiently clear display of positions on existing problems.

A useful exchange of opinions was held on many economic problems, including questions of accelerating the transition to a regulated market economy. Communists who support equality of rights and a diversity of all forms of property sharply criticized the authorities for impeding the process of granting work collectives full economic independence and for an insufficiently persistent fight to defend their interests and rights, which causes many to feel socially vulnerable. A statement was made about the need to broaden the dialogue and to search more actively at all levels for points of contact with social movements. But this does not mean that the groundlessness of some extreme, destructive slogans and demands, and their harmful and dangerous character, should not be explained to the people. In the opinion of the meeting participants, the republic Communist Party must state clearly at the congress that it supports the restoration of Georgian statehood, its attainment of real sovereignty, and the establishment of appropriate political, legal, and economic prerequisites for this.

Serious criticism was leveled at those party committees at all levels who still have not given up those functions that are not usual for them, and who have not initiated political methods of work, which promotes an incorrect understanding of the role and place of party organizations among the workers and a skeptical attitude toward them.

Under conditions of a transitional period and the formation of a rule-of-law state, the authorities in every way possible should intensify work to suppress mass transgressions of the law and law and order, and not to allow a breakdown in work and production discipline in the collectives, and, in doing this, to preclude an undemocratic influence on people with different views.

Ambiguous considerations were expressed about the difficult processes occurring in youth circles and about the deep crisis of the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] movement in the republic. Communists believe that serious thought should be given to a radical renewal of the youth movement and to a search for effective forms of its self-government, and, simultaneously, for a mutual understanding of the generations and affirmation of their succession.

In the opinion of the commission, recommendations of Communists expressed with respect to the development of the strategy and tactics of Communists in the forthcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic on a multiparty basis deserve special attention. To give this work a more purposeful character, the congress should work up a clear and realistic pre-election platform.

If we summarize the opinions expressed by Communists in pre-election meetings, which will find comprehensive reflection not only in congress documents, but also in the course of current and impending discussions at city and rayon conferences, they essentially reflect one thought—the kind of deep reform of the Georgian Communist Party that is necessary is one that corresponds to new political and socio-economic realism, national features, and the geopolitical position of the republic. Communists realize very well that the question concerns a critical choice that the 28th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party has to make. Otherwise, they may not keep up with the dynamics of socio-political life. That is why it is necessary today to pay attention to the progress of the review of the most important problems, what ways Communists propose to resolve them, and what should be presented at the congress.

A fundamental consideration about the future of the Georgian Communist Party has actually been formed. It is a question of creating a qualitatively new and distinctive party, the kind of political party that will fight for the establishment of a genuinely democratic and humane society, that establishes firm guarantees for the vital interests of the people, laws, freedom, and honor and human dignity, and which assures conditions for a modern civilized life. As for the organizational structure of the party, which should contribute to the optimal achievement of the aforementioned objectives, then, in this respect, there exist various and mutually exclusive considerations—beginning with the preservation of its present structure and ending with separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There are many who support the creation of a union of independent communist parties of the republics. Each approach demands careful analysis and thought. Each consideration has both its own truth and logic and its weak aspects and contradictions.

Therefore, it will be a mistake to mitigate the incongruities artificially and to measure all positions with one yardstick. Of course, it is far from always useful to adopt foreign experience blindly, no matter how attractive it might seem at first glance. It must be known and determined beforehand what this would bring and what the specific practical results would be for our republic, which has its own specific nature, millennial traditions of statehood, a unique political culture, and multinational oblast, city, rayon, and primary party organizations.

All of this, undoubtedly, must be taken into account by party organizations and by participants in rayon and city

party conferences, and the proposals put forth by Communists must be thoroughly analyzed before the congress. **It is absolutely necessary to avoid confrontation and divisions according to national or social categories and to guarantee a consolidation of party ranks on a single platform within the framework of a humane democratic society.**

It is a question not so much about compromise, but about a reasonable synthesis of opinions and views of those people who are fighting for a free and independent Georgia, for a Georgia that is open to mutually advantageous political and economic relations and equal participation in a union of a community of nations.

The commission, which has summarized the proposals of the participants of party meetings, and also the contents of Communists' letters, believes that only under conditions of discussion and free expression of various opinions will it be possible to achieve the desired, optimal result. At the same time, a constructive character should absolutely be attributed to the exchange of opinions, and it should be transformed into operational instructions to the congress delegates.

A serious critical mood, unquestionably, will enrich the work of the congress, especially if this mood contains a positive and constructive potential. Otherwise, very many serious problems that trouble Communists and the entire society of the republic could be disregarded. First and foremost what is referred to here is the concept of national development that was elaborated on the initiative of the Georgian Communist Party. The congress must give new force to its practical implementation and define the responsibility and tasks of party organization in this matter.

Proposals associated with the congress can be presented to the commission by everyone—Communists, members of various professional associations, artistic unions, youth and student associations, and war and work veterans.

The commission is ready to examine all constructive proposals. This should help avoid defects and errors that could be committed in the process of preparing for the conduct of the congress. The doors of the Georgian Communist Party are open for broad discussion and the examination of various opinions and exchanges of opinions. In addition, it will carefully study and summarize questions raised in the course of party conferences.

Only under conditions of such preparations can the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia take a serious step forward on the road to the democratic renewal of the socio-political life of the republic and the consolidation of the Communists of all progressive forces.

Kazakh Primary Party Organization Secretaries Meet

Participants Listed

90US0726A *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Secretaries Consult"]

[Text] On 2 March in Alma-Ata the republic conference of secretaries of primary party organizations opened at the party obkom House of Political Education. The participants in it are carrying on a concerned discussion on the party's role in present conditions and on increasing the efficiency of sociopolitical work.

N. A. Nazarbayev, the first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee and chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, opened the conference and gave a report.

The following people participated in the discussions: M. A. Dzhurunova, party organization secretary of the Kokchetav Oblast Children's Hospital; V. N. Demin, party committee secretary of the Machine Building Plant imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov (city of Uralsk); T. I. Ruza-khunov, party committee secretary of the Kolkhoz imeni S. M. Kirov in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast; N. A. Aliyev, party committee secretary of the Kaynarbulak Sovkhoz in Chimkent Oblast; K. B. Slanbayeva, party organization secretary of Secondary School No 12 (city of Alma-Ata); P. M. Melnikov, party committee secretary of the Mine imeni 50-letiya Oktyabrskoy revolyutsii of the Karagandaugol Association; K. M. Muldakulov, party committee secretary of the Aktyubstroy Trust; V. P. Katkov, party committee secretary of the Pribalkhashstroy Trust in Dzhezkazgan Oblast; M. A. Aubakirov, party committee secretary of the Krasnoznamenskiy Sovkhoz in Tselinograd Oblast; A. T. Kuznetsova, party organization secretary of the Vostochniy Open-Cut Mine of the Ekibastuzugol Association; L. V. Stolyarova, party committee secretary of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Road Building Institute; B. T. Tayzhanov, party committee secretary of the Kzyl-Orda Paper and Cardboard Plant; M. M. Urazalin, party committee secretary of the Semipalatinsk Medical Institute; V. A. Putilin, party committee secretary of the Dzhambulkhozobuv Association; T. G. Maurer, party committee secretary of the Zolotaya niva Sovkhoz in North Kazakhstan Oblast; Zh. Aziretbergenov, party secretary of the Kolkhoz imeni Amangeldi in Chinikent Oblast; G. Ya. Kozlov, deputy director of the Party History Institute under the Kazakh CP Central Committee; M. G. Talipov, party committee secretary of the Pavlodar Tractor Plant imeni V. I. Lenin Association; V. B. Khasin, party bureau secretary of the Tselinograd Medical Institute; B. F. Rubanov, party committee secretary of the Semipalatinskzhilstroy Trust; and Ye. Seytkazin, party committee secretary of the Obukhovskiy Sovkhoz in East Kazakhstan Oblast.

N. A. Nazarbayev responded to the numerous questions of the secretaries of the primary party organizations.

Taking part in the conference's work are V. G. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee; Central Committee secretaries Ye. M. Asanbayev, V. I. Dvurechenskiy, and U. D. Dzhaniybekov; G. A. Shipilov, sector head of the CPSU Central Committee Department of Party Construction and Cadre Work; and L. D. Zakharchenko, responsible worker of the CPSU Central Committee.

The conference will continue its work on 3 March.

Nazarbayev Speaks

90US0726B *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 pp 1-3*

[Text] Comrades!

Frankly speaking, a conference like this one should have been set up long ago. I am certain that timely consultation with secretaries of primary party organizations would have most likely helped avoid quite a few hidden reefs which we have encountered in the unexplored channel of the democratization of the party and would have helped counter the party's loss of prestige more effectively.

Obviously the chronic disease of the time of stagnation is still having its effect; at that time the widely proclaimed postulate that the primary party organization is the basis of the party in fact became neglect of the opinions of the rank and file communists, and the role of the "primaries" in adopting the most important party decisions was virtually nil.

Yes, perestroika in society, as in the party, started "from above" for a number of objective political reasons. But while the process of general civic politicization occurred relatively quickly and the broad popular masses were actively included in the course of democratic renewal, in the party milieu support "from below" did not prove to be so effective. And like a mirror this fact reflected the numerous flaws of our organization, which has taken on the very responsible role of the leading force of Soviet society.

For too long we closed our eyes to obvious distortions of intraparty life engendered by the Stalinist phenomenon and to the fact that the apparatus of the party organs governed all and everything on behalf of the party to satisfy the ambitions of the "chiefs." It was this that led to communists losing their fighting qualities, to the wrong interpretation of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, and to the replacement of creative initiatives with disciplined but frequently unthinking performance of duties. A kind of political dependence took deep root in the hearts of the party members, the habit of patient expectation of instructions from higher-ranking organs, without whose "blessing" not a single question of any seriousness whatsoever was decided. And when in April 1985 the appeal sounded for perestroika and vigorous revolutionary action, many simply did not hear it. And could it have been otherwise, when

previous experience of possible punishment for any unconventional thinking weighed upon the consciousness of every communist.

Without making claims to an exhaustive explanation of the causes of the present crisis in the party, I still want to emphasize that it is precisely this contradiction between initiative coming "from above" and the passivity of the "lower depths" which resulted in the appearance of the feature which hampers democratization of intraparty life. Moreover, the political inertness of the main mass of communists has an extremely negative effect on the party leadership's readiness to decisively follow the path of transformations outlined.

How can we get out of this vicious circle? What specifically must be done to bring the level of activism of primary party organizations into line with their designation today?

During preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh CP Congress, there is a chance to turn the party ship around sharply into the main channel of perestroika. It is important to make no mistakes and perform an accurate, precise adjustment maneuver, despite the extremely short time remaining. And we strongly hope that you came to this two-day talk without, figuratively speaking, empty hands. The secretaries of primary party organizations who stand at the sources of party initiatives and directly carry out the party's socio-economic and indoctrinational policy do have advice to give and suggestions to offer. All comments and proposals will be most attentively studied and generalized. And so that the most participants in the conference have the opportunity to express their opinions, the discussion is to be in three sections.

But now allow me to outline the set of issues which especially concern us today and which I would like to discuss with you.

First of all allow me to express my attitude toward the urgent problems involving the party's role in the present stage of perestroika.

The February 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the development of restructuring processes in the country was contradictory in nature. They are going on in conditions of a serious economic crisis, a budget deficit, and intensifying inflation which aggravate social and interethnic problems. Destabilizing forces which enter into confrontation with the CPSU have emerged on the political arena. All these negative phenomena have posed the following pointed question for the party: is it capable of maintaining the vanguard role and leading the Soviet people?

An exhaustive answer was given in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress: "The CPSU will carry out its policy and fight to preserve the position of ruling party within the framework of the democratic process."

It seems to me that this position deserves to be seriously considered. Paramount in the draft of the Central Committee Platform are such functions of the party committees as the program function, which includes developing new ideas, concepts, and programs which have the people's support and trust; the political function, which is being realized by the election struggle for the people's mandate of trust in the organs of power and the delegation of party members and its advocates to key posts; the organizational function, through the organization of coordinated work of all party links; and the ideological function—defense in conditions of political pluralism of its own positions and views and criticism of non-Marxist concepts of social development.

In other words, we are talking about breathing new life into the party and giving it a, so to speak, contemporary civilized face while getting rid of extrinsic authority functions, which are reverting back to the soviets. But in that case how should the theory of the "fight to preserve the position of ruling party" be interpreted? Is there not a contradiction here?

I am certain there is not. For in all times and in all states different parties have been the core of the political system, the preservers of its experience and traditions, and the spokesmen for the fundamental interests of the various social strata and the popular masses as a whole. Parties have always been the bearers of the ideology of certain classes and acted as the leading force of popular movements. So we are not the discoverers of the idea of the party's leadership role.

In any case the CPSU must defend its positions, that is, fight for political influence. Not by the previous administrative-command methods, it is true, but by parliamentary methods within the framework of a law-governed state. I must say directly that the task is not an easy one. If only because we do not have sufficient experience in the competitive struggle, many communists and party workers are afraid of open debates and controversies and experience a sense of confusion when deprived of the right to use the customary official "arguments." That is why it is so important today to turn to Leninist traditions of political work in the masses and take the best and most effective weapons from the rich but basically forgotten arsenal of party actions.

In this connection I must dwell on one more problem which disturbs the public. Today, as is well known, there has been enough talk of a multiparty system, and often without a deep comprehension of this concept and without elementary knowledge of the theory and practice of the issue. In everyday consciousness and populist statements the emphasis is as a rule put on the positive aspect of the term "multiparty system." And the fact that a despotic regime and an antipeople policy very far from genuine people's power can certainly be hidden behind this facade is not taken into consideration at all. We are given the example of the Western countries, even though in the United States itself the multiparty system is used to periodically interchange one bourgeois party for

another but invariably serving the interests of the bourgeois world. So the multiparty system must never been seen as a panacea. Especially since in our conditions it cannot arise on command or by decision of some organ.

Many people believe that under the existing democratization of intraparty life the need for other parties will pass of itself. There is undoubtedly reason for this opinion. In my opinion talk of a multiparty system should be considered people's desire to safeguard the CPSU from stagnation, bureaucratization, and degeneration.

We must take into account the will and mindset of all Kazakhstan residents on this issue and rely on the deep faith in the party and its robust strengths which live in the people. And there is no reason to look "up" to others' opinions, for we should work out our own policy and program of actions in accordance with the realities which exist in the republic.

The important thing is that it is time to raise our heads and shake off the torpor engendered by the mass attack on the party and renounce the harmful demoralizing desire of certain people for such universal repentance. The party is 20 million Soviet people and that part of the people who must not bear the guilt for the antipeople actions of the "chiefs" like Stalin and Brezhnev, and certainly must not go into mourning for anyone's benefit. We must not and do not have the right to consign to oblivion the moral feats of generations of rank and file communists whose only privilege was to be the first to take onto themselves the burdens and deprivations which befell the people, the first to go on the offensive, and the first to put their shoulders to the weight of the most serious and difficult causes.

Do we really have the right to forget as well that despite all the distortions that have occurred, it is precisely socialism which gave the decisive defeat to fascism, that the words "October Revolution," "Lenin," and "socialism" inspired millions of people on the earth to fight for freedom and justice? It is Great October which forced the world of capitalism to turn its eyes toward the oppressed and unfortunate and to make concessions to the workers' demands.

The responsibility which the party has assumed for past miscalculations, errors, and deformations has nothing in common with the guilt complex which is being persistently thrust upon it. Now many of our political opponents, competing in indiscriminate carping against party actions, paint only a black picture. And this applies not to history alone. It has become fashionable and very advantageous to criticize those who began perestroika and those who work indefatigably for it. Of course! Without proposing constructive ideas in exchange, one can simply and safely gain political capital by slinging more mud at the party.

We must not be seduced by the assumption that there are more defenders of perestroika than opponents. That is certainly so, but can we dismiss the mass of people who

do not seem to be involved with the party-state apparatus but live very peaceably in symbiosis with the administrative system and openly parasitize on it? And is it really true that there were so few for whom the main privilege of the stagnation period—the opportunity to work at half strength but receive the guaranteed material minimum and enjoy those same blessings as real workers—was convenient? Finally, former economic and party leaders and workers of various levels of the management apparatus who advanced during the stagnation years but who now are out of the picture actively demonstrate their rejection of perestroika. Look how many "victims of stagnation" there are suddenly, people who hasten to pass off any reprimand or criminal record from past years as unjust repression against them.

Recently I read in one of the central newspapers that according to local reports among the candidates for people's deputies of the RSFSR 11 citizens with criminal records were registered, including even ones who had served time for murder. That, of course, is the extreme, but is it really true that we have no people here among our candidates who are unscrupulous and have surfaced in the demagogical foam? Why do communists not reject them, why do they not open people's eyes to the real desires of the ardent populists? This passivity of party authority does not add anything. We should do everything to revive the Leninist principles of aggressive Bolshevism.

The time has come when the people of Kazakhstan should listen to our voice and become deeply aware that the republic communist party is doing everything to support the people's desire for the deepening and victory of the idea of perestroika and is fighting to improve well-being and to insure the tranquil and full-blooded life of every nation and nationality without exception and to insure social justice. We do not want street-rally democratism to overwhelm and drown everything valuable which has already come into being during the years of renewal. We are an element of the Kazakhstan people and we are always with them. Their interests are the vital concern of communists.

The priorities of party work advanced in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform are fully applicable to primary party organizations. Everyone knows that a planned, programmed start is the basis of any style of activity. It is that which makes it possible to rise above the busywork and see the socially significant trends beyond the particular phenomena. Now as never before we must have the ability to focus on meeting large-scale, strategic challenges, whether they be economics, politics, or ideology. Taking into account the particular importance of economics to the fate of perestroika, I will dwell on this aspect of party work in a little more detail.

In frankly evaluating the socioeconomic situation in the republic and acknowledging that it is a complex one, we must nevertheless mention that party organizations and committees are mastering the state of affairs and are directing their efforts to consolidating the positions

achieved and overcoming "slippages" in certain directions of socioeconomic development. What do we have in mind?

The downtrend in the growth rate in very important indicators of development of the economy has been stopped. The average annual increase in national production income in the current five-year plan period was 2.1 percent, and that is triple the rate for the same period in the past five-year plan period.

The economy's turn toward people's needs and demands has deepened. While in the past five-year plan period, 6.3 million square meters of housing came on line, in the present one the figure is almost 8 million. Food resources have also increased: procurement of meat and milk increased by 25 percent and production of grain—by 16 percent. During these years the production of consumer goods rose by a factor of 1.3 and the volume of paid services by a factor of 1.7.

The provision that Kazakhstan and its regions move to self-management and self-financing is fixed in a special line in the draft of the political Platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee for reports and elections in party organizations, the 17th Republic CP Congress, and the 28th CPSU Congress, which will soon be brought out for general discussion.

We are speaking of economic sovereignty. Not everywhere and not everyone understands this new word correctly. Allow me to cite a few figures to make it completely clear. Fifty-three percent of the enterprises located on the republic's territory are of all-Union jurisdiction, while 40 percent are under Union-republic ministries. Hence, we are in charge of only 7 percent of the enterprises. In addition, there is a distortion toward the development of the mining sectors as opposed to the light and food industry. Raw materials make up 70 percent of the structure of the output which we export. In 4 years Kazakhstan has given the country 3.5 billion rubles in hard currency but we have received practically none of it.

That is why we need sovereignty, the right to use our land and its minerals freely and independently work on our own economy and at the same time to counter the unlimited and at times unnatural diktat of the center. Will this not lead us to rejecting the time-proven values of Union unity and the very essence of interethnicism? On the contrary, republics which are strong in the economic and cultural sense will strengthen the whole Union as well. And I appeal to you, comrades, for support. Not only the republic organs but above all the primary party organizations and the labor collectives should bring the ideas of sovereignty to life.

We must watch carefully to insure that cost-accounting brings together all links of the production cycle and that its principles really become the foundations of the new production relations and insure efficient and high-quality labor in every work position.

But for now analysis of the state of affairs in labor collectives which have changed to the new structures and forms of labor organization demonstrates that the principles of cost-accounting frequently do not reach the brigade, the section, or the shop. A paradoxical situation arises: sectors and enterprises are transferred to full cost-accounting and self-financing, but underneath everything remains as before and wage leveling flourishes. According to statistical data, more than 46,000 brigades which unite about 710,000 workers operate in the republic's industry alone. However, only one-third of them work on cost-accounting and 8 percent have been transferred to contract.

Economic relations in the lower links at trade, domestic services, transport, and communications enterprises are insufficiently developed.

I would especially like to dwell on agriculture. In the 53 sovkhozes and kolkhozes in Kazakhstan which have transferred to rent relations, production profitability rose from 19 to 41 percent, while it rose by only 3.5 percent in the republic as a whole. Expenditures of labor in rent-type collectives per unit of output is lower than on the average throughout the republic by 26 percent, while labor productivity is higher—by 36 percent.

It would seem that the advantage is obvious. However, almost everywhere renters encounter opposition from managers and specialists and even residents of villages who do not want to work in the new way. But some secretaries of party organizations not only do not give these trends the proper evaluation but at times even themselves fall under the sway of the Philistines.

Serious shortcomings in incorporating rent relations are in many respects the result of the low level of economic training of farm managers and specialists who in the new conditions of economic activity do not deem it necessary to thoroughly master economic methods of management. I must say directly that such workers are completely obsolete today. We must pose the question of training and retraining cadres in the republic on a qualitatively new level, decisively reject routine work and approaches which do not prove themselves, and teach people by the living example of progressive collectives and the best managers and specialists. The question of training renters, farmers, and cooperative members is no less pressing, since not much good comes from an ignorant proprietor.

We have not yet managed to give the republic's economy the dynamism needed and fully realize the program of its financial normalization. We are also lagging behind the growth rates in industrial production as well as state purchases of grain and other indicators outlined in the five-year plan. Housing is not being built at the proper rate everywhere. The condition of state discipline in observing deliveries on contract is not improving either. And as a rule the same enterprises are among those lagging behind: the Chimkentshina Association, the Shevchenko Plastics Plant, the Pavlodar Tractor Plant,

the Balkhash Mining and Metallurgy Combine, the Semipalatinsk Fur Coat Association, and others.

In this connection the following question comes to mind—where are the communists and party organizations of those enterprises? How is their vanguard role being expressed? What have they done to bring their collectives out of the breakdown?

Today such economic categories as "independence" and "self-management" have become customary for every manager. We all are criticizing the ministries, Gosplan, and the government. But certainly in many respects the primary party organizations of the lagging enterprises with their sluggishness and passivity in work are also guilty.

The prestige of the entire party and consequently the success of perestroika depends on the ability of the "primaries" to carry out the new party policy. It is the primary party organizations who anew must interpret and embody the Leninist position that each cell and each party working committee must become the starting point for agitation, propaganda, and practical organizational work among the masses.

These tasks are made many times more complicated as a result of the increased independence and activism of social and amateur organizations. The question of reviewing the system of interrelations is especially crucial. How, for example, should the relations with councils of labor collectives and trade union committees be regulated? Today they are really representative organs of management which decide practically all issues of the collective's life. Not only the administration but also economic organs and even ministries must reckon with them. Needless to say, in these conditions administrative abuse, pressure, "shaking up" of cadres, and other methods on the part of the enterprise's party committee will be obvious anachronisms which have a negative impact on the organization's prestige. We must not forget that the basis of party leadership is influence on people's hearts and minds. It is for that reason that relations with other social organizations must be built on the principles of partnership, dialogue, and at times even compromise.

Positive experience in this interaction has been accumulated by certain party organizations in Karaganda Oblast. In the difficult days of the well-known Karaganda events the secretary of the Abay Party Gorkom A. A. Mityushkin joined the strike committee and did a great deal to help both the city's party organizations and the striking miners find a common language and when possible to quell the raging passions. Now he is the first secretary of the party gorkom. The chairman of the city workers' committee and the brigade foreman of the Churbay-Nurinskiy Mine A. D. Riffel is actively helping him, especially in resolving issues of socioeconomic development and keeping order in the city.

The party organizations of the imeni T. Kuzembayev, imeni 50-letiya Oktyabrskoy revolyutsii, Kirovskiy, and other mines acted skillfully at this time. During the strikes many workers demonstrated, on the one hand, much civic and social activism and, on the other, political maturity and the ability to meet urgent challenges together with party organizations. And that was noticed. G. I. Semenov, drift miner at the Mine imeni Kuzembayev, was elected secretary of the shop party organization of section No 2 and his colleague from the Karaganda Mine M. M. Nurtazin was elected to the territorial committee of coal industry workers. Now they are good helpers of the party organizations in all sound undertakings.

Examples of a different trend may also be cited—consolidation of party positions in elected workers' organizations. Thus, Evgeniy Filippovich Torbin was elected STK [Council of Labor Collectives] chairman at the production association of the Prikaspiyskiy Mining and Metallurgy Combine and Valentin Aleksandrovich Gorskoy was elected party committee secretary in the mine administration of this same association. Combining these positions helped the party committee secretary of the railroad transport administration Vasily Ivanovich Gedz relieve a very tense situation which took shape in the collective. The labor conflict between the workers and the managers is being eliminated by peaceful means through political dialogue.

In Dzhezkazgan Oblast party groups are being created within the councils of labor collectives which active influence the resolution of all issues examined by these management organs of workers and employees.

It is precisely in this way, through communists and nonparty activists elected to joint organs of management, that we must carry out party policy in all sections of production and social life.

One of the most important functions of primary party organizations is the organizational-political consolidation of their ranks. Many of them are setting higher standards for people joining the CPSU and for evaluating the degree of their actual participation in perestroika. And that is right. Fuller consideration has begun to be given to the opinion of labor collectives concerning those people trying to join. At open party meetings 90.5 percent of the admission cases have been studied.

However, negative trends are also being observed. In our opinion there are two reasons. The first is that quite a large number of shortcomings has been revealed in the life of the party and the country, and in the eyes of some of the citizens, especially youth, the party member's prestige is falling. The second is that some party organizations have interpreted the rejection of regulations governing admission to the CPSU as a deviation from purposeful and consistent activity in this direction. Over many years we have become used to formal-statistical

methods and gotten out of the habit of serious painstaking individual work. And that also influences the condition of the republic party organizations.

The number of workers in the new reinforcements has declined. In Aktyubinsk, North, Kazakhstan, Dzhambul, and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts the proportion of workers among those accepted as candidate members was from 50.2 to 51.8 percent, and Alma-Ata—only 31.3 percent and in the Sovetskiy and Fruzenskiy raykoms of Alma-Ata—only 8.8 and 16.5 percent.

The question arises—where are the CPSU admissions councils which were recently set up and propagandized so actively? How is the experience of the Karaganda party committees being disseminated? Unfortunately, the good initiative was cut off at the roots and it was taken to the bureaucratic absurd. There are councils but they are not operating, and in Karaganda Oblast too. The admission of workers into the CPSU here has declined in a year by 6 percent, of Komsomol members by 11 percent, and of women by 4 percent.

Formal review of issues involving admission to the CPSU in city and rayon party committees is not proving helpful either. Last year in the buro of the Kustanayskiy Party Raykom, for example, the party buro of the Ozerney Special Enterprise and the party committee of the Organizator Sovkhoz heard reports on this issue. Their preparation was carried out only by the efforts of the raykom apparat. There was no indepth analysis of the state of affairs and causes of unsatisfactory work of the party organizations. So the decrees adopted were also vague and in the spirit of the old times.

These shortcomings are also characteristic of the Yermak Gorkom and the Kachirskiy Raykom in Pavlodar Oblast, the Vozvyshenskiy Raykom in North Kazakhstan Oblast, and the Taldy-Kurgan Party Gorkom.

The experiment in Dzhambul Oblast has not yet shown positive results. As you know, as of 1 October of last year there, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, primary party organizations have the right to definitively decide questions on admission as a candidate member and the departure or expulsion of candidate members without subsequent party raykom or gorkom confirmation. In the 4 months which have passed since the experiment began, the number of workers, persons of the nonindigenous nationality, women, and young people among those accepted has declined sharply. All this should certainly put us on guard. The shortcomings of the raykoms, the gorkoms, and the secretaries of primary party organizations here are visible to the naked eye. There is also a proposal on the primary party organizations' independence on admissions issues in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee. I think that it should be supported. But success will come only as a result of painstaking, thoughtful, and purposeful work.

Strengthening the party does not mean just mechanically increasing its numbers. The question of the activism of

communists and their ethical and moral make-up is also crucial. The process of purification will obviously continue, and perhaps even expand. We must not be afraid of that. The main thing that is required of us is efficient party organizations and active communists.

Last year 2,500 communists handed in their party documents. Let me remind you that during that time 21,000 people joined the CPSU and you will most likely be proud that they tied their fates to the party in a difficult, crucial time for it. But departures from the party are an alarming phenomenon which disturbs party organizations and all communists. Why is this happening? Is this not a direct result of perestroika?

What can I say? Obviously it is, if one bears in mind that perestroika is a revolution which is fundamentally breaking down the stereotypes of ideas about socialism on the whole and about the role of the party and communists in sociopolitical life. Therefore, as in every crucial stage of our history, many CPSU members are once again reinterpreting our activities.

Another reason for departures from the CPSU is the existence of crisis phenomena in party work and the loss by certain party organizations of real impact on the course of events. Miscalculations in the ideological-political indoctrination of communists have led to the appearance of left-radical and neoconservative forces. Confusion, disorganization, timidity in practical matters, and at times even complete inaction are felt in many primary party organizations. All this in turn is reflected in rank and file communists.

Formulation of new approaches and unconventional thinking does not come easily. For many people it is a painful process and in the literal sense of the word—a drama of ideas and destinies. It is especially painful when older communists with longtime party membership leave the party. These people are our treasure. They have gone through the rigorous school of life and have enormous experience. Of course it makes them feel badly when some of our unjustly jealous publicists blacken the history of the party and the country and try to lay the responsibility for mistakes and distortions committed by political leaders of past years on the older generation. That is unethical and a dishonest way of blaming our own fathers and grandfathers. Respect for older people and their life experience has always and among all peoples been a sign of high morals, and we must not forget about this humanistic norm of behavior and interrelationships.

There are also those who value the party card only as long as it helps them advance up the official ladder. Here is one such example. F. Kh. Sirozhdanov, who was a candidate member of the CPSU, became the foreman of the large-panel housing construction combine of the Sevgrazhdanstroy PSO [possibly mobile construction association]. After 6 months he was promoted to job supervisor and after half a year—department chief. And then Sirozhdanov suddenly revealed that his goals in life

did not line up with those of the party and he submitted his application to withdraw from the CPSU. However, it is not that which is most disturbing, but the lack of principles which was shown during the second part of this story. The chief of the Sevgrazhdanstroy PSO V. Ye. Kolesnikov spoke at the party meeting which reviewed Sirozhdan's application and sincerely condemned Sirozhdanov's behavior and proposed that he be expelled from the party; then 3 months later he made this man the plant's chief engineer. But Kolesnikov is a member of the gorkom and a former first secretary of the party raykom. He did not have enough courage to defend his position at the association's party organization either.

In posing the question of the quality and growth of party ranks, I would like to hear your opinions on this issue too. What must be done so that the CPSU is replenished with active advocates of perestroika distinguished by a sense of the new and concern for general interests, conscientious respectable people capable of having a real influence on others through personal example?

Discussion of insuring the independence of party organizations on issues of the admission and departure of CPSU members is actively underway in the republic's party organizations. Three variants have been proposed: 1) primary party organizations make the final decision on these questions; 2) the party organization makes the decision but then it is confirmed by the raykom or the gorkom; and 3) the party organization makes the final decision only on the admission of candidate members to the CPSU.

Which is best? Let us consult on this question.

The section "On Party Renewal" in the Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress focuses on reinterpreting the principle of democratic centralism. As is well known, bureaucratic centralization has had serious consequences for the entire party and especially for its lower links—the primary party organizations, some of which have ceased to be the vanguard of labor collectives and lost the ability to be the leading influence on the course of events. Now we must revive Leninist norms of party life and create a mechanism of relations by which each party member can have a real impact on the content of the party's activity and the formation and evaluation of the work of elected organs, even the CPSU Central Committee, and be certain of the reliable protection of his rights, honor, and dignity.

In this connection insuring the democratic mechanism of interrelations between primary party organizations and higher-rankings organs and their apparats occupies an important place.

The February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee supported strengthening primary party organizations' role in party affairs. They should independently define their own structure and program of actions and the frequency of meetings of communists and fulfill the role

of the link between awakening civilian society and the state by harmonizing these relations.

However, I must frankly confess that it is precisely on the level of primary party organizations that perestroika is spinning its wheels. How is this manifested? Above all in sluggishness and lack of initiative. As before many secretaries are awaiting instructions from above.

Frequently party organizations still do not have a great deal of influence in labor collectives and carry out political and organizational work for the most part in their own narrow circle without interfering in the sphere of relations between "the manager and the collective" and "the collective and the party committee." The higher-ranking party committees are also to blame for this.

We have been talking a great deal about aid to the secretaries of "primaries" by elected organs and commissions of party committees. But I must state that not all of them have as yet been permeated with a respectful attitude toward the lower party links. Thus, V. I. Vlasov, member of the Pavlodar Party Obkom and director of a tractor plant, after the collective conference did not promote him as candidate for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR, could find nothing better to do than blame the party aktiv for this and announce so all could hear: "I'm going to drive out this party committee!" That was it, no more, no less.

Another case can be cited—this time pressure on the primary party organization by the raykom. The meeting of the collective of the Pervoye Maya Sovkhoz nominated its director Sh. O. Ospanov as a republic candidate for people's deputy. And because of that the buro of the Karatal'skiy Raykom in Galdy-Kurgan Oblast reprimanded the party committee secretary K. T. Zhenshebayev for not fulfilling its order not to nominate Ospanov! The obkom had to intervene and correct the party leaders who had overstepped the mark. And how about them, how did they react? They did nothing at all! Moreover, Yu. I. Kuznetsov, the raykom first secretary, proposed his candidacy to the okrug's voters without even consulting with the rayon committee members. The okrug conference did not support him of course, and then Yu. I. Kuznetsov made a new demand—not to register any candidates at all for this okrug. What kind of prestige can the party organ have there?

The question of the party committee apparat is also a pressing one. It is no secret that even after reorganization the party apparat is still trying to give direct orders to elected organs and lower links. We believe that if the party committee apparat does not fulfill the will of the elected organs and the secretaries of the primary party organizations rigorously and well, the it must be disbanded and a different one elected. That is your right.

We must say definitely that the party apparat is essential. It must be protected from groundless abuse. Incidentally, no public association can do without an apparat, but at the same time they do not like them in other organs.

Let us consult with one another, comrades, and decide what kind of party apparat is needed. There are quite a few conflicting proposals on this score—from its almost complete elimination to its revival in the old (sectorial) variant. Because of the change in the party's role in society its functions are changing as well. It must stand up for the right to political leadership of certain matters and the realization of its program positions. The question therefore arises of whether we need in obkoms and gorkoms the sectorial departments that exist in the soviets. Obviously only those departments which have political work to do and are essential to the organization of intraparty life and analysis of the socioeconomic situation should be kept.

Most likely the large number of responsible workers and party raykom and gorkom secretaries is also not always justified. Combining the jobs of secretary and department head is also possible in some places. There is also a proposal to create groups of consultants and experts and problem-analyzing groups instead of departments. Life's demands are such that we cannot do without sociological research centers under party committees. I assume, however, that there can be no uniform system here. The conditions in different regions of the republic vary too much. Therefore final decisions must be made locally by the people themselves.

And there is another aspect of this problem: we still have a generally toothless elected aktiv which is afraid to decide questions from a principled approach. It has long been time for primary party organizations to present a claim against those whom they delegated to elected organs for passivity and inability to support their interests. The time has passed when the higher-ups organized all the work without taking into account the opinions of the "primaries" and when the agendas of meetings, measures, and various discussions were simply thrust on them. Every primary organization must also more boldly reject the practice of certain and formal approval of any decision of higher-ranking party organs.

There are many methods to revive the influence of lower party organizations on the decisions of obkom, gorkom, and raykom buro's. They include preliminary discussion and consultation and study of projects with the involved organizations, communists, nonparty members, and so on.

A whole mechanism should operate here—from development of the decision to monitoring of its execution. We support the proposal that primary party organizations should have the statutory right to pose questions and evaluate drafts of programs, platforms, and decisions which will be examined by congresses, conferences, or higher-ranking committees. They should also present their views on certain problems of party life orally or in written form. Accordingly, the obligations of party organizations to their communists, workers, and the party as a whole should be significantly expanded.

In speaking of reviving the principle of democratic centralism I must certainly also say a few words about party comradeship, the highest form of party democracy. Let us look truth in the eyes: do we have comradeship in our ranks and do we understand it in the same way? That becomes particularly important during this stage.

Very often a person is left face to face with his conscience, cares, and doubts. If he does not want to share them, how often do we ask him, talk with him, and admonish him? Does the primary party organization and its secretary stand up for the honor and rights of the rank and file communist before the raykom and law-enforcement organs and, finally, before his immediate boss? I do not think so. And I can cite as many examples of communists' indifference to their comrades as you would like.

Starting in 1986 A. D. Spay wrote in the party organs and told about account-padding and poor management in taxi fleet No 4 in the city of Alma-Ata. However, instead of the signs being verified objectively, the author began to be followed and was expelled from the ranks of the CPSU. The administration reprimanded him. Attempts were even made to bring him to trial. And all of this was done in front of the primary party organization. Ultimately he was forced to appeal to the CPSU Central Committee and as a sign of protest sent his party card there. Of course, that behavior does him no honor, but after all we can understand even a communist doing that. Of course, justice conquered. All the punishments were rescinded and measures were taken against those to blame. But at the price of substantial effort.

In short, comrades, life itself suggests that the primary party organizations must make a decisive turn toward Man and his psychology, needs, and interests.

A question of no small importance is the active, aggressive policy of communists at rallies and meetings and during appearances on television and radio and in the press. Party workers often criticize the mass information media for distorting party policy, attacking Marxism-Leninism, and groundlessly criticizing the historical past. But at the same time they very rarely speak themselves. A debate is now going on in republic party organizations about the place and role of primary party organizations. And who among you has appeared on the pages of the republic press? Just a handful. The same thing is true locally. If the secretary of the primary party organizations, even one who has been released, is not able to support his convictions and does not appear in the press, does not argue, and does not debate at rallies and meetings, then he is just a bureaucrat. And his time has passed.

Decentralization of the party structure, elimination of superfluous intermediary links between the Central Committee and the "primary," and its maximal simplification has become a demand of the day. You yourselves must decide which structure it is best to have: how many shop organizations and how many party groups.

Recently, for example, the question has been widely discussed of whether party organizations should be withdrawn from the framework of production. In the sovkhoz, for example, people are proposing to merge the party organizations of the soviets, the schools, and the road construction sections. The creation of horizontal structures is also possible. I am thinking of an association of communists for target, functional, professional, and other interests.

The Lesnoy State Cooperation Association in North Kazakhstan Oblast approached this problem in an unusual way. A completely new structure of party organization has been set up here. Now every cooperative of this association has its own shop party organization. The communists of rental links are joined into party groups. The management and directive authority for now remains with the sovkhoz party committee. However, it will soon obviously be abolished, since the idea of creating a more democratic organ, a council of secretaries, is being hatched.

For life itself gives birth to new initiatives and makes adjustments to existing structures. One must only see these changes and bring all the best into the practice of party work in a timely manner.

I think that it is also possible to set up party organizations on the territory of the block and the housing development from among communists living there. That is what the Kustanay Party Gorkom did. It allowed communists to be placed on dual registration on the territory of housing-operation section No 7. What is the point of the experiment? All communists working in trade, domestic services, and municipal services enterprises and in health care and public education institutions serving the territory are also registered in the housing-operation section's party organizations. Continuing to participate in the life of their collective, they are also accountable to the party organization. And in turn that organization can make proposals on the work of communists on dual registration to the gorkom and the primary party organization by work place.

Direct attachment of the party organizations of labor collectives to microrayons is also proving itself. We might also consider the creation of section, block, and other (with the same rights as shop) organizations within the primary party organizations. Sending groups of communists to work on a territory temporarily, during very important sociopolitical campaigns, let us say during election work, seems promising. Undoubtedly, in doing so we must be guided by the interests of the work and not allow the impact of party organizations at enterprises to weaken.

One of the most important issues is involving primary party organizations in shaping cadre policy. In revising the party and its apparat we should renounce those functions involving selecting and placing cadres which apparat workers used to perform. And, I must confess,

they guarded this privilege very jealously. The "protocol-nomenklatura" rules are still alive even now. You can judge their result from the example of Aktyubinsk Oblast. Here 12 obkom and raykom workers have held their positions for more than 10 years. And there are first secretaries and department heads who have not risen from their chairs for 16-20 and more years each. How can the primary party organizations not intervene and not pose the question to the buro's of the party obkom and raykom?

The same thing is happening with promotion of cadres. It should come from primary party organizations of labor collectives using democratic procedures—elections, alternatives, accountability to the collective which promoted them, certification, and the like.

Many comrades justifiably pose the question of the status of the primary party organization secretary. Of course, such a document is necessary. It should clearly define the rights and duties of the secretary as well as measures for his social protection. In fact what is he not involved in today on top of strictly party issues? Economics, and social problems, and ecology. He is a lawyer and a technical executive, and even an organizer of entertainment and cultural and recreational activities.

It is high time to define his sphere of activity. And even the evaluation of that sphere should be revised, I think. Before, as is well known, there was one criterion for that—the results of economic activity. But that is a one-sided approach. The important thing is still the condition of the social activism of communists and the moral-political atmosphere in the collective whose party organization the secretary heads.

As you know, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee again posed the question of holding the 28th Party Congress earlier. The decision to hold it in late June or early July of this year was dictated above all by the dynamism of the political situation in the party and the country. Delay here, as was mentioned at the Plenum, risks falling behind and losing initiative and would inevitably affect the CPSU itself and the fate of the revolutionary changes it has begun. Preparations for the 28th Congress are essentially already in full swing and pregress debate is widespread in the party.

As for the republic's 17th CP Congress, the plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee which was held recently proposed that it be held in early June of this year.

The mechanism for forming CPSU elected organs must also be fundamentally changed by offering every communist and every primary organization the right to participate in forming all levels of elected organs. Obviously it will be proper if during the upcoming reports and elections we grant communists and primary party organizations the right not only to nominate but also to elect delegates to oblast conferences and congresses.

The draft "Procedure for Electing Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress" has been published and you are already familiar with it. It envisions elections on the territorial principle in single-mandate and multi-mandate election districts created on the basis of rayon and city (without rayon division) party organizations as well as directly in those primary party organizations where the number of CPSU members corresponds or exceeds the norm of representation. There may possibly be other proposals as well. Let us consult with each other. Obkom plenums may choose the variants. There is such a recommendation of the CPSU Central Committee. It is important to observe only one condition—elections must offer alternatives and be direct and secret.

The mechanism for forming collective party organs also needs democratization and greater impact from the party mass. The present procedure for electing them is unpopular today among communists. Therefore, at meetings, conferences, and congresses we should obviously go to direct elections of secretaries of party committees. I would also like to discuss with you the question of how to elect members of raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, and the Kazakh CP Central Committee.

It would be proper if, according to the established quota, members of the party raykom and gorkom were elected directly in primary party organizations, members of the obkom—at rayon and city conferences, and members of the Kazakh CP Central Committee—at oblast conferences with subsequent confirmation of their authority by delegates of the corresponding conferences and congress.

Such a procedure for nominating and electing members most likely will put an end to the practice of forming party committees by posts, increase the responsibility of those elected to their party organizations, and in fact insure the supremacy of the elected organ over the apparat. There may be other variants here as well. I hope you will express your opinions on this issue as well.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee considers it expedient to hear reports of members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Kazakh CP Audit Commission in primary party organizations for 2 months.

A full-blown report and election campaign will precede the Kazakh CP Congress. It may start in primary organizations this month, and city and rayon conferences will be held in April and oblast conferences in May of this year. This was decided at the 19th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee.

Now I would like to say a few words about the financial problem. In conditions of the transformation of the Soviet federation, correctly resolving the question of the independence of Union republic communist parties becomes especially important. But this independence cannot be complete until the communist parties provide the necessary capital themselves.

Unfortunately, today 30 percent of our expenditures are covered by the CPSU budget. That is where our problems start.

This is the first question. Should the payment for membership dues be reduced from 3 to 2 percent? The proposal is of course tempting. But that would reduce the income part of the budget by 16-20 million rubles. Add to that 200,000 more for annual underpayment of dues. Some party organizations are requesting that from 50 to 70 percent of incoming dues remain at the disposal of the party organizations. In that case, according to preliminary estimates, the party budget would be short 10 million rubles. The conclusion will be obvious: we will not escape from subsidies.

According to our profound conviction, there should be a single budget for the republic party organization. That will make it possible to spend monetary resources more rationally, insure material-technical supply of party committees, and render material and financial support to party organizations.

Perestroika has put the creation of a democratic mechanism based on dividing the functions of party and soviet organs on the agenda. However, it is already clear today that the slogan "All power to the soviets!" is being realized slowly and in a contradictory way.

First, party organs have begun to get away from traditional directive, administrative command methods of management of the economy, while the soviets and their executive organs, especially in cities and rayons, have still not resolved to take upon themselves everything which they should as organs of power.

Secondly, as you know, the draft of the Law "On Local Self-Management and the Local Economy" is now being drawn up, but we have begun to prepare to transfer territories to cost-accounting and self-management without waiting for the law to be adopted. Transferring them requires major support and monitoring on the part of all levels of party organs. Party organizations should first of all set higher standards for communists working in soviets so that they act as examples of high accountability for the work entrusted to them. Their party duty and obligation is to carry out the party line in the soviets. And in general, comrades, let us come to an agreement: political leadership in the soviets, as in other organizations, must be carried out through the primary party organizations and through the communists working there. That would be proper.

As you know, the Kazakh CP Central Committee supported the idea that the posts of party committee secretary and chairman of the soviet need not be combined. But the deputies demonstrated trust in their party leaders and there are only nine city and rayon soviets today where these posts have not been combined. There are also examples where secretaries of primary party organizations became chairman of rural soviets. Thus, in Algbaskiy Rayon in Chimkent Oblast 6 out of 10

secretaries of farms were elected chairmen of the soviets. That is great trust and it must be lived up to honorably.

Elections to soviets of people's deputies have become a major test for us and have shown our strong and weak sides in a concentrated form. Their main result is that the republic's workers supported the party's political course and its Platform.

In the days remaining until the elections for the Kazakh SSR people's deputies, we must increase party influence on the formation of public opinion and openly oppose any type of careerist or demagogue.

Each primary party organization must determine whom it will support and for whom it will provide propaganda. It is very important to form a capable, thoughtful, competent higher organ in order to advance perestroika on constructive tracks. We very much rely on you and on your help to do this.

We ask you to devote particular attention to supporting candidates for deputies from among the workers. The fact that there are so few of them among those nominated and there may be even fewer among those elected disturbs us greatly. I will say frankly that in order to form a worker core in the Supreme Soviet we must get down to specifics in working to support them and increase propaganda for them. But this is not always correctly understood in labor collectives. Sometimes when a management employee withdraws his candidacy people take it to mean that he is afraid of losing a competitive struggle with a worker. In most cases that is not true. We ask you to patiently make these points clear in your own labor collectives.

Today we must fundamentally revise many forms of joint work with trade unions. First of all direct orders on particular issues of their activity must be renounced, not to mention intervention in operational work.

Interrelations between the party and the all-Union Komsomol must be clarified. It seems to me that the problem of independent action and independence of the Komsomol is not being treated quite accurately or in the proper depth today and is unduly emphasized and accentuated. Consider carefully, comrades, when we speak of the Communist Youth League, it undoubtedly in the future must live by the ideals of the CPSU and must be the future of the party. The interrelations of the party and the all-Union Komsomol should not be confused with the whole circle of problems of CPSU youth policy: that is by no means the same thing. The Komsomol objectively cannot unite almost all young men and women. For too long we have engaged in wishful thinking here.

As for the particular forms of work of the Komsomol, they must be fundamentally changed. In devoting constant attention to Komsomol affairs, the party committees should by no means allow diktat in relations to Komsomol organizations or intervention in their routine

work. We must help them with advice and direct participation in all useful affairs. Analysis of processes occurring in the youth environment, demands on communists responsible for work in the Komsomol, and the kind counsel of the older comrade is our sphere of influence on youth.

Recently the number of groups and associations which reflect all the diversity of social interests has been growing. And that has complicated the work of party committees and revealed the lack of preparedness of many of them for work in conditions of political changes.

The so-called "informal" independent formations have not emerged suddenly of themselves. Among the causes which led to their activization one should first name those phenomena which have been called stagnant. The extremes in the development of the independent movement is a reaction to formalism and bureaucratism in the work of certain state and social organizations and crisis phenomena in ecology and culture.

The ability in any process to sense the political situation and direct efforts to resolving it is one of the most important demands made on party organizations. Take a problem such as ecology. We are more concerned about tons and kilometers and have forgotten about people. We have tried to build as much production space as possible, leaving millions of rubles worth of decontamination facilities unfinished. The ecology question has ultimately become a political one.

All this has made new demands on the ideological work of party organizations and of each communist and compels them to study the foundations of the political methods of managing society.

We are still using the arsenal of ideological means developed and tested in practice in the period of stagnation. The same lecturers, political information officers, agitators, propagandists, and mentors are going out to the people. And that would be fine if they went, except that the effectiveness and quality of this work continues to be determined by the number of papers and reports prepared.

And there is one other very important issue—interethnic relations. Representatives of more than 80 nationalities live in our republic. The most important thing now is to increase the responsibility of each people for the fate of perestroika. We are deeply convinced that the path to genuine interethnicism and the success of the revolutionary changes is possible only on the basis of profound respect of the ethnic and principled intolerance of the chauvinistic and nationalistic. Ideological work is in need of perestroika in such a way that the very process of indoctrination of patriotism and interethnicism excludes both ethnic nihilism and ethnic isolation and teaches people to distinguish between ethnic interests and their nationalistic distortions. A social atmosphere must also be created in labor collectives and in the dwelling place where a person of any nationality who lives and works in our republic feels an equal among equals.

The circle of concerns of the primary party organization is extremely broad. It includes cadres, indoctrination of people, and production and social problems. We must therefore take complete advantage of this chance which is laid in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

We can change the present situation only by relying on the people and working with them and organizing them. By resolving painful questions affecting people's everyday life and helping them in creative pursuit and in the organization of work, we will be able to change the situation, reduce socioeconomic tension, and successfully meet challenges set for the immediate future. The important thing is to get the people's trust back.

In order to increase the primary party organizations' role and strengthen their interdependence, it would be useful to create a republic council of secretaries of primary party organizations. Helping consolidate and develop the principles of democratic centralism and promoting the exchange of know-how among party organizations, holding debates and round tables, and organizing appearances of secretaries of "primaries" on radio and television would be part of their task. The council could have real impact on the social protection of party organization secretaries, make demands and specific proposals at all levels of the republic's party organizations, and provide a direct tie with the Kazakh CP Central Committee on all problems which arise in the party's lower links. If you support this proposal, then let us ponder the council's make-up. It could be set up after the report and election campaign. As for personnel, communists recommended by the oblast councils of secretaries could be members of the council.

In conclusion, comrades, I appeal to you for a frank, pointed, constructive exchange of opinions. Concerned conversation is needed not only to evaluate the situation in primary party organizations from all sides, but, the most important thing, to determine ways to strengthen the party's influence on the course of perestroika and to bring new dynamism to our work.

I hope your desires and proposals and your critical words will help improve the style and raise the effectiveness of the activities of the Kazakh CP Central Committee and all the republic's party organization.

Appeal Published

90US0726C *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1*

[Appeal of the Participants in the Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations to the Communists of Kazakhstan]

[Text] Comrades! The party is undergoing a crucial moment in its history. The position, role, and conditions of the activity of the CPSU in society are changing fundamentally. In order to preserve its leadership position in the country's political life, the party needs quick

and decisive actions to make it more democratic and expand the rights of its primary organizations.

The main task now is to wage a pre-congress report and election campaign, to form new management organs of party organizations, and to explain the positions of the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

The participants in our conference support communists' proposals to elect delegates and members of elected organs with decisive participation of primary party organizations through direct, secret elections that offer alternatives. It depends on you alone whom you will delegate to the congresses and conferences, whom you will elect to party committees, and to whom you will trust the party's destiny.

In a situation where the wave of attacks on the party is increasing, communists do not have the right to keep quiet and reconcile themselves to demagoguery and political extremism.

We have come to the unanimous opinion that primary party organizations used to be without rights in resolving many issues and pressure on them from above predominated. Therefore we have made proposals to transfer to primary organizations the right to decisively resolve questions of admission and expulsion from the party, determination of the structure and content of their work, and use of part of the party budget.

We are for a constructive political dialogue with all social movements based on socialist positions and joint resolution of practical challenges on the basis of a diversity of opinion. At the same time we consider communists' participation in formations whose ideological foundations and policies conflict with the Program of the CPSU Charter and the USSR Constitution intolerable. The time has come to draw a clear line between pluralism of opinions and lack of principles.

The secretaries of primary party organizations, in expressing the will of the republic's communists, declare support of the efforts of the Kazakh CP Central Committee focused on protecting the ethnic interests of all peoples of the republic. We are profoundly convinced that only peace and harmony create the conditions for satisfying the comprehensive interests of people of various nations and ethnic groups.

We appeal to communists to show initiative and carry out active explanatory work in labor collectives to provide propaganda on the idea of granting the republic economic independence and fight against the diktat of Union ministries and departments. As part of the Soviet federation, Kazakhstan should have the right to manage its own land and its resources.

We appeal to all communists to turn once again to young people and give all possible assistance and help in resolving their problems.

We must not forget people's concerns and daily needs. To know them and find ways to resolve them is one of the main tasks of party organizations.

We appeal to the republic's communists to take complete advantage of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh CP Congress to make radical changes in the forms and methods of work of party organizations to increase their prestige, and to strengthen the people's trust in the party.

There is no time to lose. We must more boldly overcome the syndrome of expectation and take decisive measures to put things in order everywhere and establish an atmosphere of constructive action.

Data on Latvian Parliament's Composition

90UN1448B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
29 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by LATINFORM correspondent Ye. Kovalenko: "The Parliament Begins Its Work"]

[Text] The first working meeting of the newly elected Latvian parliament was held on 28 March. The discussion of preparations for the first session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet was on the agenda.

Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet, congratulated the people's deputies of Latvia on their election and familiarized them with some statistics on the elections which had not previously been released.

So, what is the composition of the new parliament of our republic? Of 172 elected deputies, 63 are non-party members, and 108 people represent various parties of Latvia. Some 99 members of the parliament are Communists; five represent the Social Democrats; four deputies defend the interests of the "Green" party. Of those elected 104 are National Front of Latvia supporters, and 17 are supporters of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia. Two deputies subscribe to the position of the Interfront of the Workers of the Republic. A. Gorbunov went on to quote statistics which describe the educational standard of the parliament. Some 156 deputies have a college education, 11 have a secondary education, and three persons are continuing their studies at higher schools. Thirty-five deputies have academic titles.

Speaking on the main issue on the meeting's agenda, the chairman of the Presidium noted that the success of the work of the first session of the Supreme Soviet, its effectiveness and results will depend on the preparatory work. This is why, in his opinion, it would be feasible to set up working groups which all deputies who so wish may join. Even now it may be predicted that deputies representing various public movements will form differing opinions in the course of discussing particular issues on the agenda of the session. The working groups of the parliament could generalize the opinions of the

members of parliament before the session begins so as not to spend debate time during the session.

After a discussion, the deputies adopted the proposal and made statements on many of the other procedural issues.

Latvian CP Congress 6 Apr Session Report

90UN1575 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 pp 1, 4

[ELTA report: "Information Report"]

[Text] The 25th Latvian CP Congress opened on 6 April in the House of Political Enlightenment in Riga.

On instructions from the Latvian CP Central Committee Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, opened the congress.

The congress presidium was elected on an alternative basis from three choices.

Following election of the Secretariat, Credentials Commission, and Editorial Commission, the following agenda was approved:

1. The political report of the Latvian CP Central Committee.
2. The report of the Latvian CP Auditing Commission.
3. The bases of the Latvian CP Program.
4. The Latvian Communist Party Rules.
5. The position of the Latvian CP Central Control and Auditing Commission.
6. Election of Latvian Communist Party leading organs.
7. Procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Ya. Vagris, Latvian CP Central Committee first secretary, presented the Latvian CP Central Committee political report.

The accountability report of the Latvian CP Auditing Commission was presented by commission chairman A. Berg-Bergman.

The following took part in the debates: First Secretary of the Riga Party City Committee [gorkom] A. Klautsen; First Secretary of the Daugavpils Party Rayon Committee [raykom] Ya. Geyba; First Secretary of the Aluksenskiy Party Raykom E. Svarts; Secretary of the Daugavpils Party Gorkom E. Abolevich; Secretary of the Ventspils Port plant party committee V. Ivanov; First Secretary of the Leninskiy Party Raykom, Riga city, I. Garayev; party committee Secretary at the Liepava General Construction Trust Yu. Anton; First Secretary of the Ogrskiy Party Raykom G. Kigulis; grinder at a branch of the Riga "Avtoelektropribor" O. Potekhin; Chairman of the "Ladezers" Agricultural Combine Ya.

Lutsans; Director of the Ozolskiy 9-grade school in Valkskiy Rayon D. Kampe; First Secretary of the Leningradskiy Party Raykom, Riga city, Yu. Lyalin; Chairman of the "Engure" fish-farming kolkhoz firm A. Dandzberg; party committee Secretary in the Daugavpils General Construction Trust S. Beskrovnov; technician at the "Uzvara" agricultural firm, Bauskiy Rayon, R. Bochs; Director of the Central Scientific research Institute Automated Management System for Civil Aviation E. Makharev; Deputy Chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers A. Chepanis.

On behalf of the congress a delegation of those attending laid flowers at the memorial to V.I. Lenin in Riga.

The 25th Latvian CP Congress will continue its work on 7 April.

Latvian CP Congress 7 Apr Report

90UN1575B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 p 1

[ELTA report: "The 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress. Information Report"]

[Text] The 25th Latvian CP Congress continued its work on 7 April in the House of Political Enlightenment in Riga.

The delegates heard and confirmed by majority vote the report of the Credentials Commission presented by the commission chairman V. Sobolev, second secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee.

A debate on the congress reports and draft documents followed. The following took part in the debates: I. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Party Rayon Committee [raykom], Riga city; Yu. Ruben, consultant to the "Delta" engineering center at the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] State Planning Committee Institute; laboratory chief at the University of Latvia K. Podniyeks; troop commander in the Baltic Military District F. Kuzmin; Latvian CP Central Committee Secretary A. Bril; B.K. Pugo, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee; Chairman of the "Ezertsieyems" kolkhoz in Rizhskiy rayon F. Diminysh; First Secretary of the Balvskiy Party Raykom V. Varnas; First Secretary of the Ludzenskiy Party Raykom F. Stroganov; Ya. Baukshis, director of the children's and youth physical training club in Kuldigskiy rayon; electrician at the Daugavpils locomotive repair plant A. Ivanov; physician at the Rezeknenskiy central rayon hospital M. Borodulin; docent at the University of Latvia S. Dimans; A. Alekseyev, presidium chairman of the Republic Council of Interfront for the Workers of the Latvian SSR; Yelgava Party Gorkom Secretary G. Matyushonok; Latvian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Poch; and Ya. Urbanovich, first secretary of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee.

Those presenting the reports—Ya. Vagris, Latvian CP Central Committee first secretary; A. Berg-Bergman, chairman of the Latvian CP Auditing Commission; and B. Pugo, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee—responded to questions put to them.

The congress adopted a resolution on the Latvian CP Central Committee political report that in the main agreed with its conclusions and assessments. The work of the Central Committee during the period between the congress was assessed as unsatisfactory.

The congress moved on to discussion of the draft Latvian CP Program submitted to the congress by the Latvian CP Plenum. Following a proposal from the editorial commission, delegates voted by majority not to accept the document.

Supporters of an independent Latvian Communist Party walked out of the congress hall. They (261 delegates) gathered in the Small Hall in the House of Political Enlightenment where they decided to adopt as their basis the draft program submitted to the 25th Congress by the Latvian CP Central Committee with the additions submitted at the 6 April session by A. Chepanis, and proposed that it be considered at a congress of supporters of an independent party that is planned to be held on 14 April.

The 518 delegates remaining in the hall decided to continue their work. The central issue was the election of the Latvian CP Central Committee first secretary. Three candidates were nominated—A. Rubiks, A. Klautsen, and O. Potreka. A. Klautsen decided to withdraw, and this was accepted as satisfactory.

A. Rubiks was elected by secret ballot as Latvian CP Central Committee first secretary.

A conciliation commission was set up and assigned the task of organizing a meeting between representatives of the two wings of party and trying to work out a joint decision.

The congress elected the Latvian CP Central Committee. One-third of the mandates were reserved. Who will occupy those seats depends on the results of the conciliation commission's activity.

The newly elected Central Committee was assigned the task of working on the Latvian CP Program to extricate the republic from crisis and to submit the program to the congress for consideration. The congress also adopted a number of resolutions, which will be published.

The 25th Latvian CP Congress went into recess pending completion of the 28th CPSU Congress.

It is planned to hold the first plenum on Wednesday 11 April.

New Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum

90UN1649A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Report on First Plenum of new Central Committee of Latvian Communist Party]

[Text] The First Plenum of the new Latvian CP Central Committee convened on 12 April in Riga. The plenum was opened by A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee.

Organizational issues were examined. V. Rymashevskiy was elected second secretary and bureau member of the Latvian CP Central Committee. I. Skuin was drafted into membership of the Latvian CP Central Committee and elected secretary and bureau member of the Latvian CP Central Committee. A. Klautsen was elected secretary and bureau member of the Latvian CP Central Committee. He remains simultaneously first secretary of the Riga Gorkom [city party committee].

Elected bureau members of the Latvian CP Central Committee were V. Baranov, Yu. Dmitriyev, O. Zinchenko, L. Kalinina, O. Potreki, and Ya. Trubinsh.

Ya. Britans was approved editor of the newspaper TSINYA; A. Vasilyenok, editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA; V. Krustin, editor of the newspaper LAUKU AVIZE; V. Brokan, editor in chief of the magazine KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVIJ; G. Kurpnek, editor in chief of the magazine GORI-ZONT; and K. Dundurs, director of the Latvian Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum examined procedures for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Latvian Communist Party and the timing of these elections, as well as for conducting the reporting and election campaign in the republic party organization. An appropriate resolution was adopted on this matter.

The plenum established a commission for the political appraisal of the historical path of the Latvian Communist Party.

The plenum also examined the question of procedure for discussing in party organizations the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee to communists of the country, "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis," and adopted an appropriate resolution.

Participating in the work of the plenum was Ye. Trofimov, section head in the department of party structuring and personnel work of the CPSU Central Committee.

Landsbergis on Kohl-Mitterrand Proposal

90UN1863B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
29 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Report by ELTA correspondents I. Bagdanskis and R. Chesna: "Press Conference with Vitautas Landsbergis"]

[Text] A press conference took place on 28 April in the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council. Vitautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, met with Lithuanian and foreign journalists.

The journalists asked him what his reaction was to the letter of French President Francois Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In answer the chairman of the Supreme Council declared that their initiative is positive and that the content of the letter also supports our efforts to achieve a constructive dialogue with the leadership of the Soviet Union. The letter of the president and the chancellor even stresses that a dialogue should begin immediately and urgently. We have desired this the entire time, but unfortunately without success. It is possible that the letter will also help us to achieve the beginning of a dialogue. The letter includes the right of the Lithuanian people to independence, and that is just as important as direct contact with us. The letter also has a proposal to think about suspending the effects of the decrees adopted by our Supreme Council in order to facilitate the beginning of a dialogue. It is a constructive proposal and merits discussion. We know that in some places this letter was received as a concession to the Soviet Union's ultimatum and it has even given rise to protests, but we do not consider it that way. And in fact our view has been confirmed because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris has published a supplemental explanation stressing the meaning of our law and the declaration of independence.

And our response, apparently, will contain certain proposals for the leaders of France and West Germany. It is possible that this will be some sort of suggestion that their initiative not end with this letter alone. Especially as significantly earlier the president of France instructed Mr. Roland Dumas, minister of foreign affairs, to suggest to the Soviet Union and us that France act as a mediator to facilitate the beginning of a dialogue. And here we see the continuation of that same policy—circumspect, tactful, and consistent. We will also await the results of today's meeting of the leaders of the European Community in Dublin inasmuch as the meeting of foreign ministers that took place a week ago supported Lithuania and reprimanded the Soviet Union its poor conduct and the use of force. Today an escalation of that force is taking place. I believe that there will be some reaction. It will also help us to solve those specific problems of people's lives caused by the Soviet Union's blockade.

Vitautas Landsbergis stressed that there can be no talk either of repealing or of suspending the declaration of independence. As for the other legislative acts adopted after 11 March, it is possible to discuss what the Soviet Union sees in them as an obstacle in our current relations or what makes contacts difficult. A transition period is a genuine necessity while the Government of Lithuania takes in hand all the functions of state management over its territory. There is a desire to discuss this process. We are preparing several draft projects in this area.

The chairman of the Supreme Council said that if Moscow will confine itself only to the categorical demand of repudiating the declaration of independence, then there will be no movement beyond this line.

Continuing on this subject at the wish of the journalists, the chairman of the Supreme Council explained that it is also impossible to repeal the declaration of independence because Lithuania's Basic Law also is part of the package of the aforementioned act. In the event that it is repudiated or declared invalid in Lithuania, another law must function—the USSR Constitution. This must not be allowed because this would mean voluntarily joining the Soviet Union. It would be worse than in 1940 when the Lithuanian Seimas was forced to adopt the compulsory decree. We do not have the voters' authorization to adopt such a decree.

The journalists asked if any official documents have been received concerning the blockade imposed by the USSR or about restrictions on movement of cargo through Klaipeda port.

Vytautas Landsbergis answered that there are no official documents either about the scale of the blockade or according to which order it is being done. True, only the instructions of N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the minister of railways are known. A few days ago N. Ryzhkov denied the very fact of the blockade and explained that he did not know who gave instructions to halt rail shipments to Lithuania. Is there really such disorder in the Soviet Union, or is it insincerity and a wish not to take the responsibility?

Vytautas Landsbergis noted that one gets the impression that Moscow is avoiding the resolution of specific issues which could be discussed and is constantly advancing unacceptable issues. He said that there are various proposals from our side. A way out could even be found if that categorical demand were not put forward in the form of an ultimatum.

Vytautas Landsbergis also answered other questions from the journalists. The press conference was conducted by Povilas Pauparas, head of the department of information of the Supreme Council.

Landsbergis 22 March Council Speech

90UN14894 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
27 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, at a plenary meeting of the 22 March Supreme Council session, under the rubric "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] Respected colleagues! Permit me to tell you how our situation and goals look today. The spring equinox has arrived. That means that tomorrow the days will begin to lengthen. They will continue to get longer every day. Our land will begin to blossom.

But yesterday evening I saw a strange edict proclaimed from the screen of Central Television and which we have now read in the press: They have directed unwelcome actions against the hunters of Lithuania and guests of the Republic of Lithuania. Important matters are at the basis of our conflict with the neighboring country, which does not wish to acknowledge our independence. The question of sovereignty arises. In the first place, who owns the border? Next, it has already been proclaimed that the constitution of another state operates in Lithuania. And what must shock us even more, the organs of power of another state take it upon themselves to interfere and impose their order, catch hunters, and hunt for people. This is already a concrete fact, because an illegal conscription into the army is beginning. And although we see that very disagreeable conflicts are possible, our position must nonetheless be the traditional one—calm, social order with additional law-and-order detachments if they are needed, and, I believe, nonresistance to force. "Sajudis" has proclaimed this principle on every occasion. Moral and civil opposition, in my view, may be used. If a tank arrives for a hunting rifle, one should not fire on the tank to save the hunting rifle.

We are also opposing them by other means, by preparing official documents of protest. Two have been produced today alone. One has already been sent and the other is being sent right now. The latter is a protest and an answer to the basic mistake of the Soviet Union committed in the decree of the third special USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Described in this letter are the legal foundations of our position and the complete illegality of our opponents. This document is rather long. If you wish, I can read it on another occasion—either at the end, or perhaps at a press conference. The other document, which as I said has already been sent, is an appeal to the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia addressed to Nikolay Dementey, chairman of its Presidium. It consists of one page.

"Respected Chairman, we strongly request that you communicate to the government of the Belorussian SSR that Lithuania has declared its observation of the universally acknowledged principles of international law and of that chapter of the Helsinki Final Act which affirms the inviolability of the borders of Europe. We hope that as a member of the United Nations the Belorussian SSR will uphold the accepted norms of international law stated in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Helsinki Final Act, and especially those decrees that guarantee the territorial integrity of states.

"In light of current events, the Republic of Lithuania expresses the wish that the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Belorussian SSR government will affirm that they do not have any practical claims or pretensions on Lithuania.

"The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Presidium calls upon the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia to bring to

reason those citizens of Belorussia who are frightening or inciting citizens of Lithuania who reside near Belorussian cities."

By the way, as a member of the United Nations, Belorussia's passport there is defined in a very concrete manner with regard to geography. If Belorussia somehow managed to alter its territory, then apparently it would be required to register itself anew.

In addition to these statements, the thought came up in the Presidium yesterday that we should perhaps address ourselves to the world with a special statement about the danger which threatens the Republic of Lithuania and its citizens when a far stronger armed force is raised against Lithuania. Such an address has been prepared because we need to do everything possible to see that no one decides to use force against the people of Lithuania.

It seems to me that our most important task is the formation of a government. If I am not mistaken, listening to the exchange of opinions here on the occasion of the one-month deadline, it seems to me that one week in our situation is a very long time. Remembering the nature of our situation in general as well, I would like to turn to these days too. It was announced that by 24 March any youths who had abandoned their military units must be returned or, apparently, they will be taken by force. As I have already mentioned, a call-up for the Soviet Army has begun, and we do not know on what day the other promised forcible actions may begin in Lithuania. We must have a government, a capable new government, and we must have it as soon as possible from an international point of view as well. It would be very good in practice if we could work day and night, split ourselves into commissions, meet again, summon people, carry out polls, and consult. If we could have a new Lithuanian government by Sunday, then we will have completed a very serious and tremendous effort. I understand that such a proposal may be unpopular, each of us has his personal matters and work that have already been planned, and in addition everyone is tired. But I have nonetheless raised the issue hoping that you are not adamant and that it is worth your changing your opinions. And if we already had a new government today, or if we were to have one tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, then the attitude of the world toward us would change, and indeed it has already changed considerably even without that.

International opinion is changing in our favor because Moscow is committing crude mistakes. News of this is arriving from the West. There is a report that more than 100 U.S. Congressmen signed an address to the President appealing to him to declare diplomatic recognition for Lithuania as an independent state immediately. And personal information I received over the telephone reveals that it is extremely important to have a new government. By the way, it does not hurt that the main committee for the liberation of Lithuania has formed a fund of 500,000 dollars for the government of Lithuania which, apparently, may begin to use it.

The approach of the Government of Denmark, reflected in a telegram our Ministry of Foreign Affairs received yesterday, is very characteristic. In other words, the Danish embassy in Moscow is in contact with the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is also quite unusual, a significant occurrence. In this declaration it is presumed that difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union are ahead, but the Government of Denmark hopes that both sides will be able to come to an agreement on a reasonable transition period. As a result I again return to the final acknowledgement we will receive, which the world will soon begin. I have no doubt of this, especially once we have already formed a government, a new government. The Law on the Government that has been passed proves that its new structure (that is, its foundation) should also be established concretely and approved personally.

Within this context, permit me to make public a very valuable statement to the chairman of the Supreme Council and to the chairman of the Council of Ministers: "We congratulate you and express our happiness at the rebirth of an independent Republic of Lithuania. Understanding how important the world's recognition is, we dare to trouble you and propose our services. For the government that first recognized an independent Lithuania, we are prepared without compensation to design a mission and prepare all the draft documentation for its construction—Yonas Anushkevichyus, Algirdas Norkunas, Algimantas Sharauskas, architects and winners of international, Union, and republic competitions."

As for matters which we should consider not only in connection with the formation of a mission, I would like it if we could do this all quickly. We can and must do some of it today, especially in connection with what you heard at the morning session concerning supposed visits to Lithuania by guests of an uncertain rank.

A very important link in the whole system of the defense of our rights is the procurator. We must strengthen all the links, postponing nothing. The weak place in this link is the fact that in essence we do not have a republic procurator which, according to the Lithuanian Constitution, must be appointed by the Supreme Council. The respected Vidutis Barauskas worked in this post in an entirely indeterminate situation. He was appointed, as we would now say, the procurator of another government, and he was not appointed in Lithuania. He was one of those officials in the entire law and order system whom we requested and whom we entrusted with temporarily fulfilling a post. Today we would like to thank Procurator Vidutis Barauskas very warmly for carrying out this task until now at our request. I believe that he will find a place in the system of the procuracy for his experience. And in accordance with my office, I would like to propose that we appoint a procurator of the Republic of Lithuania. It would be very good if we could do this now so that the officials arriving from Moscow will find a genuine and steadfast procurator of the republic who enjoys our trust, will talk with them as an

equal by virtue of his authority, and will receive them as guests depending on what they want.

With the accord of the deputies Vitautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, proposed Arturas Paulauskas, who until now worked as the republic's first deputy procurator, as candidate for the position of procurator of the Republic of Lithuania.

Vitautas Landsbergis characterized the candidate's personality and spoke positively of his career activities and civilian position.

Landsbergis 23 March Council Speech

90UN1489B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
27 Mar 90 p 2

[Speech by Vitautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, at a plenary meeting of the 23 March Supreme Council session, under the rubric "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] Good day, respected deputies and colleagues! These days will be extremely important for us, perhaps some of the most important for the changes we are bringing about. These days are important because we will have a new government. We will achieve another level in the formation of state power, and the world surrounding us will have to declare itself on this occasion.

In the meantime the pressure from outside continues, even though it also occurs inside, in Lithuania itself—in the form of foreign troops. These forces are getting larger all the time. They openly demonstrate how armed, powerful, and ready they are. Of course if they intend to do anything, they could as well have done it earlier. There were enough of them at any time. But now we see the maneuvers, the new units arriving, and the fact that they are purposely demonstrating their arms and their presence. We see, as it were, a part of the psychological war that is being waged against Lithuania. It is many-sided. Earlier it appeared mainly in the form of economic threats and warnings and now, as we see, it has moved to a new level. It is possible that if we hold out—and I do not doubt that we will withstand this pressure—some additional levels will yet be found for pressing us and demanding that we renounce the stands we have taken. Some of our stands are very clear. For instance, who has sovereignty over this land? The residents of Lithuania or of another state? No one in the world would accept the second alternative except for that same state. Although that state is mistaken, it is very strong. The world cannot immediately force it to repudiate its position. For this reason there is maneuvering, hesitation, and a search for ways and conditions to solve the problems of that state so that they will be fairly resolved from the point of view of humanity and so that state will not, as they say, lose face, and so that it will be able to cope with its internal contradictions.

Earlier I had the occasion to speak to some people who were asking me questions, and now I would like to repeat myself: If Mikhail Gorbachev were able to solve this problem of his country's, which the Lithuanian elections have accentuated so much today—that is, the problem of the seizure of the Baltic region in 1940—then he would truly be a great man in history, one who has genuinely turned the wheels of history—not through declarations, not by way of partial reforms, but through fundamental, basic political and moral reforms. Perhaps his opportunities are limited, perhaps there are obstacles around him. We do not know that. But we trust in reason and good will, and in him and the leadership of the Soviet Union despite our present conflict with them.

Today we have a statement from Mikhail Gorbachev which reached us in the form of a telegram and was published yesterday. It puts emphasis on the detachments of volunteers formed in Lithuania that were supposed to, in the words of the telegram, take over the functions of the border troops and in part those of the organs of internal affairs. In this telegram it is suggested that measures be taken immediately to stop the creation of such formations. I will not comment on the wording, which had various nuances. The words "I suggest" are not bad words. And it is also not bad that they wish to be informed of the implementation of the suggestion. The first telegram was phrased differently. But those two days, after which they ask to be informed of the measures we have taken, are cause for concern because that deadline—24 March—coincides, perhaps accidentally, perhaps not, with the deadline that was given in the ultimatum of the military command, also 24 March. The soldiers must return to their units, otherwise they will be subjected to persecution. The persecutions began even earlier. Yesterday one soldier who had abandoned his unit was abducted in Vilnius. For the time being we do not know the names of the persons who will be charged with abduction of a person on the street. We know only that they dragged him to the Vilnius headquarters. Yesterday I telephoned Colonel Uskhopchik, who declared that he had only heard of this incident from me. He promised an explanation. At my demand that he go immediately to the headquarters and release the illegally detained citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, I was given the repeated answer that he only carries out the orders of the military command and that I could not give such an order. I warned that he would bear the responsibility for the consequences and that there were cases where soldiers carrying out the orders of a higher command were nonetheless forced to appear in court afterwards. Despite the fact that I asked to be informed of events, and it seemed to me that we agreed on such information, nothing has been forthcoming. Mechis Laurinkus, who tried yesterday to go to the headquarters and was still trying an hour ago today, has still not been able to report anything. Do you not think, colleagues and deputies, that we should make up a declaration in the name of the Supreme Council concerning the abduction of Lithuanian citizens that has begun in Lithuania, because it threatens us? And perhaps such a request

should be sent not only to Moscow. I have taken up such a tone because Mikhail Gorbachev's telegram designated a fixed date. As I already mentioned, it coincides with the date set by the military command—that is, tomorrow's date. Therefore we must work together today. If it is necessary, we must break off the plenary meeting, again separate into commissions and groups, and again discuss the candidacies of ministers and form a Council of Ministers.

Today, tonight, and tomorrow morning—as long as is needed. In order to have the opportunity to address the world in the name of a new Council of Ministers which has already been approved by us.

I am writing an appropriate answer and a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev and I will be able to inform you about it later. I will also let you know if I receive any additional information about events in Lithuania or about attitudes toward us in the Soviet Union and the world. Yesterday we received the news that there was a resolution in the U.S. Senate demanding that the President recognize the independence of Lithuania and its government, but that it did not collect the needed number of votes. Today the resolution was passed unanimously with a change of wording to "discuss the question of recognition."

Landsbergis 2, 3 April Council Addresses

90UN1568A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Address by Vytautas Landsbergis, republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Chairman, at 2 and 3 April Supreme Council meetings: "On the Political Situation"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Supreme Council, esteemed colleague deputies! The past days have been no less substantive than the days before them. We have gathered in order to continue our constructive work on restoring the state at a time when the issue of the Lithuanian state has become the subject of extensive discussion. This discussion is important for our own existence, work, and future; this is why I will review Lithuania's situation in the international aspect on the basis of the available information.

This aspect is now dual: the East and the West. We are very significant for the East and the West, especially because of their mutual relations. Some people are trying to move us to pity because we may change these relations in one direction or another. However, they talk little of our own fate and our rights. Those who support us, and support us unquestioningly, include considerable political forces and very influential political figures. They know that they can facilitate the improvement of the world only by speaking up in favor of justice.

Various responses have come to us from the East. I have received a letter with a request that it be read at a session of the Lithuania Supreme Council. This is an appeal to the Ukrainians of Lithuania: "Brothers and sisters! You

are fortunate to have two motherlands, Lithuania and the Ukraine. Your second motherland, Lithuania, has taken the first step toward liberation. In a free Lithuania, you will also be free. We believe that the fate of your parent land, the Ukraine, is of concern to you, as well as to all progressive Ukrainians in the world. You also wish it well and wish it to be free. There will not be a free Ukraine without a free Lithuania. For this reason, allow us to consider a letter by several Ukrainians from Lithuania, published on 30 March of this year in the newspaper RADYANSKA UKRAINA, to be their personal opinion rather than the position of the 45,000 Ukrainians in Lithuania (the authors of the letter expressed their indignation at the resolutions of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council—editorial note). At the same time, as the freedom of Lithuania is being asserted through the trials of resisting a great power, we call on you to support its rebirth following which, we hope, the time of liberation of the Ukraine will come. [signed] Ukrainians from the Ukraine Dmytro Pavlychko, Ivan Drach, Volodimir Yavorivskiy." These are the main authorities and leaders of the democratic movement of the Ukraine.

The attitude of the Soviet Union leadership toward the issues of Lithuania and, frankly speaking, its own problems is another factor significant for our lives. Apparently, and understandably, the leadership of the Soviet Union has its own political difficulties and obligations when it makes relevant categorical statements. This is why we need to look for ways to help both ourselves and this leadership. You are aware of the President of the Soviet Union's Appeal to the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, as well as his appeal to the Lithuanian people. The people of Lithuania have begun to send telegrams not only to the Kremlin but also copies of them to us. Perhaps we will receive more of them. We will also draw on this abundance of views and hopes in developing our response to M. Gorbachev. Apparently it would be feasible for the public organizations, primarily Sajudis which has already discussed this issue, to embark on organizing large public meetings of citizens. The fact that Mikhail Gorbachev addresses the Lithuanian people directly and simple courtesy make it a duty of the Lithuanian people to respond. It also makes a difference for us whether our position will be outlined by our voices alone or not.

We have already drafted a response of the presidium to Gorbachev. It is quite exhaustive, and concentrates both the main arguments we saw fit to recall and, we believe, all the good will and favorable attitude that we have expressed from the very beginning so as to make possible a resolution of the issue in the form of a dialogue rather than two monologues. The foreign affairs minister of Norway observed aptly that the USSR must understand—a dialogue means talking to your opponent rather than just addressing him. We also want talks to take place, and this is why we see positive elements in both appeals. Mikhail Gorbachev's desire to discuss issues of Lithuania's status within the framework of the Constitution of the Soviet Union is one such aspect. This

problem could be discussed from different angles. We are not against discussing it from this angle as well. We proposed to M. Gorbachev that we send an authorized representative who will explain in more detail how this problem is perceived from the other side. The telegram I am referring to was sent the morning.

Referring to the draft response of the Supreme Council to Gorbachev, V. Landsbergis proposed to share views at a plenary session, and subsequently to convene several permanent commissions. They would submit a generalized concept, which would be finally prepared by the editorial commission. The document of the Supreme Council could also draw on the response sent by the presidium.

We may take into account what we referred to as the Estonian variant. Some people are trying to contrast it with the road taken by Lithuania, though this contrast is hard to discern. The Estonians have also proclaimed the restoration of an independent republic and mapped out a process for creating all the structures of an independent state. We have exactly the same concept of this, and we are striving to reorganize and take control of state structures. To be sure, nobody is under the illusion that a legal act promulgated by us immediately leads to complete independence. Possibly some detached observers could have gained the impression that our acts are a demand to transfer all authority right away, the next day. We did not hope for this, and for this reason we did not demand it. In many instances we indicated in our statements the stages we foresee and how we will assert independence by means of agreements and a gradual transfer of functions. On the other hand, the Estonians also stressed very categorically the illegality of the authority of the Soviet Union on the territory of the Republic of Estonia from the day of occupation in 1940 until now.

At present, very many people are asking—to be sure, few people in Lithuania, mostly abroad: Are we really going to retract the declaration of independence? Even the British press has spread such rumors. We may respond to this unequivocally, like before. When they asked why we do not agree to, or do not want to hold a referendum, I said: The issue of a referendum may also be discussed, but not that of independence. Obviously, if some people imagine that the elected deputies who said "yes!" to independence will say "no!" this time, three weeks later, these people do not know Lithuania. It is another matter that, as I said, the Soviet Union has its own legal and domestic policy problems, and that we may help it somewhat by discussing this issue from the angle that it desires.

With reference to our situation in the aspect that hinges on relations with the Eastern state, we should turn to some attributes of these relations. The harsh war machine continues to be demonstrated against us. The people who order armored personnel carriers to drive through the city at night do not think about those asleep or sick, or about what the statistics of nervous illnesses

and heart attacks are going to be if this psychological warfare is kept up for a long time. It could be that international humanitarian organizations need to give this more thought. One appeal to them has been handed out to you. This is an appeal to the International Red Cross and the International Organization for Human Rights. Besides, the Vilnius City Council which will convene after the elections should send a bill to the armed forces for the damaged streets.

As I see it, there is a more favorable sign of sorts, if it is really so—they stopped demanding that hunting rifles be surrendered. However, young men refusing to serve in the Soviet Army are still at risk; they are being hunted. This is a difficult issue for the Lithuanian state. We may understand that this is an issue of not only, say, the prestige or might of the armed forces (if they believe that they themselves will be weakened if the young men of Lithuania are left alone) but also an issue of the Lithuanian Government's prestige. Of course, this is being done on purpose, in order to humiliate the government and show what it, the authorities incapable of protecting their citizens, are worth. Well, under occupation he who is in control of everything is stronger. However, I think that this situation will not last long.

Apparently, the creeping occupation of offices did not continue toward the end of last week. However, today we once again heard about encroachments on the Publishing House and Printing Plant of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee. Once again, a proposal by the writer and peace advocate G. Borovik to talk to the republics, which we heard yesterday on TV, is a more favorable sign of sorts. Indeed, we can do this. It is very easy to talk to our northern neighbors; we have strong support in Moldavia and the Ukraine. Even in Belorussia, whose government has made territorial claims against Lithuania, we nonetheless enjoy the support of its People's Front. This support also saves the honor of the Belorussian people.

I would like to read a letter from the prime minister of Denmark at this point (the text of the letter has been published in the press—editorial note). The specific language of the letter in an address to the Republic of Lithuania Government undoubtedly amounts to recognition of Lithuanian as an independent state with an independently operating government. Here is a very short statement by the Government of Iceland: "In response to a question put by the delegation of Lithuania yesterday to the Iceland ambassador in Norway, the Government of Iceland states: The Government is prepared to offer its services in order to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute over legalizing the striving of the people of Lithuania for freedom and independence. For this reason, in the event of an agreement between the two parties the government will be pleased to offer Reykjavik as a venue for talks between the negotiating parties."

I am looking at a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress, the discussion and voting on which will, as far as I know,

be held tomorrow. Its adoption would be almost an obligation for the President. [passage omitted containing Joint Resolution 289 dated 28 March 1990]

Many people in the West do not doubt that the resolution will be adopted. We are going to analyze it closely; many people will consider it. It will immediately have a political impact on our still difficult situation. In summation, I would like once again to express my faith in our solidarity rather than that of the world at this difficult time.

Respected colleagues! Today, I would like to share my thoughts and considerations on how the situation is developing in Lithuania rather than review the international situation. It is possible that I will try to make a prediction of sorts which, as with any prediction, may or may not come true.

A little bit on possible events in Lithuania. I will proceed from how the situation has developed and what has been done to date against the independence of Lithuania. Those who cannot agree with an independent Lithuania, those who are against restoring the state independence of Lithuania as a matter of principle, and, of course, those who tried ahead of time to prevent the residents of Lithuania and the deputies elected by them from taking this step have been using methods that are now emerging quite specifically.

Crushing the morale of the people is the main method used by all totalitarian systems, which has been known for a long time. It has turned out that intimidation through undermining the economy is not as justified as it initially appeared. Apparently, destroying it is disadvantageous. It is too closely tied to the economy of the Soviet Union. Apparently this is also disadvantageous from the point of view of politics.

In turn, they are trying to vigorously affect our moral condition through all known and apparent means, through a show of unlimited military might. They are trying to get on our nerves, disrupt our balance, self-control, restraint, and unity. We should note that this does work in some cases, but substantively it does not. Among other signs we have observed and which perhaps we will have to face are attempts to refute the lawfulness of our decisions, and when this fails, to discredit the Supreme Council or particular individuals. We may imagine and even expect that discrediting materials against particular individuals will rain down on us, and on a much greater scale than KRANKLIS and the like used to do. However, there are more refined things, primarily in our press, which cause a strange feeling. Naivete is apparent in the publications of journalists, and this makes one think: Is this not false naivete to ask the Supreme Council categorically when it is going to embark on negotiations with Moscow? Foreign journalists are also asking about this, and we have to explain that we have been sending proposals for negotiations from the very first day on, that we desire good relations and want to maintain economic contacts and political

cooperation. However, when this question is put to us in our newspapers, another question comes up all by itself: Necessary as it is to approach the work of the Supreme Council critically, attempts to portray its work sarcastically, even in an ironic way, are apparent here. I do not quite understand the definition of the Supreme Council in today's TIESA as a council incapable of thinking or as a council that has not thought to date. Supposedly, the time has come to think. It is possible that journalists distorted the words of esteemed Lenginas Sepetis. I would like to wish for us not only to be steadfast and tenacious, of which thus far there has been no dearth and which I think we, our people, or the public of Lithuania, will not lack in the future, but to also wish, in a sense, composure or attention to one's words in our work.

They are striving to undermine our legal order. This is also a method of discrediting the state. The intention is to undermine information and, therefore, glasnost. If newspapers are not going to be published, a form of direct political censorship will appear here. They even enumerate the newspapers, from TIESA to publications not favoring "socialism." This would spell the end of the era of "glasnost," and not only in Lithuania.

Since it all started with Lithuania, the latter will perhaps be once again to blame—as they are trying to portray it now, Lithuania, which has harmed the Soviet Union. Many such things are now being done by someone else's hands, though they are referred to as local, or rather pseudo-local. The restriction of glasnost on 4 April 1990, which is now endangered, and the breakdown of information and publishing may be accomplished using the same local hands. To be sure, we are working and will work under any circumstances, and we will endure. As our ancestors, the figures of the first restoration used to say, here it is for you!

Some people do not like our stamina. We will endure, but they will try to interfere with this. But how? I get the impression that a sham local coup and the dissolution of the organs of power is one of the possible scenarios. Which forces are capable of this? I think that the well-known fascist elements, which do not have much support in our society. However, in this endeavor they could draw on the military forces dispatched, which demonstrate so much the vagueness of their actions. Who will be responsible in this case? It is quite possible that Moscow, as represented by the civil and military authorities, will attempt to sort of remain on the sidelines and create an impression that the locals are supposedly fighting for power. In this manner it will wash its hands of it, and possibly will blame some old generals and subsequently purge the general officers. Or the generals will shift the responsibility to the local or regional military command. From that point on, it is a matter of their domestic policy, but there are grounds to expect something bad.

Such reasoning may prompt us to take certain legal steps; declarations may also be made. Thus, we have a fundamental resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia

which determines the status of Estonia—it is an occupied country. It has been occupied since 1940 through the present—such is its reference point. We wanted to offer the Soviet Union another variant. However, at present the world is being shown that we are or may be an openly occupied country: Buildings are being taken over, law enforcement organs are being usurped, and it is not known what further steps may be taken. This is why we may mark the present-day evolution by some resolution on the current situation, possibly even drawing an analogy with the year 1940. Last fall, when the foreign minister of Sweden had to give explanations concerning his unfortunate statements, he came up with this formula: "Indeed, Lithuania and other Baltic states were occupied, but only for a month and a half. Subsequently, they were annexed. Therefore, at present they are not occupied but merely annexed." They want to return us from annexation to a condition of active military occupation. It could be a way back, to the year 1939 through the year 1940. We have heard serious suggestions to return to the status of 1939, to the treaties with the Soviet Union that existed at the time. Certainly, the path of this return would be strange. Be that as it may, I suggest that we discuss this idea. In this case how are we to define our status, which will change yet again?

One more thing needs to be defined. The occupying force is ultimately responsible for everything that happens under these conditions of intensified or open occupation, when the country is occupied, not because troops not subordinated to the government of this country are deployed on its territory but because the troops vigorously interfere in the life of the land and impose their own regulations. The occupying force is also responsible for every possible provocation, for every coup staged by a local or pseudo-local group, because it has approved of it though it could have prevented it. We must grasp this: No matter what happens in Lithuania in a violent manner, Moscow will be responsible for everything because it has tremendous forces here. I believe that it is necessary to prepare a document or two on this issue while we still have time to prepare them.

Landsbergis 9 April Press Conference

90UN1552A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
11 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by ELTA correspondents Y. Bagdanskis and R. Chesna: "Press Conference at the Supreme Council"]

[Text] Another offensive against Lithuania. A diplomatic mission in Canada. The Procuracy of Lithuania carries out its usual work. Why did the U.S. Senator not arrive? Millions of telegrams to Moscow.

There are ways of speaking about negotiations in such a manner that they will not take place at all. At a meeting with journalists that took place on 9 April Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, characterized the position of the USSR this way on the question of beginning negotiations

or even of consultations about negotiations with Lithuania. He noted that Moscow has chosen such a tactic with the clear goal of discrediting the aspirations of the people of Lithuania and its leadership in the eyes of the world. They are trying to impose the opinion on foreign diplomats, journalists, and society that any Union republic is permitted self-determination and secession from that Union now that new USSR laws have been passed. But Lithuania is disregarding this with its hasty actions, is not observing the rules of good conduct, and is undermining the stability of the country. And this presents a danger not only for perestroika but for Mikhail Gorbachev himself, and thus for world stability. According to V. Landsbergis, they forget that Lithuania, which did not join that Union, is not required to secede from it, and finally that these new laws on secession take priority even over the USSR Constitution, whose Article 72 stipulates the right of free secession from the USSR. The Soviet Union, said V. Landsbergis, needs something else—it needs to change the world's attitude toward Lithuania from favorable to hostile. This is why we must explain what the parliament and government of Lithuania, expressing the will of the people and the majority of the citizens, are really trying to do. And we must use every means, including the mass media, beginning with an objective description of the course of events for those abroad and ending with the local press.

Bronys Kuzmitskas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, continued these thoughts at the press conference and shared impressions from his numerous meetings in Canada, where he travelled with a diplomatic mission. There they are interested in the conduct of a referendum in Lithuania, the establishment of borders, the possibility of an economic blockade, international relations, and other questions of our life. On the question of Lithuania, Canada's official circles are looking to the United States. However, the parliamentarians and the public as a whole, whose opinion the government must consider, are on our side. A desire to defend those who are weaker prevails there. A council of Canadian veterans even proposed defending Lithuanian youths who have deserted the Soviet Army if they are subjected to persecution. However, B. Kuzmitskas noted, we should not also expect them to support us unconditionally and without considering some of the interests of both the East and the West.

Answering a question about the situation that has arisen in the republic's Procuracy, Kazimeras Moteka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, announced that the republic's Procuracy is working normally even though its buildings have been occupied by USSR servicemen. Its employees have found temporary lodgings in the Procuracy of the city of Vilnius. The courts are only reviewing indictments signed by the Republic of Lithuania procurator. A. Petrauskas, the "imported" procurator, tried to send several cases to the people's courts, but they were returned to the Republic of Lithuania Procuracy. The installed procurator tried to take over the functions of distributor of finances, but he did not succeed at that

either. None of the notaries or banks confirmed his signature, which has been approved in Moscow. In this fashion A. Petrauskas is a purely formal person, virtually isolated in his activities.

At the request of journalists Algirdas Saudargas, minister of foreign affairs, talked about the meeting with U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato and his trip to Lithuania. The senator, who was supposed to visit Lithuania at the invitation of the chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, was met by A. Saudargas in Warsaw. The previous Friday he and the people accompanying him arrived at the Polish-Lithuanian border. The Polish border guards allowed them through, but the Soviet guards did not. He asked that an exception be made, as had happened before, but the Soviet officials refused to grant the request. On parting, the U.S. senator presented the Republic of Lithuania minister of foreign affairs with the U.S. Senate resolution on Lithuania and expressed confidence that there would be no such barriers to a visit the next time.

Answering a question about his correspondence with Mikhail Gorbachev, Vytautas Landsbergis noted that the statements of the leader of the Soviet Union depend very much on the state of affairs. One instance was presented. Before Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, left for Washington there was a meeting in Moscow between representatives of Lithuania and Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council. This meeting was presented in Washington as a sign of good will and of the USSR's wish to enter negotiations, because it was necessary to Moscow at that time. And now the meeting with A. Yakovlev is characterized as purely private and not obligating the Soviet Union to anything. The same thing can be said if one compares E. Shevardnadze's statements about Lithuania in Washington and President Gorbachev's statements now that an agreement has been reached on the date of the summit talks. He received an agreement from the United States, and now President M. Gorbachev can bravely permit himself very cruel threats against Lithuania. Of course it is unpleasant and very difficult for us to listen to it, but we felt earlier that Moscow did not want a dialogue, V. Landsbergis noted. Kazimeras Moteka, deputy chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, reported that many of the actions of those who had come from Moscow testify to the Soviet Union's desire to introduce dual authority to Lithuania. A clear confirmation of that is the seizure of the Press House and the former Institute of Party History. These are preventive measures toward the accomplishment of the above-mentioned goal. But on the other hand, the USSR is avoiding glasnost as much as possible and is trying to keep the world community from finding out about its illegal actions. Perhaps this is why simple, unarmed people who had gathered at the Press House were subjected to so much pressure—the soldiers arrived in 13 trucks.

Vytautas Landsbergis was asked about the possibility of a referendum in Lithuania. In his answer the chairman

of the Supreme Council stressed that if someone from Moscow or some other party were to propose that Lithuania conduct a referendum, we could discuss the question. We have already spoken about it several times. But characteristically there have not been any direct proposals from Moscow to conduct a referendum. There is only a demand to submit to the laws of Moscow, or in other words to acknowledge that we are a republic of the Soviet Union, that we joined the Soviet Union through our own wish, that we were always happy, that now we wish to constitute ourselves differently and therefore we need a referendum. Consequently they wish to put us in a false position and entrap us.

Vytautas Landsbergis reported that millions of telegrams had already been sent through our mail to Moscow and that almost all of them support the ruling of the Supreme Council. An enormous meeting of people took place in Lithuania. In Vilnius, where 300,000 people gathered, they all unanimously declared what they want: Freedom, freedom, freedom!..

The press conference was conducted by Povilas Pau-paras, head of the Supreme Council's department of information.

Landsbergis on Political Situation

90UN1552B Vilnius EKHO LITY in Russian
11 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, to 9 April Supreme Council session: "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] Respected colleagues and deputies!

The last few days have been rich in both events and information, and have led us to reflect. I cannot discuss everything, but I want to bring up several of the more important events.

A new, perhaps long-term, well-conceived factor in the current political situation is the beginning of an international Soviet propaganda offensive against Lithuania. In reality it is a struggle for international opinion, which was almost exclusively on the side of Lithuania. Now they are trying to shake it and change it, even partially. And whenever they are successful they try with all their might to expose it and to show that many do not support us.

International opinion is an extremely important factor in our current struggle. Our only weapons, as you know, are our will, consistency, and peaceful work. On the other hand the international opinion that supports us puts pressure on the Soviet Union to act more fairly than it has up until now. This is one of the evident facts which, perhaps, is not without interest for the leadership of the Soviet Union on the scale of its entire politics: The main argument and factor of all those politics—the prestige of M. Gorbachev and a certain image of him that has been successfully created over the years as a

savior of mankind—is threatened. It has turned out to be in definite danger: It had already begun to seem to some people—they talk and write about it—that he is not what he appears, that he is a dictator in the old mold and a poor politician who has driven himself into a corner with dangerous and extreme statements concerning Lithuania. In other words, a man not of the future but of the past. At the very most, a man of today tending toward the past. We too, perhaps, entertained certain illusions that were or are widespread, and it is possible that we ourselves desired these illusions: People said that some of the forcible actions in Lithuania were only carried out at the decision of the higher military command, that it was the military's own independent policy, and that perhaps it even intentionally compromised M. Gorbachev.

Unfortunately, Mikhail Gorbachev's own conduct regarding Estonia—the conversation with President A. Ryutyl, in which there was a threat to use against Estonia the same means that were used against Lithuania—tells us something else: Everything being done in Lithuania is well-planned and approved at the top. But then the question again arises, and not only among us: Are not the statements of M. Gorbachev, which they try to present in Moscow as hasty and ill-considered as though there will be no negotiations with Lithuania, their real position? Can things not be set right? If this is so, then one can only welcome it. On the other hand, we consider it entirely likely that not only does Moscow wish to avoid negotiations but that it also does not intend to maintain preliminary contacts of good will. Moscow avoids this, and as a result it puts a deliberately impossible condition before Lithuania as well. It is very convenient to say that Lithuania does not wish to fulfill such a simple condition and begin negotiations. We know what kind of condition it is, and we will never be able to fulfill it because we do not have either the moral or the legal right to do so. So let the question of M. Gorbachev's intentions remain open for the present. The near future will answer it.

In the meantime, as I said, a large-scale international propaganda offensive has been begun. They have made use of diplomats, journalists, and even military men. So everyone, probably, was shocked by the news that Major General Safonov, commander of Karabakh and the neighboring rayons of Azerbaijan where a special situation has been introduced, speaks about direct ties between Lithuania and the events in that region. Supposedly "such information has been received." With such a vague formulation one might put forward whatever he wants—even dreams or fabrications. They say that "they have information" that emissaries arriving from Lithuania are instigating the activities of armed detachments and that directly afterwards the number of clashes, human victims, etc. increases in Karabakh and the neighboring rayons. They are using the long-famous tactic of Goebbels—lie, lie—but the trail will remain! We, by the way, could prove the exact opposite case:

Now, in fact, there are fewer conflicts there because it is necessary to transfer their forces to Lithuania and instigate conflicts here.

Even before this we noted that Soviet officers often lie. And this is not just an exception within their system. Perhaps it is because the armed forces are, as previously, a part of the political force of the Soviet Union and play a corresponding role in it. Now they have begun to interfere in the purely political affairs of Lithuania. And when they do not get the desired results, they become annoyed. And the conduct of these annoyed forces, who imagine themselves all-powerful, is especially dangerous.

Thus, on Sunday a military helicopter flew low over a great meeting in Vingis Park where more than 300,000 people had gathered. It would be difficult to imagine the consequences if the Lithuanians' nerves had given way, if they had become frightened and tried to run from it rather than responding to it with scorn and mockery. Or what if the wind had been strong enough that day to crash the helicopter into the ground? There would have been hundreds of dead there, and even more crushed by the terrified crowd. This was stupendous irresponsibility and a crime before any kind of humanity! We decided at the time to send a protest to General D. Yazov. He also bears responsibility for what is happening and for what might happen, but he will just throw the telegram away and will not punish a single one of the guilty.

These days much attention is focused on events at the Press House and around it. We know that if the Press House is put under the control of the CPSU subunit in Lithuania, it will mean the end of a free press. And it will indeed be a task for them after the provocation with the procuracy did not produce any tangible results. As you know, troops entered the Press House to guard who knows what from who knows whom. In fact, this is interference in the separation of property, although no one in the world has ever heard of the army getting involved in this sort of thing. Apparently they have another goal in mind.

The seizure of the Press House manifests itself as a guard placed at the director's office. Visitors are not allowed in, and they have begun carrying out psychological interference with the work. Some secret goods appeared in the basements of the building, and rumors were heard that the building might even be blown up—the workers are becoming alarmed again. But the goal is rather clear: To disturb work and then accuse the leadership of the publishing house of poor work. This method has been famous in Lithuania since the times of Dekanozov.

Yesterday I had a strained conversation about this with General Maksimov, who was sent from Moscow to either monitor or, perhaps, give his blessing to "combat" operations. General Maksimov came to the Supreme Council to consult with us on how to resolve a problem that had arisen. He demanded that we send away the people who were gathering near the building and allow the troops to carry out their sacred duty. We demanded

in return that the troops, who are the source of the tension, must not seek out the guilty but instead, as the source and means of force and tension, must themselves leave. The discussion went on for a fairly long time. Nonetheless it was agreed that the board of directors of the Press House would be allowed to examine the basements and convince themselves that the goods delivered there do not present a danger to peoples' lives, that the guard would be moved from the door of the board of directors, and the main thing—that the trucks with the soldiers who were standing at the entrances would be removed. And then the civilian population would disperse. And it was done that way.

Nonetheless, questions persist. Some of the tension around the Press House seems artificially created and is being maintained. Lithuanian Radio has played and continues to play a certain role in this by directing the attention of the entire republic there specifically. We must consider whether this is really necessary.

We have answered force with legal means and with nonresistance to force, never mind armed resistance. But the mass concentration of people which is able to create an obstacle to armed force was not there before. Now it is. I do not wish to be a malicious prophet and scare people, but one can see the arrangement of the Tbilisi events in this. There too the people were guarding something and not doing anything but singing, dancing, and praying, and they started to beat them with shovels. But for that it is necessary that they become an obstacle or even just a feigned threat for someone. Our people are disciplined and understand the situation. They know that there were soldiers in civilian clothes with rocks in their pockets among them yesterday who, in the event that close contact was established with the other soldiers, could arrange a provocation. A significant distance was maintained, and they managed to avoid provocations. Nonetheless, is it necessary for so many people to be there constantly?

If, in the very end, if the problem of the property of the Lithuanian Communist Party really presents itself as is formally maintained, then I propose that the Lithuanian Communist Party take upon itself the initiative of submitting this question for arbitration or to the Supreme Court. But there is no justification for the presence of troops.

In the meantime the policy of blackmail and psychological pressure continues. It continues by means of propaganda when one thing is intended for internal and something else for external use. Let us say that they are trying to convince the residents of the USSR that the situation in Lithuania is unstable, that the tension has reached almost critical proportions, that it continues to heat up, etc. Many letters and telegrams are arriving from the Soviet Union in support of us, but faked letters of a condemnatory nature are also arriving sent by the collectives of whatever oblast, apparently on directions

from above. There are also statements that repeat propagandistic themes to the effect that a threatening situation has been created in Lithuania and proposing that we change something or renounce something in order to eliminate an impending "danger."

What danger are they speaking about? If armed people give rise to danger, then the soldiers themselves or their command can eliminate the danger without difficulty. We, as you know, are unarmed. We even handed in the majority of our hunting rifles for storage. They say that the rights of the USSR's citizens have been placed in danger, but no one has said which rights specifically. Even the high procurators could not answer that question, nor could the residents of Lithuania, a portion of whom are convinced that their own rights are being constricted. Has any one of them really said, "We now feel worse off"? But in this regard we must consider what is giving rise to the bad feelings—events in Lithuania, or those people who come here with the purpose of inciting trouble?

It is quite strange that those who have declared themselves the defenders of human rights in Lithuania are calling for a boycott of elections, even though elections are one of the fundamental democratic rights. They call for strikes, warning at the same time that the economic situation in Lithuania is worsening. It has not worsened noticeably, everything is functioning normally, but strikes really can make it worse. Then all those predictions and warnings would come true. And if there really were strikes in Lithuania, the losses from them would have to be covered by those who incited them and who occupy high posts beyond the borders of the republic and protect certain organizations in Lithuania that function with their help.

A danger which they could still cite is the differing interpretation of the issue of CPSU property in Lithuania. Speaking honestly, the CPSU does not wish to resolve this problem either in the manner that is accepted in the civilized world. On the other hand, if property such as the Press House has already brought its investor a tenfold profit, covering the costs of its construction ten times over, then one can see pure colonialism in the claim of ownership. It is always apparent when an empire invests something in its colonies and then violates them when it defends its "rights."

They talk about the "moral terror" in Lithuania felt by each person who thinks differently from the Lithuanian Supreme Council, or thinks differently within the Supreme Council itself from what one should think according to the text of the decrees that have been passed. Can anyone really believe this? Do you believe it? Attempts to undermine the authority of Professor M. Burokyavichyus among the Lithuanian people was cited as one example of "terror." It is being described in their press with all seriousness. They are also using such methods—long ago perfected and taken from Stalin's arsenal—as false interpretations in the Soviet press of the speeches of foreign figures. Of course people learned

long ago one should not seek truth in PRAVDA, but when one quotes ministers or senators the reader may well believe that they think that way. Let us say that TASS quoted the speech of Dumas, France's minister of foreign affairs, in parliamentary debates on Lithuania where the subject was the fate of the Lithuanian embassy in Paris. It is very interesting to compare the true text of the speech with what is published in the Soviet press!

In our turn, we also should do something differently than we have done until now. We need more reliable internal information and communications with the rayon press. And finally, the newspaper VALSTIBES ZHINES must be quickly reorganized as a daily newspaper which more completely reflects everything happening in Lithuania, or in any case in the realm of politics. We must organize more broadcasts in Russian on the radio and television, because the citizens of Lithuania expect it. We may have to dub television broadcasts more often. We may have to give more speeches in Polish at the expense of that part of the programming that Warsaw Television currently broadcasts. Incidentally, we also need broadcasts in the languages of the other peoples of Lithuania.

We see a Soviet propaganda offensive underway in the international arena as well. We are now hearing from there that the leadership of the USSR is in favor of negotiations with Lithuania, but that it is put off by an impossible, unacceptable, prior condition. In general when foreign politicians speak about negotiations, they usually insist that negotiations be conducted without any prior conditions. Moscow, in the meantime, is silent about its own conditions and wishes to show that it is in favor of negotiations. Incidentally, the USSR minister of internal affairs is declaring that there is no military constraint in Lithuania and that Moscow's conscience with regard to Lithuania is clean...

I must note that they very much enjoy bending the words "law" and "constitution." It is true, there was some irritation in Moscow immediately after we declared the restoration of independence. Some of them were angry at themselves that they had not managed to set legislative traps that would have complicated the republic's path to independence. But now that the laws have been passed and are maintained by decrees that are previously unprecedented in the world: The laws are supposed to be function retroactively!

Moscow talks about its wish to solve all its problems using legal, legislative, and constitutional means. Only the Lithuanians are using illegal means and violating the constitution which they themselves voted for! They present a picture of sacred innocence as though no one remembers how it was that we voted for the Constitution of comrade Stalin and for all the other constitutions. And they forget that 1.8 million people in Lithuania rejected the amendment to the Soviet Constitution. Feigning naivete, they say that the Lithuanians themselves "adopted" the Soviet Constitution, so why do they now not wish to "secede" from the Soviet Union quietly, peacefully, and in accordance with it? And there are

those in the West who are deceived, even among the diplomats, who perceive such arguments as though they had real content! Without even considering the fact that not one of the previous laws or the Soviet Constitution ever functioned in Lithuania with our accord. They were thrust upon us. Estonia has also spoken clearly about this now.

The old propaganda is coming back to life and explaining that the Soviet Union is itself looking into its "internal affair"—the wish of one of its republics to "secede" from the Union—in a friendly manner. They again imply that is an affair of internal policy. Sometimes it even slips into the comments of the ministers of foreign affairs of the United Kingdom or Italy. It must be that Soviet propaganda, resorting to its proven methods, is effective.

Moscow has now become "good." It allows secession. If anyone is so foolish and dissatisfied with these blessings, let them leave. But it must be done without hurrying, according to the law, and with regard for the will of each. But a part of the population, you see, does not agree. And so they try to look like kind uncles who are having problems with difficult, disobedient children. Emperors and tsars were always disposed to consider themselves "fathers," enjoying the right to punish their children for their own good. This principle still exists, and they are trying to explain the situation to the West from this position.

The word is going about that in Lithuania we are not considering the wishes and the will of Lithuanian residents of other nationalities. But by other nationalities they mean every single person. As though all the Russians and Poles of Lithuania were, without exception, dissatisfied with the rulings of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

We know that in reality this is not so, but it goes abroad in just this fashion, with an increase in the percentages. Incidentally, a tried and tested means of inciting hostility between the peoples is being used: Put all the Lithuanians on one side and all the non-Lithuanians on the other. Such a hypocritical, two-faced political game is not a novelty either.

Here we need vigorous action. We need to create an efficient special political information service in Lithuania. We must not spare resources and we must enlist qualified people. This activity should be coordinated by the unfortunately modest forces of the Lithuanian informational centers abroad. We must call for the help of Lithuanian emigres and call for them to devote more attention to this political struggle.

We will have to overcome the indifference of the governments of other countries. It is not the same in every case. From the governments of some countries we receive very appreciable help, whereas some of them have washed their hands of us or are even acting according to the principle of "not adding fuel to the fire." But the results are the opposite of what they want.

Such a refusal to get involved, a position on the sidelines, is a desire to avoid responsibility. There is view of the situation which has it that no one knows what methods our opponents, who possess great strength and a lopsided political thinking that is limited by that strength, are capable of resorting to. A more decisive recognition on the part of foreign countries not only of the Lithuanian parliament but of the government, as well as contacts with the government, would serve to stabilize the situation. Unfortunately, not everyone understands this in the West, or they have the appearance of not understanding it.

We just heard that the European parliament in Strasbourg discussed two resolutions concerning the Lithuanian question. One of them was clear-cut, defining the demands on the governments of the European countries and simultaneously warning the Soviet Union. But when it was necessary to vote for it, the number of members of parliament decreased, and some prominent politicians did not even show up in the hall even though they were authors of the resolution. This does not do credit to the politics and politicians of the Western countries. There were not enough votes to approve the resolution.

The other resolution was passed. It is more conformist and even contains one article that causes concern. Nonetheless, it too has its positive moments: An address to the Soviet Union and to the Republic of Lithuania, as though to two governments. To two political forces which must resolve a problem by way of constructive dialogue. This is not much, but it is still recognition.

The beginning of a new Soviet political campaign was designated right in the United States, which E. Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs, visited with his team and his propaganda staff. In the meantime U.S. officials, repeating their former warnings that the use of force in Lithuania would not be tolerated and that it would have a negative effect on Soviet-U.S. relations, nonetheless agreed in advance on a date for a summit meeting. Again, this gave rise to various rumors: On the one hand it is a factor obligating Moscow, and on the other hand it encourages Moscow inasmuch as nothing that Moscow did in Lithuania hindered the establishment of a date for the meeting.

The statements of several U.S. officials concerning relations with Moscow and calling them "our version of tough love," sound peculiar. This is in reference to some precautionary apologies to Minister E. Shevardnadze that in the event of the use of force in Lithuania, the U.S. Administration will have no other recourse (Congress, you see, is quite decided!) than to reject a number of good initiatives and already-developed treaties with the Soviet Union. Such apologies do us no good. We need a clear-cut position from the Administration, or in any case the same one as Congress maintains.

On the other hand, the President of the United States of America gave a warning that was formulated more firmly than at any time previously. The new element in his

statement was that at the summit he will raise the question of Lithuania with President Gorbachev as a regional problem or a problem in the relations between the two countries.

This is really not only a question of Lithuania. It is a problem of the Baltic region and the entire eastern and northeastern region, and a world regional problem. This concept is being put into circulation. Then it undoubtedly will become an object of attention for the United Nations and its Security Council. There are also calls to raise the question of Lithuania at the International Court at the Hague, and there are proposals for possible mediation by quite influential and authoritative people in negotiations between Lithuania and Moscow. In a political sense these are positive achievements for Lithuania.

But perhaps the main factor, which is already making its appearance and may soon become influential, is open and sincere people's diplomacy, and not the rhetorical formulations of professional diplomats. We are observing the appearance of such diplomacy in both the West and the East. In the West it appears as pressure by public organizations on the governments of their countries, including constant demonstrations such as those in Sweden. It is also putting forth its first shoots in the Soviet Union: It is not only a matter of meetings in support of Lithuania, but also our contacts with deputies from the various republics and the representatives and leaders of democratic social movements. It is just this people's diplomacy, appearing on the scale of the entire Soviet Union, which may become the factor that will unexpectedly develop into tremendous activity of revolutionary significance in all the republics, Russia included. It may happen that the government of the Soviet Union will become superfluous and that people will talk with people, and they will negotiate better. And then indeed what we have begun to think about will be revealed: Are M. Gorbachev and his leadership of the future or of the past?

Landsbergis 17 April Council Report

90UN1729B Vilnius EKHO LITY in Russian
19 Apr 90 pp 1,2

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, at the 17 April Supreme Council meeting: "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] Today we may review the events of not only the recent days but also of the entire month. This has been the month of asserting our independence. On 11 March, we promulgated legal and state acts of great significance and embarked on the road of their implementation. This difficult road we opted for has its own difficulties and its own advantages.

What did the Act on the Restoration of Independence amount to? This was an expression of the will of the citizens of Lithuania, our unanimous self-determination. We crossed the Rubicon, on the other side of which we now find ourselves in a new legal situation. Is it really

new? Many things clearly remind us of the year 1940 which many of us remember in our lifetime. This prompts us to think that in the political aspect as well we find ourselves in the same situation as we did then. At the end of June-beginning of July of that year, Lithuania still was a state of sorts, but could resolve little through the efforts of its government because it was threatened by another country's army and, in particular, the Soviet secret services.

If we were to compare that period with the current one, at present much would speak in favor of the current situation. Primarily, it is the fact that the organs of state power of Lithuania are much stronger and much more independent now; they were not taken aback even by military action on the territory of Lithuania. It could be that we have become accustomed to this. On the other hand, in 1940 the strike against Lithuania was timed for the very day Paris fell, when the Baltic area was not on the mind of the world; at present the situation is absolutely different. The tremendous attention of the world on the Baltic area is our reliable weapon.

We have stood up to the threat of the state to use all its force with a view to defending the past, at any rate, what has already become the past in Lithuania. We have not been held back by threats, shows of force, all kinds of attacks, and the subversion of psychological warfare. We have withstood attempts at a political blockade and efforts to isolate Lithuania in the international arena. We have had to endure more refined pressure aimed at us giving up the main accomplishment which has brought us to the new legal position. We have heard demands to rescind what will not be rescinded. Besides, we have heard proposals to suspend the 11 March decisions, though nobody has explained how we can suspend the effect of the constitution without becoming participants in a coup and dictators (who usually suspend constitutions) and submitting to the once forcible application of the USSR Constitution on our territory which will this time be in accordance with "our own" wishes. It is possible that many of those who have proposed this formula to us are our good friends, but they have not thought it through.

We have also had to withstand the subversion of legal order, an attempt to undermine the legal order of Lithuania and introduce dual legislation and dual supervision by the procuracy. We have had to withstand the fueling of ethnic discord which was built up in Lithuania in advance, and has recently been bolstered by a threat to annex a territory of the Republic of Lithuania. Finally, there is some propaganda invention about imaginary "compliance with the constitutional law" and USSR laws in Lithuania.

Mutual understanding and solidarity, unity, and conscientious discipline have been our weapon in this peaceful struggle. The public of Lithuania, its citizens, young people, various social circles and public organizations have indeed displayed a high degree of maturity. They have shown the world that Lithuania is worthy of its

independence right now. Solidarity of the peoples inside Lithuania itself is our weapon too. Perhaps all of you noticed a report on a survey of public opinion of the citizens of Vilnius carried out by an organization of the Soviet Union. Its results destroyed the myth of Soviet propaganda and attempts to split the population of Lithuania into Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians and to draw an artificial line between them. Solidarity of the peoples has come to the fore with great strength among the peoples of the Baltic area. This is expressed in a multitude of declarations with offers of help from neighboring Latvia and the unequivocal position of Estonia to resolutely follow our path. Also, Estonia has made a decision on the most urgent and sensitive issue—on the illegality of military service on the territory of Estonia. We have read or at least heard the statement of the People's Front of Estonia on Lithuania. However, the phrase about the aggression of the Soviet Union against Lithuania has been omitted for some reason from the text published in Lithuanian. We have received assurances of solidarity from the peoples of the Soviet Union at rallies and manifestations, as well as in the statements of delegations of deputies. Finally, the solidarity of the peoples of the world with us has turned out to be more striking, powerful, and consistent than the position of many governments. A time has come when mass movements and the social upsurge of the people play a tremendous role in Eastern Europe; in other countries, phenomena also occur which may be regarded as a step toward people's diplomacy, a direct conversation between the people and their representatives, and spontaneously emerging new political forces. Perhaps this will become a very significant factor on the scale of the Soviet Union capable of neutralizing intentions that are hostile to us and showing the kind of friendship of the peoples and their cooperation that is possible without the services of the nomenklatura bureaucracy.

World public opinion is our weapon as well, which incidentally depends on our consistence and extremely clear-cut position. In this field we have encountered the competition of the press, of all the mass media for the minds of the people. This competition has been provided by the myth of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the world and the old, entrenched pragmatism and indifference of the West. A lot has changed or is changing in our political struggle at this level, and so far we have been getting the upper hand. This has been facilitated by the grave mistakes of the leaders of the Soviet Union; authoritative politicians regard their actions in precisely this way.

We can also sum up certain results. Firstly, demands to begin negotiations or a dialogue have been heard since early March. Czechoslovakia, Iceland, and France have offered their territory for these purposes. Quite influential individuals have offered to mediate. As the foreign press has reported, Pope John Paul II has also come up with such an initiative. In the environment of such proposals or persistently voiced hopes that relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union should be

resolved only by way of urgent negotiations, the USSR has set a precondition. This condition is patently unrealizable. This is why setting it has a clear objective—to delay the resolution of the issue, perhaps also hoping that public opinion will be misled—that supposedly Lithuania is being stubborn and does not want negotiations. However, nothing has come out of it. If anything, we can understand that this was necessary for the leadership of the Soviet Union in order to evade a direct answer to a question about its reasons for failing to begin a dialogue. It is possible that it was not entirely prepared, though we raised the issue of the negotiations which were to bring about the restoration of the independence of Lithuania in Moscow as early as last summer. However, this was ignored, and this is why they did not prepare for the events of this March. Perhaps it is only now that they are beginning to perceive the new situation as an accomplished irreversible fact, and the negotiations are becoming unavoidable.

It is important that many Western politicians and statesmen indicate quite clearly what the purpose of the negotiations is, namely: Their result should become the formal implementation of independence. Others are inclined to suggest to the Soviet Union how to get out of this situation and of Lithuania. The foreign minister of Denmark and former U.S. Secretary of State Shultz have referred to this. Influential politicians are considering the International Court in the Hague, to which someone could submit the case of Lithuania or which could discuss the claims of the Soviet Union against Lithuania and vice versa. If the Soviet Union refuses to take part in the proceedings at the Hague, a certain reaction with regard to the USSR should follow on the part of Western countries. This is Western politicians are proposing.

The second result which has been assured everywhere, and has even been repeated by the leaders and propagandists of the Soviet Union, is that force and coercion supposedly cannot be used. This was discussed in different ways, sometimes even in a way dangerous to us: The use of force may be permissible under certain circumstances? It is strange to read the statements on possible bloodshed in Lithuania which are still published in the Soviet central newspapers. All that is not known is who is going to spill whose blood. Perhaps armed people will spill the blood of unarmed ones, but why do they talk about this without naming the main source of danger?

The Soviet Union has repeatedly given promises to the West, and it has subsequently come out that its promises are not reliable, and sometimes they have been directly referred to as lies and deception. With regard to the Lithuanian case, some Western politicians have voiced an opinion that it makes sense to find out what the Soviet Union really is and who the West is dealing with. It is better to find out than have delusions. After all, if even Prime Minister of Great Britain M. Thatcher says that she is shaken by the sudden reversal of Gorbachev's policy, this shows that the leaders of the USSR indeed make mistakes.

Thirdly, we have encountered a quite extensive and efficiently managed propaganda campaign whereby the Soviet leaders constantly maintain (forcing this on Western politicians as well) that, supposedly, Lithuania is an internal affair of the Soviet Union. PRAVDA has stooped low enough to state that everything is being done "pursuant to international law." Such statements have also been made by some Western politicians. However, as far as we know from a detailed description of a meeting of President G. Bush, Secretary of State J. Baker, and other officials with representatives of the Baltic organizations at the White House, J. Baker said clearly that the view on applying the Law on Secession from the Soviet Union or any referendums to Lithuania is unacceptable to the United States.

Attempts have been made to prove that all issues should be resolved within the framework of the USSR Constitution. This wording is still repeated in the central press of the Soviet Union. However, this constitution does not apply in Lithuania; it has been forced on us. Even previously nobody in Lithuania had voted for it freely, and on top of it its effect has been officially suspended since 11 March!

All of this is but a delay, we may even say, contradicting itself, because this constitution clearly refers to the right of the republics to freely leave the Union. Recently a law was hastily developed in Moscow which makes no reference to "leaving freely." It turns self-determination into the determination of everybody but the people themselves. This confusion in one's own laws and regulations testifies to the profound political and legal crisis the Soviet Union is going through at present.

The position of major Western states has been consistent, after all. They set forth the illegality of the annexation of the Baltic area, still do not recognize it, and interpret the issue of Lithuania only as an issue of relations between two states, or, as President Bush said, this is a regional problem, that is, a problem of the Baltic area and this part of Europe. There is real blackmail regarding the future of Mikhail Gorbachev and the hopes of Western countries attached to him: Supposedly, who is to be "sacrificed"—Lithuania, or Gorbachev and perestroika, as if the actions of Lithuania would amount to returning to stagnation rather than a consistent continuation of perestroika. The Soviet Union is issuing new warnings: The issue of Lithuania may even endanger peace in the entire world. This is altogether paradoxical because the world gets to see the kind of "peace-loving forces" stationed in Lithuania and how they behave. They are trying to convince Western politicians that they should not hasten to recognize the government of Lithuania and establish direct diplomatic contacts with it because this may provoke the very extreme forces of the Soviet Union. In other words, recognition would provoke madness, and this is why it is better not to be in a hurry.

Of course we will also have to be patient. One month is a very short period of time compared to the years it took

Lithuania after the proclamation of independence in 1918. When they argue for propaganda purposes that "nobody has recognized you," we are well aware that many states of the world have put it very simply: "We have recognized you since 1920, and we have never changed our position."

It appeared that the Soviet Union would persistently seek our political isolation, and would try to impress on us for the specific purposes of psychological warfare that we are, supposedly, alone and that no one supports us; people who are alone like that are easier to break. However, it is not working out for the Soviet Union either; this is prevented by the international and domestic situation in the Soviet Union itself and, as I have already said, by world public opinion. Public opinion in the world and in many areas of the Soviet Union is on the side of Lithuania.

How does our situation look now from the point of view of relations between Lithuania and Moscow? It is ambiguous. On the one hand, the need for a dialogue is perceived and acknowledged. At times the maximum unrealizable condition comes up, but actually unofficial contacts are maintained, and documents appear which address other questions than the unrealistic, maximum condition. Specific issues are also raised. This is exactly how the last appeal by Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov looks. Throughout the world it has been marked as an economic ultimatum, a promise of blockade. They are already revising it verbally in Moscow because they, perhaps, have noticed that this is a political step which is disadvantageous for them. So, on the one hand, they are moving toward a dialogue realizing that it is inevitable, though certain difficulties caused by the hasty declarations of Moscow do exist. On the other hand, still new methods of applying pressure are used, exactly which can be described as the threat of an economic war. In all honesty, it was immediately apparent that this is rather a means of political pressure on the people, perhaps even showing them actual, visible unemployment if these economic sanctions are going to be used. Meanwhile, artificially created unemployment would once again signify the orientation of Moscow toward social subversion and splitting our society in the hope of doing some political fishing in troubled waters. In turn, the other side of the coin is beginning to emerge, or a certain revision of this position: By hampering economic relations, show the Soviet Union how currency is to be made. This very explanation has become more common on the part of Moscow officials. Certainly, this makes us consider greater economies. On the other hand, this should give us more confidence. After all, this is "de facto" recognition of the fact that Lithuania is already another state with which settlements are going to be carried out through international procedures.

Unfortunately, the proven methods of pressure and old intimidation techniques are still in use. This is what the imaginary "disputes" are regarding party or someone else's property. Paratroopers or soldiers of the internal troops continue to be invited as experts in the course of

these disputes. We should acknowledge here that our parliament as well has paid little attention to solving this problem. One more danger is looming for us, for Latvia, and Estonia—it is the possible forcible draft of young people into the army. To be sure, in this matter we have certain proposals so far through unofficial channels. Perhaps they merit our attention if the supreme military command of the Soviet Union—for now, let us say, not yet the government—consents to an agreement similar to the one which was proposed in a program adopted by the constituent congress of Sajudis but has been invariably rejected by Moscow. After all, we see at present that many things which used to be rejected just as categorically are now discussed as a normal and imminent given. However, we invariably stay ahead and outpace the reforms emerging in Moscow, and this is why we are rebuked all the time.

The threat of a sudden use of force for eliminating the leadership by, say, introducing direct presidential rule, or even without its proclamation, continues to exist. Finally, there is also a threat in the event the most reactionary, profascist elements prevail in Moscow.

In the propaganda effort against us which is still under way in the central mass media we should pay attention to the so-called problem of human rights. Finally it is becoming clear what is really at issue. Probably, at issue are the people who will not want to accept Lithuanian citizenship but would like to live in Lithuania as Soviet citizens. Their problem should be understood and taken into account. Rumors and propaganda fabrications to the effect that those who do not have a certificate of Lithuanian citizenship will be unable to buy anything, that they will starve, or be expelled from Lithuania do not even merit a response. However, we should explain more often to the people concerned that this is not going to happen. By now a new, inflammatory term "refugees from the Baltic area" has appeared in the Moscow press. They tend too much toward equating us with Caucasus problems. But this does not work, despite their many efforts.

In the political struggle we are waging, as we understand it, in the interests not only of Lithuania but also of the Soviet Union it is desirable to realize not only the mistakes and crimes of former leaders but also certain mistakes of current leaders. We are looking for a road toward dialogue through various channels, including yesterday's declaration of the Council of Ministers about a Lithuanian delegation headed by the prime minister being prepared to go to Moscow. This declaration has brought about an extensive response throughout the world. Direct contacts with the republics and cities of the Soviet Union are an important method in this political struggle. We strive for contacts with the West through trade. For us, trade is the best aid in politics. Politically, it is also more correct than just to ask for aid which, incidentally, we will perhaps be given if necessary. However, our dignity and genuine interests call primarily for the development of trade.

Delegations of scientists, artists, and so on operating on a volunteer basis could accomplish a lot in establishing contacts with the republics, political movements, and new democratic forces of the Soviet Union. This work is already getting under way, to be sure, with some delay. Former USSR deputies also have to be invited to do this. This has also been discussed, and a pertinent document is being prepared on creating a corps of advisers to the Supreme Council with these deputies. At the same time they will be given assignments for work in the Soviet Union.

We should have paid more attention to what used to be called party property. But it is not only party property. The House of the Press is a vital issue associated with freedom of the press and freedom of speech. These are not only economic issues, though this, the preservation or loss of national wealth, is also important. This is why, I repeat, we should acknowledge that our parliament has not paid enough attention to these issues and has not risen resolutely enough to defend them. Actually, we should raise these issues in arbitration, and, if necessary, in the international forum. Certainly we should use the authority of the republic in defending this rather than leave these issues to the Communist Party of Lithuania alone which, in all honesty, has not displayed enough vigor in this matter either. It is good that the public has joined in and offered defense so far.

We could touch on the scope of issues which were already touched upon in the letter of the Council of Ministers in the course of discussing a more extensive response to the leaders of the Soviet Union or an appeal to them. Some things may be made more specific or added. So, we have an occasion to outline our point of view on the draft of the young men for military service, determination of the rights of citizens and human rights as a whole in conjunction with, for example, the certificate of citizenship which for some reason has angered so much the leadership of the Soviet Union, despite this being nothing but a consistent step toward implementing the Law on the Citizenship of Lithuania. Our response may proceed from specific, fresh issues which, apparently, will evoke certain bilateral explanations.

The concerns of generals in the Soviet Union associated with strategic interests which will, supposedly, be perceptibly infringed upon in the event of "the secession of Lithuania from the Soviet Union," and which General Denisov recently made a statement about, are one of the main issues. We should approach this concern very seriously. The West may already regard the troops of the Soviet Union stationed in Lithuania as troops situated outside the Soviet Union. In turn, we may offer to sort of return to the status of 1939-1940 and even to a certain model of a state-to-state treaty of this period. Certainly, this would only be an intermediate stage on the way to our goal—the restoration of Lithuania's traditional neutrality. Apparently such a stage is unavoidable. Returning the relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union to a legal dimension is the main advantage and the main argument which is indicated in the draft of

the letter. We should particularly strive for this legal determination at present, when the leaders of the Soviet Government stubbornly repeat their thesis about the imaginary effect of the USSR Constitution in Lithuania. Despite this just being bewildering to us, looking for common interests is a constructive point of view and method rather than a confrontation of positions.

There are common interests indeed. They invariably provide a platform on the basis of which people, political forces, and states come to an agreement. In turn, we may and should take further steps in our legislative activities and work on creating state structures which would bring about real independence along with a gradual transfer of functions by the Soviet Union. This would be a period which could take us to complete independence. I would call it a future period rather than a period of transition.

I think that we will return to the questions and possibilities enumerated here in the course of discussing our draft response to President M. Gorbachev. The draft has been handed out to you. This is a short document, but we may make additions to it concerning some specific aspects. Despite these aspects being touched upon in the letter of the Council of Ministers, perhaps in the response we should discuss in more detail the points which were not clear to the leaders of the Soviet Union or, perhaps, reached them in a distorted interpretation, such as, for example, the problem of certificates of citizenship. After all, the leadership of the Soviet Union is being misled by continuously repeated phrases about the supposedly "late night" hasty vote for the declaration of independence. It may be that certain educational repetition of well-known truths present in the document is in order. I remind you that many people in the East and West alike are awaiting our response.

Landsbergis, Others Meet Press 18 April

90UN1730E Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by I. Bagdanskis and R. Chesna: "Press Conference in the Supreme Council"]

[Text] **The threats continue. The truth comes out by itself. Will Lithuania be a member of the United Nations? Parliamentarians from Leningrad: "We are with you." A break in the political rulings.**

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council; Cheslovas Stankys, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council; Lyudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Supreme Council; and deputies Virgilijus Čepaitis and Kazimieras Uoka met with local and foreign journalists at a press conference which took place on 18 April in the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.

In answer to a question about an economic blockade, Vytautas Landsbergis said that recent actions on the part of the USSR are part of the same system of psychological and political pressure as before, reinforced now with economic threats.

There was a question about whether it would not be advisable to set forth the administration's opinion, via an ELTA report or in some other form, on several inadmissible statements by high officials of the USSR, for instance on the statement of Minister Shevardnadze to an IZVESTIYA correspondent concerning his trip to the United States. Vitautas Landsbergis answered that in some instances it probably could be done, and not only on the occasion of Minister Shevardnadze's statement but as a result of statements by representatives of governments of several other foreign countries which are false or which distort our position. But for the present we are not doing that, he noted, because we assume that the truth will come out by itself.

Has Lithuania appealed to the United Nations or other international organizations as an independent state, and is it preparing to join the United Nations? The chairman of the Supreme Council answered that there have been no appeals from our side. But we did make an appeal in the name of the mass movements of the three Baltic countries in response to Moscow's statement of 27 August 1989 which threatened that the Baltic countries could not exist if they wished to secede from the Soviet Union. At that time we appealed to the general secretary of the United Nations for the United Nations to intercede on the part of small states who are in danger, but we did not receive an answer.

When Lithuania begins to establish diplomatic relations with other countries, then countries will appear who are interested in Lithuania's membership in the United Nations. Membership must be proposed by a country that is itself a member of the United Nations.

There was another question for Vitautas Landsbergis: Will quotas for the use of resources be introduced?

"One of the members of the administration should answer that question. I doubt that such plans have been worked out in detail over the last day or two. On the other hand, a Supreme Council decree calls upon economic organizations and the citizens of Lithuania to prepare themselves today for strict savings of all resources in the future. Such psychological preparations are also necessary."

The chairman of the Supreme Council was also asked: Will a dialogue begin between Lithuania and the USSR? Vitautas Landsbergis noted that a delegation is being sent to Moscow and that it will seek out meetings with envoys authorized by the leadership of the Soviet Union for preliminary consultations.

"What is the meaning of the Supreme Council decree not to pass new political legislative acts before 1 May if parliamentary consultations begin between Lithuania and the USSR?"

"The interpretation of our decrees depends to a great degree on good will or bad intentions. We are going to be adopting decrees and laws related to questions of the internal life of the republic, its economic organization,

and other factors. If someone wants to, he can, of course, interpret any of them as a political act as well," answered Vitautas Landsbergis.

Deputy Kazimeras Uoka informed the journalists that Sergey Berezinskiy, deputy of the Leningrad City Soviet, was taking part in the conference. This morning the Leningrad City Soviet formed a special commission and authorized it to be its representative in Lithuania. If Moscow tries to break off economic and other ties with Lithuania, the Leningrad City Soviet will, on the other hand, encourage them.

Sergey Berezinskiy, deputy of the Leningrad City Soviet, said that after elections to the local organs of self-administration which took place in March, the political situation in that city changed fundamentally. The economic situation is now forcing the USSR to change over to market relations, and the former traditional commercial ties are changing. As a result there is currently a search for partners with whom it would be possible to conduct an mutually profitable exchange of products. In the opinion of the guests, the people of Leningrad hope to find such partners in an independent Lithuania as well.

When the conversation touched upon economic sanctions, Deputy Kazimeras Uoka noted that the oil distribution station in Birzhayskiy Rayon is surrounded by armored personnel carriers and guarded by soldiers. And that certainly means something!

A question was raised in connection with the proposals of Egidiyus Bichkauskas, deputy and representative of the Republic of Lithuania in Moscow, at the session on the principles which should be at the basis of relations between Lithuania and the USSR.

Answering the question, Cheslovas Stankayavichyus, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, explained that the editorial commission which prepared the Supreme Council decree on this issue analyzed three whole drafts. In the final version of the document, the proposals of E. Bichkauskas found a positive response.

The press conference was conducted by Povilas Pau-paras, head of the information department of the Supreme Council.

Landsbergis 23 April Council Report

*90UN1804A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
25 Apr 90 pp 1, 2*

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, at the 23 April Supreme Council session: "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] We have just heard the words of a representative of the People's Front of Azerbaijan about cooperation, help, and solidarity. We could recall and quote many more such statements; however, this time we had a happy occasion to see the representative in person. Still, I will read a short telegram which appears characteristic

and significant to me. "We are outraged by the unlawful decisions of the executive power of the Soviet Union. We stand together with you. The people will prevail. [signed] USSR People's Deputy Belozertsev, Karelia; Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputy Luchinskiy, Leningrad." We have heard about such aid from politicians and USSR deputies, and now we have heard it from people who have power. This is a sign that the slogan "For your freedom and ours" which has become a principle is also a good sign for our future. However, Lithuania, even if it were alone in the world, is prepared to withstand difficult trials, and it may suffer greatly while making its contribution to a joint struggle for democracy and justice, as has often happened. However, this solidarity and striving for common goals are a guarantee of our victory. Incidentally, a statement made by Boris Yeltsin in Spain against the blockade of Lithuania as an impermissible and excessively cruel measure is characteristic of other reports.

Many important events have occurred in Vilnius in recent days. The renewal of Sajudis at its congress is one of them. The reinforcement of the CPSU in Lithuania also occurred, which was even accompanied by changing its name, in which the attribute "CPSU" is added in parentheses to the three letters "CPLi" [Communist Party of Lithuania]. Someone might even explain the word "Lithuania" in this manner by adding in parentheses that this is "USSR."

Perhaps, we are now awaiting a government report on the situation in Lithuania and measures taken by the government. However, the government is not here at the moment; it is in a meeting, at work; the report will be delivered later. There is one more reason for this: Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene will arrive in Vilnius this evening. We know in general terms about her trip to the Scandinavian countries together with Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Saudargas. I informed the Sajudis congress, which was broadcast on the radio and TV, about this; this is why I would not like to repeat myself. I will only recall that the manner in which they were greeted and the political work done by them are significant from the point of view of contacts, agreements, and the determination of opportunities, as well as the diplomatic recognition of Lithuania, which nobody in the Scandinavian countries has any doubts about anymore. Esteemed Prunskiene and Saudargas are still taking part in meetings and a press conference in Stockholm, where they arrived from Copenhagen together with the Swedish foreign minister on his plane. In the afternoon they will leave for Moscow, where a press conference will be held. We may receive some information tomorrow; the government will submit an exhaustive report on the situation in Lithuania on Wednesday.

I may say something about the economic blockade. The blockade, which was announced and took a clear shape in recent days, is complemented by unannounced but no less painful, not to say cruel, measures of sabotage, consisting of withholding from Lithuania the deliveries

of products that were planned and envisaged by contracts and which have already been loaded and shipped to Lithuania. However, their routes are now being changed. This is one more blow struck at our economy; more specifically, this will affect the operation of enterprises and their production processes. Even earlier we knew that financial operations may also be disrupted, and that bank activities may be made difficult. At present, Moscow is doing it, since it has certain practical opportunities for it and, apparently, is not restricted by any other considerations of, say, a moral or political nature. It is characteristic that, under the circumstances, even an official representative of Moscow arriving in Vilnius offers assurances that there is no blockade, that it is incomplete, that other goods are being delivered to Lithuania in a regular manner.

Under our proposal, a joint commission of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers for counteracting the blockade should be formed. Even with the prime minister absent, we could know and do more at present to establish contacts with the republics, cities, and individual enterprises of the USSR. Certainly this is primarily the prerogative of the ministries and the Council of Ministers. However, we should be aware of what has been done last week or over the weekend. The residents of Lithuania would be calmer if they knew, say, whether we would send our representatives to establish economic contacts and determine opportunities for deliveries to Azerbaijan and other locations in the Soviet Union from which deliveries to Lithuania are made in a regular manner. It was already communicated that we were forced to restrict export deliveries of products from Lithuania; something was already said about deliveries to the Soviet Union. We could take all of this into account and deliver everything to these very oblasts without restrictions, and seek commercially reliable and sympathetic cooperation with partners who desire to be partners. Perhaps the Supreme Council also needs to think about creating a deputy group or commission using the corps of advisers, if we are going to create it.

Deputies of the Supreme Council also have other ideas. Perhaps, we will discuss our other proposals later.

One of the proposals made in the Supreme Council—to set up a blockade fund—has already been implemented. An account number has been announced, and the residents of Lithuania have contributed money. I believe that this is going to be of practical importance, and it plays a unifying and rallying political role at present. Such blockade funds are also being set up outside the republic. There is information about the Lithuanian communities of the world sponsoring such an initiative; the Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania allocated half a million dollars for Lithuania even before the blockade. A report has now arrived that the fund of Lithuanians in the United States, which has a capital of approximately \$5 million, allocated \$1 million for aid to Lithuania. The Lithuanians of Great Britain have allocated 0.5 million pounds for aid to Lithuania. Of course, if measured by the price of oil this is not a lot. However,

if we proceed from the potential of public organizations and Lithuanian communities abroad—it is a lot. We are sincerely grateful to them. This will probably serve to create favorable international public opinion with regard to Lithuania, primarily in the national and international organizations of large states, which have considerably greater opportunities. This will also draw attention to the special situation existing here. Many signs show that the Soviet Union's blockade measures outrage not only the public but also politicians. Thus far there have been certain statements and words; however, it is not likely to stop at that. The issue of the blockade of Lithuania was discussed the day before yesterday at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community. Serious concern about the existing situation was stated, and it was noted that the Lithuanian issue cannot be resolved by the method of violence. This is addressed to the Soviet Union, which apparently believed that some of the European countries that depend on it the most would give less support to Lithuania.

Of course, we would like the leadership of the Soviet Union to seek a political solution, which is what it has promised and has even referred to at international gatherings. In our time, all conflicts should be resolved by political means alone. Unfortunately, when they have to make decisions themselves, the deeds belie the words. Other voices are also being heard. Thus, Marshal Akhromeyev has stated that violence may be used in Lithuania. If this indeed were the position of the Soviet Union this would amount to acknowledging its helplessness and its inability to find political decisions, display flexibility, and look for common ground and compromises. For our part, we have officially proposed and sought common ground on many occasions. Our delegation's trip to Moscow is a specific attempt to bring the beginning of a dialogue closer or to continue this dialogue, which could be initiated by a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas and others, and Aleksandr Yakovlev. Meanwhile, various signals are coming from the Kremlin through official and unofficial channels, even contradictory signals; finally, we have to know what is true.

We should also think about how to behave and what to recommend to the residents of Lithuania in case of an extreme situation, because it is quite possible that attempts to cause social disturbances are going to be made by exacerbating economic difficulties, creating artificial unemployment, and spreading false rumors. As the prime minister said, the objective of the social disturbances designed by Moscow is to crush the leadership of Lithuania. Another possible goal is to find even the smallest pretext for the use of force and introduce presidential rule, which is the dream of the CPSU branch. We should also be prepared for this situation. We should consider it in very simple terms. What if this building is going to be seized—do we know what we are to do? Should we, for example, head for the auditorium of the Academy of Sciences and continue our work, or begin a hunger strike, or do nothing? Maybe we should

announce to the world: This is occupation as plain as it can be. Let the world decide whether to condemn the USSR as an aggressor or to let it do this. It is another matter what the people are to be told. Some people may recommend various forms of resistance; some people will advise us to do nothing, obey, be cautious, and preserve as many lives as possible. We do not need senseless sacrifices because the Soviet Union will fall apart one way or the other. Also, we can proclaim universal civil disobedience, meaning that the people who have decided to become Lithuanian citizens should not recognize the functions and functionaries of another state.

What can such an action of civil noncooperation be about? There is one example already—an attempt to disrupt the system of legal order in Lithuania. Our jurists, procuracy, courts, and the Supreme Court have gone through this trial with honor. If they are going to cling to this policy in the future, that is, the courts will not accept the cases referred to them by Procurator Petrauskas or some other imported procurator, whatever his name, it is left for the occupational authorities to maintain the courts themselves and bring in judges just as they are bringing in doctors. Perhaps Lithuanian physicians are taking an honest step by refusing to work at military commissariats.

Why do I discuss the attitude toward us in the world and in the Soviet Union? There are alarming facts: A trend to go for broke or at least to create this illusion is emerging on the part of the Soviet Union. President M. Gorbachev is being artificially placed in a situation of extremely inflexible policy which has no way out so that a dilemma could be set forth for the rest of the world which is significant in this instance: Who is to be advocated? Who is to be supported—Gorbachev, by sacrificing Lithuania, or should they think with terror about what is going to happen if someone other than Gorbachev comes up in Moscow? This has been done for many weeks now; this is why quite varied opinions on this artificially created issue are emerging in the West. The Soviet Union and certain political forces in it are bringing this kind of pressure to bear on the world. For example, although voices are heard increasingly often in the United States saying that a summit is impossible given this kind of attitude toward Lithuania, their actions are different, as shown by the fact that Canada and the United States of America have refrained from issuing visas to the representatives of the Republic of Lithuania Government. This is associated with the forthcoming summit. Apparently the Soviet Union is applying pressure, explaining that this would be a challenge at the wrong time. However, it is clear that the leadership of the Soviet Union is irritated not only by Lithuania's persistence but also by the still expanding recognition, which primarily amounts to recognition in principle of the Lithuanian state, its parliament, and parliamentary contacts. At present, they are trying to interfere with this in Moscow by repeatedly refusing to issue visas to foreign parliamentarians to enter Lithuania.

From among contacts at the ministerial level and higher I could also recall a visit and negotiations by K. Prunskiene and A. Saudargas in the Scandinavian countries and mention a letter from President of France Francois Mitterrand.

The discourses of the newspaper PRAVDA, which level accusations at the United States worded so sharply as to say that morality is something that has nothing to do with the American way of thinking, testify to a certain loss of the sense of measure. Such words have not been applied to the United States for a long time. Lithuania is being portrayed to the world public as a kind of spoiler of peace among the peoples. Supposedly, the East and the West could have come to terms splendidly if it were not for this ill-fated Lithuania! As if the world could not see that Lithuania is not alone, that all of Eastern Europe and republics of the Soviet Union are striving for the same. However, this propaganda line is also being pursued.

A sober, clearly expressed point of view which does not apply to Lithuania only exists in the West. The conclusion is drawn that it is exactly the economic policy of the leadership of the Soviet Union that has brought on decay and a crisis in the country. The English press is stating that the Kremlin has assumed a false position with regard to Lithuania, that the strategy of M. Gorbachev has not worked out. The French newspapers LES ECHOS and LE MONDE say what we have noticed ourselves—these measures against Lithuania mean recognizing its independence. Mediation from outside forces is capable of helping us overcome the crisis. This is what President of France Francois Mitterrand referred to at a meeting with President G. Bush, recalling his initiative on this issue. Besides, these newspapers state that actually Moscow has nothing to say, that all political initiatives originate in Lithuania but they are left without a response. It is also noted that the West is maneuvering clumsily, failing to find a clear-cut policy. Indeed, the previous U.S. Administration assumed a waiting attitude, and even used the inopportune term "noninterference." This "restrained" line is facilitated and, by all signs, will be facilitated by the journalistic "canards" of the Soviet Union about the supposedly changing positions and inconstancy of Lithuania, a split in opinions in the Lithuanian Government and, on the other hand, peaceful and not entirely truthful statements by Minister E. Shevardnadze which supposedly show that the Soviet Union exhibits good will and good intentions with regard to Lithuania. Unfortunately, this helps the United States postpone a discussion of this problem and refrain from making specific decisions.

Apparently, we will receive a response on measures which will be taken within several days. Measures of an economic nature, the freezing of treaties, non-adoption of laws economically favorable for the Soviet Union, and so on are under discussion. Even a phrase to the effect that the United States "are not discussing military measures" surfaced in a statement of the White House press spokesman. There have already been serious suggestions

to cancel the summit. Highly influential people are asking how M. Gorbachev can be politically assessed when he crushes the independence of the Baltic countries. For example, this was stated by chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress.

At present Lithuania is invariably a front page story, and this is the issue of not only Lithuania but of all Baltic countries. President Bush has already defined it as a regional problem. We saw on our TV a meeting of deputies from the whole of Latvia at which they voted and unanimously resolved to demand that a session of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, which opens in early May, restore Latvia's independence. The measures the Soviet Union has taken against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were also protested. The Supreme Soviet of Estonia had already previously resolved that Soviet laws do not apply in Estonia and that they are illegal. Having defined their status as that of an occupied country, they have now declared that the duty of military service is illegal on this territory. These are specific steps which Estonia has not and will not rescind. We are not alone on this great issue which so much concerns the mothers and fathers of Lithuania who have young sons. The legal situation in Estonia is similar. The People's Front of Latvia came out even earlier with its principled position and a proposal that not one Latvian young man should join the Soviet Army. Such statements and attitudes have spread throughout the Caucasus, and it is highly doubtful whether an army draft could be held there and in what manner. Therefore we are not alone, and this demonstrates the kind of crisis the Soviet Union has come to face.

Shved on Congress of Loyal Lithuanian Communist Party

90UN1730C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 2

[Interview with V. Shved, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU Platform) provisional Central Committee, by T. Bavykina: "In Search of a Constructive Approach"; date and place not specified]

[Text] **The Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU Platform) begins its work on 21 April. It will take place in three stages. As a result, the first question which we directed to V. Shved, second secretary of the (loyalist) Lithuanian Communist Party, was why such a system of work was chosen.**

[Shved] It was chosen primarily because the 28th CPSU Congress will be taking place soon, and we wish to correct and clarify the program documents of our Communist Party, which will be worked out for the most part at the first and second stages, with regard to its rulings. At the first stage the political report of the Central Committee will be heard, and the new staff of the Central Committee and the Central Control and Auditing Commission will be elected along with the candidates for delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress. At

the second stage the delegates to the CPSU forum will be elected after they have been discussed in the party committees and the party organizations and with regard for the opinions of the latter. At the third stage, which will take place after the 28th CPSU Congress, the program documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party will be defined more exactly. We believe that in such a manner the strategy and tactics of the CPSU which are adopted by the country's party forum will work for us too, and the character and tasks of the work of our Communist Party will coincide with that of the CPSU.

[Bavykina] Vladislav Nikolayevich, so that we do not have to return to this question again, I would like to ask you, quoting the political report in the old tradition, what you think of the political situation in Lithuania on the eve of the congress.

[Shved] As for the current political situation, I would characterize it in brief as a constitutional crisis which is continuing to worsen. One gets the impression that the republic's Supreme Council and administration stubbornly do not wish to acknowledge realities and come to terms with them.

[Bavykina] Only one of the sides does not wish to come to terms with the realities?

[Shved] I would say that the USSR, like any state entity, is driven by an instinct for self-preservation. To conduct negotiations on the basis of the conditions that the authorities of Lithuania have proposed is the same as acknowledging the fact that a republic has seceded from the USSR. And that would be a precedent. As a result, I am in favor of deciding the question of Lithuania's secession from the Union on a legal basis. I am convinced that if we return to the status quo, the situation on 10 March, we can then progress much further forward than we have today. Who benefits from a stubborn confrontation with the USSR? I do not support an economic blockade, but the hasty actions and rulings of the republic's Supreme Council and administration are simply forcing the center to change the character of its economic relations with Lithuania. And our own economy is not in such great shape—negative tendencies in it continue to accumulate.

Of course the instinct of self-preservation peculiar to any state entity must not be put above the interests of the people. But practically nothing has been done to improve the situation of the people even in the republic, although they constantly declare that the supreme power is guided by the public's interests. We keep hearing: Everything will be better in an independent Lithuania. It is the same as before when we kept promising everyone an earthly paradise under communism and justified any of our actions with the words, "The party has decided it that way,"—although only a small group of people was in favor of this decision. I do not see any fundamental difference in general. In essence only the name of the structure has changed, in politics as before the person is

the means and not the goal, and dictate is more customary and reliable than democracy.

Today it is very important to have a constructive opposition to the authority. It would be stupid to speak against Lithuania's independence when all of human history is permeated by aspirations to be free. But independence still does not guarantee democracy. In my opinion the political process was developing more democratically before 10 March than it is today. I wish to recall the words of R. Gudaitis at a "roundtable" in TIYESA in October 1989: "When we come to power we will seize power with an iron hand, and then there will be nostalgia for the socialist past." He was right.

[Bavykina] But no one succeeded in immediately forming a constructive opposition because those political forces which could have comprised it were not unified. There have been calls right up to the present for harmony, but confrontation continues. The proof of that is the relations between the two Lithuanian communist parties. Do you see any opportunity for their cooperation and consolidation and, in the future, their unification?

[Shved] Undoubtedly cooperation is possible and necessary on the basis of the democratization of society. We have much in common. Relations between our communist parties are going better at the lowest level than "at the top." Of course we understand Lithuanian independence differently. But with the creation of a new federation even that stumbling block could be removed. However the center, unfortunately, is almost always late in adopting important political decisions of fundamental significance. Locally things are in a hurry, and as a result centrifugal forces begin to predominate. These days everyone interprets the notions of "federation" and "sovereignty" as he wishes. But it is extremely dangerous to play with these concepts and speculate on them. If a political entity such as the Soviet Union comes crashing down, it can bury all of us under its wreckage. Scholars predict that we could lose up to 50 million people as a result of civil clashes. That is something to think about.

I believe that consolidation is also hindered by an unprecedented campaign of persecution taking place in the republic against those who think differently, according to the principle of "he who is not with us is against us." To halt it we need common sense and a sense of realism in politics. And the realization that distorted methods can distort the goal as well, however noble it might have once been.

We declare our party the party of social defense, equality, and guarantees. And we call upon everyone to work for the person himself and his welfare. With these themes for a basis, is consolidation with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the republic's other political forces who are pursuing noble goals really impossible? I am convinced that at the congress the Communists will introduce specific proposals to achieve such a consolidation and that they will propose forms of cooperation on a mutually acceptable basis.

[Bavykina] Vladislav Nikolayevich, as a result of a refusal to accredit correspondents of several publications to the congress, the Lithuanian Union of Journalists has published a declaration condemning that ruling as discriminatory and in violation of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Press and the Other Mass Media. What caused the aforementioned decision, and will it be changed?

[Shved] No, we are not prepared to change that decision. And the problem is not that we are unhappy with the political orientation of the publications which have been refused accreditation. But I have already mentioned the unprecedented nature, in a number of the republic's publications, of the campaign to persecute those who think differently. The struggle of ideas has been replaced with a struggle among people, and they do not shrink from using openly Stalinist methods: Putting labels on people, insulting openly, and juggling facts. Is this not a violation of the Law on the Press? The publications which we are not accrediting have especially distinguished themselves in this regard. I stress: It is not because of political considerations but from ethical considerations. Political pluralism demands high morality and common human decency. Otherwise it can turn into political hooliganism, which greatly complicates the search for constructive decisions.

[Bavykina] I thank you for the conversation.

[Shved] Nonetheless it is a pity that we cannot see in the "press box" representatives of the publications of various tendencies, including those we are not accrediting at present. I would like to hope that the decision will be reviewed. It would be one of the proofs of the search for constructive decisions.

Shved Press Conference on Party Congress

90UN1640B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 Apr 90 p 2

[ELTA report: "Before the Congress"]

[Text] A press conference was held in Vilnius on 17 April with V. Shved, second secretary of the provisional Lithuanian CP (loyal to the CPSU platform) Central Committee. Some 20 people, mostly representatives of the central mass media, came to find out how the 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU platform) would take place.

Of course the relative absence of the Lithuania media compelled V. Shved to report that workers of the newspapers ATGIMIMAS, RESPUBLIKA, LETUVOS RITAS, and SOGALSIYE would not be accredited because they, in the words of the speaker, slander the party organization of the CPSU in Lithuania.

The 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU platform) is scheduled to take place 21 April in the auditorium of the Vilnius Higher Party School. Because the auditorium seats 600 people and

there will be more than 900 delegates representing 47,000 loyalist communists, a portion of the delegates will be following the course of the congress on television screens. The congress will be conducted in three stages: In the course of the first stage there will be a discussion of the political situation in Lithuania and a Central Committee (no longer provisional) will be elected. The second round of the congress is scheduled to take place on 2 June and will discuss the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. The third round of the republic's congress should take place after the CPSU forum.

Loyal Lithuanian CP Congress Ends

90UN1802B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
24 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[T. Bavykina report: "Confrontation Is Unconstructive and Dangerous"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the first stage of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Congress took place on 21 April. The congress heard and discussed the Central Committee political report and elected a new Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission.

The congress changed the party's name. It is now called the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU).

M. Burokyavichyus was elected first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee; V. Shved, second secretary; and Yu. Kuolyalis and L. Yankelevich, secretaries.

S. Yuonene was approved as editor of the newspaper TARIBU LETUVA, and A. Gelbakh, editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA. A. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the congress.

The congress will continue in June.

Despite the fact that Moscow's sanctions are lowering the turnover of the republic's economic mechanism, its social and political life has been crowded with events of varying significance. There have been so many of them that it has been difficult for us journalists to keep pace everywhere. The end of last week, for example, was marked by a whole "bouquet" of congresses. Politicians who are not listening to one another are, perhaps, suited by this "compactness" of political life, but, as the driver who brought me to work this morning for three times the usual fare (what can we do, he sighed, pocketing my money, gasoline is now 1 ruble a liter) told me, one no longer knows what to watch, what to read, and who to listen to.

Nonetheless the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) Congress did not become lost in the string of political events. Primarily because, as the political report observed, more than 40,000 of the republic's inhabitants had firmly declared their affiliation to the CPSU and because there were still very many who

were awaiting the 28th CPSU Congress in order to make a final choice. However this might run counter to our wishes and aspirations, the center's policy determines and will for a long time to come, most likely, determine a great deal in the life of the republic. This is a reality with which we have to reckon. Just as with the fact that there is in society's political system a Lithuanian Communist Party which acknowledges itself to be a part of the CPSU and which expresses, as A. Girenko said, the interests of, if not the majority, considerable numbers of the population of the republic.

Did the congress justify these hopes? I spoke with many people in the breaks between meetings of the congress, and no one gave me an unequivocal answer. Both yes and no, the Communists said. Yes, because the congress consolidated the ideological and organizational unity of the party and presented for extensive discussion in the party organizations a carefully formulated draft program, in which the Lithuanian Communist Party is defined as a party of a socialist choice whose goal is the building by the people themselves of a humane, democratic, socialist society in which everything is put to the service of man's interests and requirements. And no, because it was not successful in avoiding a mass-meeting approach, shrillness and insults and name-calling in respect of the leaders of the republic and political opponents and the kind of criticism which is usually called destructive.

It is a great pity that at times the spirit of confrontation hovered in the hall of the Higher Party School, where the congress was held. We have to agree with the speakers who observed that the insufficiently restrained tone of the statement of the Political Analysis and Party Strategy Commission of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee published as "greetings" in the republic papers on the eve of the congress contributed to this also. The confrontation continues, although it is now surely clear to everyone how it is weakening both Lithuanian communist parties and making more difficult for the journalists their work, difficult today as it is, in the search for additional "epithets" pertaining to the name of now this, now the other communist party. But were it all just a matter of our journalists' troubles....

After all, the start of a dialogue is not in sight, although both communist parties declare their readiness for such. Thus even at the congress practically no specific proposals on forms of cooperation were submitted and no questions for general discussion and political consultation proposed, aside from a statement that such a dialogue was essential—and not only with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party but also with other social

and political forces of the republic. But a start is needed. Even if not with a "roundtable" (the confrontation has been allowed to go too far) but from where there are sharp corners—they cannot, after all, be avoided in dialogue, and it will sooner or later be necessary to pad their sides, unless each communist party continues to consider itself the exponent of the truth in the last instance. But for this it is necessary, as V. Shved rightly said, that each be prepared to take the first step toward the other.

I heard in the lobbies of the congress talk to the effect that very much needed today for the establishment of cooperation with other social and political forces, in addition to the program maximum whose draft was offered to the congress' delegates, is a program minimum which sets forth specific proposals and maps out steps to ease and then normalize the social and political situation in the republic and consolidate all progressive forces. Unfortunately, this opinion was not heard from the congress' platform, yet it could have turned the course of debate in a more constructive direction.

The more so in that the rudiments of such a program minimum were contained in the speeches. For example, S. Pirozhkov, deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet, proposed the tactic of support in parliament for A. Brazauskas and his supporters adhering to realistic standpoints on the question of the achievement of Lithuania's independence and also the organization of "pressure from below" on parliament by way of the population's greater knowledgeability as to the possible consequences of rash decisions.

I would like to hope that such a program minimum will be formulated as the second stage of the congress.

Lithuanian Trade Minister Appointed

90UN1567E Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
6 Apr 90 p 3

[Decree of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council: "On the Appointment of a Republic of Lithuania Minister of Trade"]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council decrees:

To appoint Albertas Ambrazeyus Sinyavichyus minister of trade of the Republic of Lithuania.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.

Vilnius, 3 April 1990.

Georgian Journalists Attack 'Interfront'

90US0868B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Apr 90 p 3

[Appeal of the Georgian Journalists Union Secretariat]

[Text] Colleagues! The Georgian Journalists Union Secretariat appeals to you to speak up in defense of our common interests.

Georgia has repeatedly been on the verge of physical and moral annihilation. But each time it has been rescued by people's indomitable faith in the unity and integrity of the country and belief in the victory of reason and goodness. This belief helped us get through the black April of 1989 and unite hundreds of hearts in an anguish of pain for Georgia.

The people's aspiration to democracy, full political and economic independence, and real sovereignty has prompted dark forces to incite notorious bloody conflicts, to which innocent people have fallen victim. Today these forces are once again placing human lives on the scales of immorality.

The so-called Interfront which is being formed in the republic is disseminating slanderous proclamations, in which anonymous authors are insulting the entire Georgian nation, calling it a nation of turncoats, traitors, gangsters, and idlers. Impudently falsifying reality and directing their efforts not toward the consolidation of the whole of society on the path of the creation of a democratic, law-based, free state but toward the incitement of hatred, the creators of this opus are calling on the non-Georgian population to rise to the defense of their own rights which are allegedly being stifled by chauvinists. This outrageous slander has evoked the angry indignation of all citizens of the republic. Letters from private individuals, associations, and organizations representing the interests of various nationalities are streaming into the Union of Journalists, newspaper editorial offices, and television. People are demanding punishment of provocateurs of all stripes, considering the sole permissible body in a multinational republic a front for cooperation and joint struggle against the proponents of imperial ambitions and administrative sergeant major dictators.

We would like to remind the initiators, sponsors, and creators of the so-called Georgian Interfront of elementary legal concepts and the fact that all actions inciting national strife come under Section 3 of the Law "Increased Responsibility for Encroachments on Citizens' National Equality and Forceful Violation of the Unity of USSR Territory" of 2 April 1989, and Article 75 of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Criminal Code.

As we have learned, the Georgian SSR Procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the fact of the appearance of this slanderous proclamation. It is a matter of honor for journalists to contribute to the

objective coverage in the media, and not only of the republic, of all stages of the investigation which has begun.

Words not only wound and kill but also heal. The Georgian Journalists Union Secretariat calls on you to serve by truthful words and specific action the unity of the peoples living in the republic.

Authors of Letter on Lithuania Listed

90UN1680D Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Who Sent a Letter to Lithuania?"]

[Text] As our newspaper has already reported, many readers have approached the editorial office with a request for the names of the Moscow Soviet deputies who sent a letter to Chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania V. Landsbergis. In the letter, they expressed support for the dissentient actions of the current Lithuanian leadership and denounced the position of the USSR president.

On Sunday we expressed our hope that the deputies themselves would give us such a list. It was provided the day before yesterday at a press conference of the organizational committee for preparing the first session of the Moscow Soviet. It is printed below. The number of the electoral district is given in brackets.

Yu.K. Vorobyev (365), S.V. Chernyak (467), Ye.S. Tverdokhlebov (469), Yu.M. Yemelyanov (385), V.V. Bukovnikov (179), Yu.Ye. Khranov (79), V.M. Koveshnikov (110), A.F. Dryzhenko (177), V.V. Lebedev (163), O.B. Kazakov (214), A.N. Savelyev (282), S.G. Kolbanov (447), A.I. Pogorilyy (483), D.V. Yagodin (113), V.K. Gromov (347), M.V. Leman (60), V.O. Bokser (453), A.G. Kornilov (462), A.P. Gay (239), A.V. Babushkin (127), A.V. Gustyr (465), V.S. Stepanenko (449), M.B. Pakhomov (242), N.N. Filatov (372), B.L. Malinovskiy (309), O.I. Suprunenko (308), V.P. Ivanenko (72), Ye.L. Butov (159), V.S. Protasova (129), L.N. Sholpo (474), V.P. Filatov (423), V.V. Khoteyev (400), S.T. Filimonov (248), V.F. Polyakov (240), V.A. Kondratov (82), O.N. Romanovskiy (77), V.A. Uchitel (71), V.G. Dubinin (299), N.V. Aleksandrovskaya (288), R.R. Chervontsev (491), A.I. Artushev (461), S.B. Sheboldayev (162), A.I. Zverev (456), S.A. Sinyayev (151), D.I. Yaremenko (172), L.L. Kolosov (84), V.O. Nekrasov (73), A.F. Lisenkov (315), Yu.A. Nisnevich (396), T.Ye. Sergeyeva (58), V.N. Khvatikov (126), V.A. Maksimov (262), Yu.I. Maksimov (263), V.I. Brodin (215), A.S. Rozanov (143), A.V. Prudnikov (76), V.A. Shepelin (409), S.I. Balashov (429), V.V. Borisov (278), V.S. Boldyrev (422), B.N. Golubov (404), M.E. Fleys (412), Ye.A. Faynshmidt (359), A.V. Shulgin (81), V.A. Kozmidadi (247), G.F. Shalygin (141), N.V. Zybina (115), I.V. Bogantseva (337), A.A. Kalinin (54), G.I. Zadonskiy (224), V.P. Mironov (497), A.V. Popov (479), I.A. Belyeyev (116).

Ukraine Komsomol Warns Against Nationalists

90UN1702C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1:6 Apr 90 p 3

[Statement by the Central Committee Bureau of the Ukrainian Leninist Communist Youth League: "In the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Leninist Communist Youth League"]

[Text] On 1 April of this year, the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth conducted an unsanctioned demonstration in Kiev, the results of which have far-reaching political consequences. A column of almost 200 individuals broke through police lines, intentionally brought transportation to a halt, committed acts of provocation at the military quartermaster garrison, blocked police vehicles, heaped insults on law enforcement agency personnel, and raised a blue and yellow flag over the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] premises. All these actions were committed under red and black flags, the party symbol of the Union of Ukrainian Nationalists and its armed formations.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union openly directed the actions of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth. One of the leaders of the Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputy A. Shevchenko, called upon those gathered "not to serve in the army of occupation and not to take the oath." He promised the support of the "Ukrainian parliament."

Children were used in the illegal activities.

Police organs were incapable of restoring law and order, and yielded to all the demands of the demonstrators.

Assessing this situation, the Central Committee Bureau of the Ukrainian Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] considers it necessary to affirm once again its intention to take advantage of the broadest opportunities, including rallies and demonstrations, to freely publicize its convictions and points of view. At the same time, we consider it justified to refuse permission to the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth to conduct rallies—it is the leaders of this organization who have called for "rivers of blood to flow," who want "to resurrect the Bandera Ukrainian Insurgent Army," "to drive out the occupiers." It is they who yearn for new Petlyuras and Shukheviches, declaring openly that Bandera and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalists are their ideals. This is the spirit in which the unsanctioned demonstration of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth was conducted on 1 April in Kiev. Its organizers were hoping that their mockery of the law, rattling the nerves of the military and police, would lead to clashes which would provide the impetus for further dramatic events. Such actions cannot be considered anything other than provocation. Who does this benefit? Apparently it helps those politicians who, with the exception of certain areas of the republic, could not manage to attain power through constitutional means. Their reasoning is

understandable—to use children and young people to provoke the authority, which lacks sufficient prestige among the population, into applying force. Under conditions of great social tension and discontent, this could lead to mass disturbances and create the ideal situation for "people who like to fish in troubled waters."

Additionally, these facts provide a basis for believing that certain political forces, skillfully using the period of composition of the new soviets, have confidently adopted a course directed towards exacerbating the situation—and they will introduce new provocation.

As recent events have shown, law enforcement organs are not always able to maintain public stability. Moreover, application of force on their part is today beneficial to certain opposition formations.

In the present situation, the Central Committee Bureau of the Ukrainian Komsomol appeals:

—To the labor collectives, to party and Komsomol organizations of Kiev and the entire Ukraine, to stand up in defense of civil peace and national unanimity in the republic. We hope that our genuine alarm will be felt in the workers' collectives and by the intelligentsia, that it will become a subject of serious discussion and a reason to take necessary measures, for our future depends on the position each one of us takes.

—To the young men and women of the Ukraine. Some of the political opposition is attempting to exploit your sincere aspirations for change, your youthful energy and romanticism to achieve unseemly ends. We hope that you will not give in to provocation, that a feeling of responsibility and common sense will prevent you from being utilized as a destructive force.

—To the social movement of the republic. It is our conviction that social formations should have broad opportunities for political self-expression, should be able to fight for their positions which differ from official ones. But contradictions must be resolved through civilized means. The actions of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth and certain Ukrainian Helsinki Union leaders threaten the sprouts of our democracy and rule-of-law state, and play into the hands of those who dream of the return of totalitarianism. We hope that the independent movement will objectively evaluate the course of events, and will support the concepts of non-violent political rivalry.

—To the Ukrainian People's Movement. We foresee that our reaction to the participation of Rukh activists in the above-mentioned events will confirm our expectations—that there are people in the Ukrainian People's Movement leadership who are truly faithful to the ideals of humanity and honor, to the program declarations of this organization regarding a rule-of-law state.

—To law enforcement organs and the military authorities. We believe that our endurance and prudence will ruin the plans of the provocateurs, that the rights of citizens to life, personal dignity, and security will be safeguarded.

The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol requests: —That the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies analyze at its first session the political situation which has developed in the city, and that it make decisions, taking into account in equal measure the needs to further develop democracy, unswerving observance of the laws, the maintenance of law and order, and an intolerance of anarchy and permissiveness.

—That the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet examine the conformity of the behavior of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy A. Shevchenko with existing legislation and make an assessment of it. We consider it necessary to request the Credentials Commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet not to confirm the authority of a deputy engaging in appeals of instigation. We hope that the labor collectives and residents of the district in which A. Shevchenko was elected will critically evaluate the conduct of their deputy and arrive at the necessary conclusions.

We appeal to all citizens of the Ukraine to recognize the danger in the actions of forces of provocation. Instigators only continue to expand their activities—we can still stop them, still prevent them from causing bloodshed in our land. Let the grief of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Fergana and Dushanbe serve as a bitter lesson for us. [signed] Bureau of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Leninist Communist Youth League

Commission To Study Andizhan Riots Formed

90US0983B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
6 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee has formed a commission to study the causes and consequences of the disorders in Andizhan city on 2 May 1990.

The commission chairman is Sh.R. Mirsaidov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

The commission deputy chairman is I.Kh. Dzhurabekov, deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

The commission secretary is V.I. Gugin, section chief in the Uzbek SSR cm.

The commission includes representatives of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, and public organizations, and USSR and Uzbek SSR people's deputies.

The commission has been assigned the task of taking immediate steps to stabilize the situation in Andizhan city, and to investigate, reveal and hold accountable those who organized and took part in the disturbances, and to study the status of the moral and psychological climate in the oblast and the political and socioeconomic situation, and to submit appropriate recommendations.

Conflict Between KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Publisher Viewed

90UN1456A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 26-28

[Interview with Yevgeniy Averin, chief editor of the newspaper KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, conducted by correspondent Sofya Dubinskaya: "A 'Survey of Books' [knizhnoe zreniya] for Whom?"]

[Text] [ZHURNALIST] Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, maybe it would be better to start our conversation from the end—with the last months, that have brought many unpleasant incidents for your newspaper? How do you explain the paradox: the paper's popularity is growing, while the editorial staff is in disgrace in the eyes of its publisher?

[Averin] There is no short answer to that question. In my opinion, the reason lies, all the same, not in a clash of characters, but of concepts. For a long time, the newspaper was oriented towards a narrow circle of readers. There was the feeling, evidently, that KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE was a professional publication, and that, consequently, the basic contingent of readers were workers in the book field. When I came to the paper in 1986, we made the decision to be more attentive to our readers. We conducted broad surveys, anonymous, but with indications of profession, age and location. The results surprised us: just one percent of the newspaper's readers were workers in the book field. While 99 percent were members of the creative and engineering and technical intelligentsia, students, librarians, literature teachers, and book society activists. And people who write—not only professional writers, but journalists, too, and those who had not yet joined creative unions. In a word, everybody for whom books are the most important part of life.

[ZHURNALIST] Had this audience formed even before you joined the editorial staff?

[Averin] Of course. And attempts to broaden it also began before my arrival. It is just that we are not afraid to admit a conscious orientation exactly towards this sort of audience, and not towards winning over the purely professional reader.

[ZHURNALIST] Even so, you cannot get away from the very fact of your newspaper's professional character. One of your publishers is Goskompechat [State Committee on the Press], and it follows from this that your readers, the majority, in any case, must be department workers...

[Averin] Why "department workers"? KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE is addressed to readers, that is to the consumers of the products of that department. There are other publications for the discussion of the department's internal issues. Yes, and book propaganda can be conducted in different ways. It seems to us that pure advertising and information—although doing a paper that way is easier—is less interesting. Speaking about a

book in the context of today's political, ideological and cultural life is more difficult, and yet more interesting both for the readers and the journalists.

And in general, why does the book department exist, anyway? Isn't it for the satisfaction of broad and varied reader demands? I am not talking about every worker in each of Goskompechat's departments—that worker is still simply a reader. Just like the person who has worked or works in a mine, in a hospital, at a factory. We are united by the fact that all of us are citizens of one country, members of one society. And the people's needs, the country's interests are determined primarily by that community atmosphere, without which any sort of concrete professional action is inconceivable. It is this atmosphere, in my opinion, that every newspaper, especially one like ours, should reflect. This along with books—is the bread not only of culture, but of science, politics, art, and philosophy. Besides, our second publisher is the All-Union Society of Booklovers. We are simply obligated to consider its interests.

[ZHURNALIST] I can understand your conception of the newspaper. But at the start of our conversation you used this phrase: that the conflict between the paper and its publisher was a clash not of characters but of concepts. Does this mean that the publisher, Goskompechat, sees the newspaper differently?

A newspaper, according to the logic of things, is the connecting link between the publisher and the reader. Conflict is a spark—it often arises without warning, and is difficult to put out... Shouldn't some sort of median model exist, that would consider the interests of both the reader and the publisher? After all, in founding the newspaper, Goskompechat is within its rights to expect from the paper perhaps not blind obedience, but at least assurance that the founder's line will be propagated.

[Averin] And we do not think of ourselves without it. None of us who work at KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE intend or have ever intended to refuse publications concerned with the planning, manufacture, or distribution of books and their life among readers. The issue is something else—should KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE be a real newspaper that breathes deeply and has an exact understanding of contemporary life, or should it be published as a kind of informational bulletin for a narrow circle. And if we look away from KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE and the situation that has developed around it, we will see that I am not alone in this sort of position. There is a certain rightness in the vulnerability of a newspaper chief editor's situation. On the one hand, he is obligated to consider and implement the publisher's position (otherwise, the publisher would have no use for the newspaper). On the other hand—he must consider the interests of the reader, who has the right to read in a newspaper exactly what he demands. Otherwise, why would he subscribe to that particular newspaper? And the publication is itself, in a way, between two millstones. This may not be a very successful comparison, but it is an exact one. The quality of the product—in this

case, the newspaper—depends on the extent that the “millstones” correspond to one another. If the interests of the publisher and the reader diverge, conflict arises, which is harmful both for the newspaper and its editor.

[ZHURNALIST] Yes, rumors that the chief editor of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE was being removed have been greatly exaggerated for half a year. I happened to read two publications in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, written two weeks apart. First was an interview with the chief editor of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, in which you set forth the essence of the dispute Goskompechat Chairman N. Yefimov has with you. Later, there was an interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, in which he accused you of “caricaturing” his position. After these two publications, one could only shrug his shoulders and ask: who is right?

[Averin] It is possible that our publisher (like many others) would be happier with a more quiet newspaper that publishes book surveys, reviews, and literary essays, but today's newspaper has no choice but to reflect the clash of positions formed in this kind of agitated period of restructuring. Accusations of cliquishness, of publishing “strange” materials were made repeatedly by Goskompechat workers before. Nevertheless, I still do not understand the essence of the publisher's unwillingness to, as the committee chairman put it, do the paper in the English manner. An informational-reference and advertising review? That is an interesting idea. And for this, it would be necessary first to bring the state of the consumer market, not just the book market, to the English level. Because here, books not infrequently fulfill the function of black caviar, that is, of a certain type of freely convertible hard currency. What, besides irritation, could an impassive book review evoke in the reader under circumstances like these?

[ZHURNALIST] But is it, after all, his own thesis, set out with your interpretation in the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI interview, that Yefimov disagrees with?

[Averin] I would be happy if people misunderstood him in that way. You see, the matter is not about personal ambitions, but about the way the newspaper should be. There exists this accusation towards KO as well: cliquishness. I think that we often confuse cliquishness with the certainty of a position. Well, what kind of cliquishness can they be talking about on the newspaper's pages, if I. Shafarevich and P. Karp, V. Kozhinov and S. Lesnevskiy, O. Mikhaylov and T. Ivanova coexist on them. And when they, as a rule, set forth their viewpoints in dialogues with our correspondents, who do not merely “listen,” but express their own positions, think outloud, and call for the reader to consider what has been said. Can one call the extremely fierce battle of positions and public ideas that is taking place in the country cliquishness? Certain organs of the press contrive to avoid it, but they are becoming fewer all the time. And the subscriber chooses those newspapers and magazines that clearly define their positions—this is natural...

[ZHURNALIST] I heard that your circulation has grown and your mail has increased?

[Azerin] The circulation has grown from 280,000 to 430,000. The change in the mail is even more characteristic: 1987—18,000; 1988—36,000; 1989—about 50,000. When we determined that exact number in the first days of January, it turned out that over 52,000 readers had written to us in the last year...

[ZHURNALIST] That is significant! But the growing popularity still doesn't seem to please the publisher?

[Azerin] Judge for yourself: 14 November, the Goskompechat college heard the issue of a model for KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE. An examination of the question “On the Newspaper's Work Using the New Model” is scheduled for the end of March. In my mind there is no doubt of the publisher's right to take measures of this sort, but with the difficult situation that has developed in the book-publishing business, the only condition under which the college might consider the purely professional newspaper question of a publication's model for an entire quarter is if “model” is understood to mean the line and position of the newspaper. What, finally, is a model? It is a format. But at the college's 14 November meeting, V. Moldovan, Goskompechat party committee acting executive secretary, demanded that I be relieved of the duties of chief editor...due to my morally damaging line.

The reason for this sort of accusation (and the editorial staff's work had been examined by the party committee before the college) were so-called “signals”. One of these (anonymous!) contained a count of the number of our authors with characteristically non-Russian names. It said that for some reason talented Russian writers do not suit the weekly KO. The second signal was Mosgorlit's [Moscow City Directorate for Literary Affairs—the office of the censor] conclusion about our, as it was stated there, “pathological” partiality for Solzhenitsyn.

[ZHURNALIST] Obviously, it had in mind the article by Ye. Chukovskaya on the necessity of restoring Solzhenitsyn's citizenship, and of returning his works to our reader?

[Averin] Yes, this article was published less than a year ago without a Mosgorlit visa, on my personal authority. But today, Ye. Chukovskaya's “seditious” ideas would not seem courageous to anyone. Solzhenitsyn's works are being printed in large circulations in the thick journals, and the writer's organization has openly expressed that it is for the writer's return to the country. And V. Medvedev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, speaking from the tribune of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and all organs of the press, without exception, “left” and “right”, are united in the opinion that it is right to publish the books of the outstanding Russian writer in his Motherland. And so, our “moral damage” has turned out to be simply a sober opinion.

[ZHURNALIST] I wonder, today do the censor or party apparatus workers interfere in the work of the editorial staff?

[Averin] Now—no. They do not interfere at all. Although, not long ago, recommendations came from various directions that were totally unrelated to the operation of one or another department. I remember they advised insistently that we refuse to publish I. Brodskiy's "Nobel" speech: "Well, Why Do You Need This?" And yet Brodskiy's speech was a sort of inspired hymn to the book. Where, if not in our newspaper, should it be published?

[ZHURNALIST] Yes, in that case I can understand you. But how did the pre-election program of the late Academician Sakharov appear on the pages of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE?

[Averin] I do not deny that this bears no direct relation to books. But it is related to culture, to the renaissance of civic society, to the renovation of socialism. Yes and, to be honest, I simply could not refuse Andrey Dmitriyevich when he came to us with this request.

[ZHURNALIST] The signature of Academician Sakharov, already in his capacity as USSR People's Deputy, together with the signatures of other highly visible activists in science and culture, stood at the end of the appeal for protection from the editorial staff of the journal OKTYABR that was printed in your newspaper, as well. Here, your newspaper clearly took the position of one of the sides. But where is the opinion of the other participants in the conflict?

[Averin] You see, it can be seen in two ways. If you were talking only about an evaluation of the work of A. Sinyavskiy or of a story by V. Grossman, then—no matter what my personal position or that of the majority of the editorial staff—we would not have printed an appeal of any kind. It is said that everyone has the right to his own opinion. But this is a completely different matter. An attempt was made to decide moral, philosophical, and ethical differences of opinion using traditional organizational conclusions [orgvyvody]. Certainly not the first attempt to made in the last year or two. And some, alas, have been successful...

Nevertheless, in January, the Goskompechat college basically approved the conception of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE that was presented by the editorial staff. We hope that this is a good sign.

[ZHURNALIST] And now, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, an extremely personal question. Several organizations in the two capital regions, the Moskvoretskiy and Kiev, have nominated you as a candidate for Russian Supreme Soviet deputy. When this issue of the journal comes out, obviously, the results of the elections will already be known. Say a few words, even just a general outline, about the program that you will bring to your constituency.

[Averin] What kind of a personal question is that! I never even considered running for deputy. Look at this particular fact: both informal organizations—voters' clubs, and scientific collectives, and the collective of the country's largest repository of books—the Lenin Library, were working for me. At meetings on my nomination for candidacy, some orators said that they did not know me personally, but that they always read the newspaper... You will agree that these conditions make the question of nomination far from personal. And, completely apart from the election results, I consider myself obliged to justify the public's trust. As far as the program goes, I will try to give you at least a few of its propositions.

Instead of the proud but insubstantial motto "first among equals" that is used in Russia, I would like to implement the motto "with genuinely equal rights among equals" for the republic. I believe that daily, painstaking work is necessary in order to effectively overcome the remainder principle in the financing of the social sciences, culture, public education and health care for all regions of Russia. And this will not occur without constant parliamentary control.

I will mention one more point in my pre-election program: as a basis both for intra-relations within the RSFSR as well as for Russia's inter-relations with the country's other national ways of life, genuine internationalism and a deep respect for the history, culture and ethical lifestyles of all peoples should be decreed. The time has come to restore the moral and ethical principles that are an organic part of the Marxist conception of the ideals of a free man.

I have already met people who have given me their trust. I have to say that these are not easy meetings. People are tired of words, they are meticulously interested in the concrete actions I see behind the propositions of my pre-election program. And absolutely everywhere they ask how I allowed the conflict between KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE and Goskompechat to occur. Because this question is directly connected with the discussion of the Law on the Press, they are interested in my attitude towards this document as well.

[ZHURNALIST] Maybe you will tell us about this, too?

[Averin] This document is the very gulp of air that we have always needed badly. I can wish for myself, and for you, and for all of our colleagues that it finally goes into action. Concerning its details, it seems to me that it requires additional work in the following area: any publication is created, in the final reckoning, not for the editorial staff and not for the publisher, no matter how interested he is in his newspaper or magazine. It is for the reader. For this reason, in my opinion, the Law on the Press must become a law that protects the rights of the mass media consumer, as well. Then, it will protect both the good editor, and the good publisher. I am not expressing this idea for the first time... Only by considering the interests of the consumer of your work and mine will the Law acquire real life.

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Leningrad 'Informal' Press Exhibition Reviewed

90US0716A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 10,
5-11 Mar p 8

[Report by Sergey Krayukhin, Leningrad: "Free From Censorship: Reflections on the 'Informal' Press Exhibition"]

[Text] A Fact of Our Life

This slogan is symbolically stamped on the first page of the newspaper *Lichnoye Mneniye*. Try in vain to find such a publication in the official catalogs or try to subscribe to it. Nor can it be bought at the usual newsstands. Except, that is, for the young man I once saw with a bundle of *Lichnoye Mneniye* papers near the Kazan Cathedral, offering the latest issue to passers-by. I knew nothing about the publication at that time, and I did not buy one. Today, however, I had an opportunity to acquaint myself with it and study it thoroughly.

It is not just a matter of one publication, however, but of an entire trend in our journalism expansively referred to as the "informal press." The "independent" press exhibition which opened at the Moskovskiy Rayon Central Library was the first not just in the city on the Neva but in the nation. The designation "press" is extremely relative in this case, to be sure, since the exhibition includes not just newspapers and collections turned out on a printing press, but also items typewritten or even handwritten. The vast majority of them were born on the wave of the restructuring and are no more than 2 years old—3 at most. There are also those conceived in the bowels of the era of stagnation, which have only recently emerged from the underground and been able to discard the stamp of secrecy.

Not just the uninitiated reader, I believe, but even professional journalists cannot fully imagine just what the "informal press" is like today. There is a shortage of information, and a large number of these publications are inaccessible to the general reader. Just how much can one learn and understand from those isolated issues of "independent" newspapers and magazines which one happens to get his hands on at some meeting or conference? Here, at the exhibition, one can get a true picture of how multifaceted, diverse and contradictory the stream of "informal" literature is, and of its scale. Although the exhibition does not claim to provide exhaustive coverage of the field, it contains much food for serious thought. Let us put aside the ranting sheets and leaflets—and some of these are extremely ingenious. Let us also cast some doubt upon the term "independent"—all the publications do depend upon someone. The question is whom.... We shall discuss only those represented at the exhibition.

Apparently in an attempt to reach the hearts of various readers by the nearest route, the "independent" litterateurs offer a highly diversified palette of publications. In addition to newspapers and magazines, there are leaflets, satirical collections and miscellaneous pocket books. Printings range from single copies to several thousand. In their program declarations the publishers attempt to demonstrate the need for an "independent press." And they know far more "about us" than we "about them": "The silence of our television and press is not due to their being uninformed but to cowardice and enfeeblement," one reads in the *Uchreditelnoye Sobraniye*, organ of the Democratic Alliance Party. Their own author, Viktor Pershkhalo, further states in an article: "There is such a party." And even more definitely: "The soviets are the ideal instrument for effecting a communist dictatorship...." Russia's future, in the opinion of the "independent" publication, lies in establishing power for the constituent assembly.

The tendentiousness of this historical approach is obvious. Certain other publications of the "informal press" suffer from the same kind of bias: the independent sociopolitical magazine *Nevskiy Zapiski*, the newspaper *Golos* of the confederation of anarcho-sindicalists, *Svobodnoye Slovo*, organ of the Democratic Alliance. Despite the great diversity of their political programs, they are remarkably unanimous in their views on our official press. In their opinion, the official newspapers are bound hand and foot by the party-state apparatus, and the "free" word cannot appear in them. In one of the leaflets we find this little verse by V. Lyubarskiy:

A conditioned brain.
Cleansed of doubt.
At the controls,
A veteran chekist.

One can and should disagree with a large number of publications which, under the cover of the "free from censorship" slogan, carry appeals such as "Anarchy is the mother of order!" or "Our mission is to remove the Mafia mob from power." It is apparent, however, that the "informal" press addresses some sort of readers' interests, which are certainly not criminal but which the editors of the official publications do not get around to. The newspaper *Ekspress-Khronika*, for example has published and continues to publish important information on events in the nation more efficiently than many of our central publications. More efficiently, but... with extreme bias. I believe that the accepting reader will find a far greater range of literature in the "unofficial" press than in the official press, including the miscellany *Blagovest*, the *Vestnik Khristianskoy Demokratii* and a number of other publications. The impression is created that the official editorial boards mistreat their writers far more often and reject more items submitted to them than the samizdat publishers—and that the articles appear "free of censorship."

I would like to dispel the persistent myth that the "informal" press is "unprofessional" and "second-rate." For the most part by far it is extremely professional journalism, which we can sometimes learn from. For example, I never read such brilliantly written articles about the infamous food ration cards as those in the independent, democratic newspaper *Nabat*. The headline alone is worth a lot: "Without a card, you get no lard!"; "Could you remove from the card a piece with a little more meat on it, a classier sausage...?" It was in samizdat literature that a promising new genre, the ecological ditty, was born. It frequently replaces long-winded scientific articles:

Protecting nature is our call
One in three is a member in
The Nature Protection Society
We collect dues from one and all
Beyond that, let the deluge begin

"We can!" said journalist Vadim Mikhaylov in a press release for the *Tambov Memorial*. Indeed, there is no longer any question about the competence of the "informal" press. It exists and is developing, and one can no longer ignore this fact. We need to learn all about this complex process so that, if necessary, we can carry on a competent and well-based discussion. The exhibition presently at the Leningrad library can help....

Findings of State Commission On Chernobyl Discussed

90UN1465A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 16 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Academician I. Lishtvan by BELTA correspondent D. Patyko: "A Conclusion, But No Solution"]

[Text] The State Expert Commission [GEK], formed by USSR Gosplan, has prepared its findings on the State Programs for liquidating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, representing Belorussia, the Ukraine and Russia. A BELTA correspondent met with Belorussian Academy of Sciences vice president, and academician I. Lishtvan, who participated in a discussion of the results of the commission's work.

[Lishtvan] It is difficult to speak briefly about this—answered the scholar—as the findings cover 70 type-written pages, and each point has its own conclusions. On the whole, the attitude towards our program, and to the Ukrainian and the Russian programs, is a critical one. But we will not immediately strike an offended pose. The experts are right in some areas. For example, they feel that the program should first have set a distinct goal, and then proposed the means for its achievement.

[BELTA] As I understand it, the only goal can be the protection of people's health. Is this really not designated in the program?

[Lishtvan] Yes. The evacuation of about 120,000 people is intended. However, the program examines a sort of super-task as well—to bring the economic loss from the accident to a minimum immediately. So take, for example, the payment of compensations, which is considered a normal phenomenon. If people are being paid 15-30 rubles a month for living on contaminated land, it means that this is, all the same, considered harmful. For this reason people reasonably ask us: why pay money if it doesn't improve our health? Wouldn't it be better to spend it on resettlement?

Or this question. Many funds have already been spent on de-activization, including those areas that people found necessary to leave. But with this de-activization are we making the land safe for people? Experience says no. Then for what purpose are new colossal sums of money being invested in these jobs? Wouldn't it be better to leave the stricken land in peace?

[BELTA] Well, you can't question the experts' logic. And how could the people who developed the program, including the scientists, not have seen any of this!

[Lishtvan] Concerning the Belorussian Academy of Sciences scientists, their opinions do not coincide with the opinions of the GEK experts. We expressed these ideas during the adoption of program, as well, but they, unfortunately, were not considered at all. Its conclusion on the impermissibility of accepting as a basis the 35-bar concept, which the country's Ministry of Health and

other departments have insisted upon, and which Belorussian Academy of Sciences scientists have been speaking out against since the very beginning, can be considered a very positive result of the commission's work. This concept, as it is noted in the GEK's findings, "is incorrect and unproved scientifically", and suffers, I would add, from a certain "office flavor". It counts only gamma radiation, although we know that it is impossible to assure people completely pure food products. And besides cesium, our lands are "sown" with strontium and plutonium. There is an awful lot of the lead that was used to "fill" the reactor, and finally, there are nitrates and nitrites which, along with radionuclides, increase the negative effects. For this reason, to rely upon the 35-bar concept means to destroy people.

[BELTA] It has been calculated that the expenses for supporting life in the contaminated regions will be, in the final sum, greater than for resettlement.

[Lishtvan] Correct. When the Americans, who, as we know, are good at counting money, had a similar situation, this question did not even arise. After the accident at the Three Mile Island plant, they evacuated the people immediately, and announced that the land was unsuitable for utilization for a minimum of 100 years. And there the levels of contamination were much lower than ours.

[BELTA] And what about the levels? How much can we trust the published charts?

[Lishtvan] The expert commission also has an authoritative opinion about that. The GEK subjected to its criticism separate data on several regions of the Ukrainian SSR, for which the USSR Hydrometeorology Scientific Research Center [Gidromet SSSR] has been compiling charts. Too much averaging has been allowed. And, you see, geological organizations have very exact instruments that can investigate enormous territories from a plane in a given number of hours. The Belorussian Academy of Sciences, incidentally, has already agreed to organize an experimental investigation of the Volozhinsk Rayon. As soon as the snow descends completely, a survey will be conducted at low altitudes. And so, taking advantage of the situation, I would like to warn the local inhabitants about this.

[BELTA] But isn't this an expensive pleasure?

[Lishtvan] No. The region's farms can manage it easily. The investigation should result in a document agreeing with the USSR Gidromet, according to which the rayon will receive the right to make independent decisions. As far as a similar investigation of the entire republic's territory goes, I think that that would not be worth doing without waiting for centralized financing.

[BELTA] But let's get back to the work of the expert commission. What exactly did it decide?

[Lishtvan] So far, no final decision has been made. We will insist that the program be examined and adopted at the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[BELTA] But the question of financing has to be decided. I don't think that the 17 billion rubles that the republic requires will be available.

[Lishtvan] It isn't 17 billion anymore, but 23, according to new calculations, but we must be prepared for not receiving the entire amount. There are objections to the commission that can still be argued, but there have also been genuine "mines" planted in people's confidence in the program. Several construction jobs have been included in it, which, in the commission's opinion, are indirectly related to the liquidation of the effects of the accident, and should be conducted on the basis of plans for the republic's socio-economic development and for special-purpose programs.

Radioactive Contamination in Leningrad

904A0282A Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA
in Russian 15-31 Mar 90

[Report on interview with Yu.N. Shchukin, chairman of the commission on radiation monitoring, by Lyudmila Raykova, Leningrad: "Safety Is Not Guaranteed"; date and occasion not specified]

[Text] **"Safety is not guaranteed" is what scientists, many of whom aspired to a deputy's seat, declared on the eve of the elections in an appeal to the residents of Leningrad. Anxious residents tried to find out where and what forms of danger they were to be alert to. How do you protect your own from danger and how do you safeguard yourself? Your correspondent addressed all of these questions to Yu. N. Shchukin, chairman of the commission on radiation monitoring. He was the first to sign the appeal.[end bold]**

[Shchukin] The situation in the city is close to critical. Over the last three years, 1,500 locations were found with radioactive contamination. All of them are plotted on a map of the city, but for the people of the city the map remains a secret under lock and key, although I am convinced that any person has a right to such information. That is why we decided to turn to the residents of Leningrad.

So far, of the 1,500 radioactive patches, a little more than 30 have been rendered harmless. The rest have been "preserved," and we are compelled to keep watch so that the "cover" of the preservation is not broken, and this can occur at any moment. Our city is one of the largest nuclear centers in the country. It was here that the first

grams of radium were brought. It was here that work began on splitting the nucleus. And today the entire Primorskaya side, Prospekt Smirnov, in a word the former dumps on the outskirts, have become a residential area of the city. Dangerous wastes are buried under the homes. What is more, we found parts of radio instruments in the most unexpected places: on lawns, in squares, and in dwellings. And three weeks ago we closed three classrooms in a school of the Aleksandrovskaya settlement, Pushkinskiy Rayon. An increased radioactive hum was found there. Decontamination in the school had to be started immediately, but almost a month passed after the closing of the dangerous classrooms. And, today, the city still cannot organize this work skillfully and quickly. Therefore, in emergency situations (and this case is an emergency) we ask the assistance of the professional firm—the Radium Institute imeni V.G. Khlopin. A team of its employees uncovered floors in the school and was compelled to stop. Special preparations and a whole system of measures are needed to eliminate the dangerous deposits. Thus, N.K. Laychukovskiy, deputy chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], for a year did not do anything to set aside a plot of land for the burial of radioactive wastes, and his colleague from the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], V. P. Rogovtsev, did not do anything to create a specialized transport subunit.

A total verification of schools, vocational training schools, technical secondary schools, boarding schools, and children's clubs is going on now in Leningrad. And a lot of instruments were discovered on which there was a permanently active compound (SPD)—luminophore, mixed in a lacquer with salts of radioactive radium.

At present, the danger of the radiation to people is not known; its effect can appear even in the third generation. Radioactive contamination cannot be distinguished either by taste, color, or smell.

I will not go into detail, but, in our opinion, it is necessary to have a fundamental review of the legal concepts of the presence and operation of potentially dangerous and injurious enterprises in the region on the basis of social, economic, and ecological conditions. The city needs a system of permanent monitoring of the radioactive situation. Because today cargo is transported through the streets that is dangerous for the environment and for human health.

Today 200 permanently assigned and a thousand temporary dosimetrists work round the clock just to check on products coming into the city.

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